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ABSTRACT 
Policy legacies and the politics of labour immigration selection and control:  
The processes and dynamics shaping national-level policy decisions during the recent 
wave of international migration 
Christopher Frederick Wright 
The two decades preceding the global financial crisis of 2008 saw an increase in international 
migration flows. This development was accompanied by the relaxation of immigration entry 
controls for select categories of foreign workers across the developed world. The scale of 
labour immigration, and the categories of foreign workers granted entry, varied considerably 
across states. To some extent, these developments transcended the traditional classifications 
of comparative immigration politics. 
This thesis examines the reform process in two states with contrasting policy legacies that 
adopted liberal labour immigration selection and control policies during the abovementioned 
period. The instrumental role that immigration has played in the process of nation-building in 
Australia has led it to be classified as a ‘traditional destination state’ with a positive 
immigration policy legacy. By contrast, immigration has not been significant in the formation 
of national identity in the United Kingdom. It has a more negative immigration policy legacy 
and is generally regarded as a ‘reluctant state’. Examining the reasons for liberal shifts in 
labour immigration policy in two states with different immigration politics allows insights to 
be gained into the processes of policy-making and the dynamics that underpin it. 
In Australia, labour immigration controls were relaxed incrementally and through a 
deliberative process. Reform was justified on the grounds that it fulfilled economic needs and 
objectives, and was consistent with an accepted definition of the national interest. In the UK, 
liberal shifts in labour immigration policy were the incidental consequence of the pursuit of 
objectives in other policy areas. Reform was implemented unilaterally, and in an 
uncoordinated manner characterised by an absence of consultation.  
The contrast in the manner in which reform was managed by the various actors, institutions 
and stakeholders involved in the process both reflected, and served to reinforce, the 
immigration policy legacies of the two states. Moreover, the Howard government used 
Australia’s positive legacy to construct a coherent narrative to justify the implementation of 
liberal reform. This generated greater immediate and lasting support for its reforms among 
stakeholders and the broader community. By contrast, lacking a similarly positive legacy, the 
Blair government in the UK found it difficult to create such a narrative, which contributed to 
the unpopularity of its reforms.  
This thesis therefore argues that policy legacies had a significant impact on the processes and 
dynamics that shaped labour immigration selection and control decisions during the recent 
wave of international migration. The cases demonstrate that a nation’s past immigration 
policy experiences shape its policy-making structures, as well as institutional and stakeholder 
policy preferences, which are core constituent components of a nation’s immigration politics. 
The UK case shows that even when reluctant states implement liberal labour immigration 
policies, these characteristics tend to create feedback effects that make it difficult for reform 
to be durable. The relationship between immigration policy and politics thus becomes self-
reinforcing. But this does not necessarily mean that states’ immigration politics are rigid, 
since the institutions that help to make a nation’s immigration policy and shape its politics 
will inevitably undergo a process of adaptation in response to changing contexts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE RECENT WAVE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE LABOUR 
IMMIGRATION SELECTION AND CONTROL POLICIES OF DEVELOPED STATES 
 
Immigration brings change. This makes it an inherently controversial issue that presents many 
challenges to democratic states. The complexity of immigration and its impact on virtually all 
aspects of public policy gives states a significant interest in controlling migration flows as 
best as they can. The former Australian Prime Minister John Howard once pledged that his 
government – rather than any other institution or entity – would “decide who comes to this 
country and the circumstances in which they come” (quoted in Marr and Wilkinson, 2003: 
245). This is an objective that all democratic governments aspire to meet through their 
immigration control and selection policies. But remarkably little is known about how and why 
governments decide who is allowed to enter their territories and the precise reasons why entry 
is permitted. This thesis provides insight into the processes and dynamics that inform 
government decisions on labour immigration selection and control.  
 
The two decades preceding the financial crisis of 2008 saw an increase in international 
migration flows. This development was accompanied by the relaxation of immigration entry 
controls for select categories of foreign workers across the developed world. Neither trend 
was uniform. The scale of labour immigration, and the categories of foreign workers to which 
states granted entry, varied considerably. To some extent, these developments transcended the 
traditional classifications of comparative immigration politics. A number of states that had 
historically maintained tight immigration controls began to compete for foreign workers with 
states with strong pro-immigration legacies. Temporary work visa programmes were 
increasingly used by states with traditions of permanent immigration.  
 
The regulation of labour immigration control and selection, though often driven by technical 
aspects of economic policy, inevitably seems to arouse sensitivity. As Papademetriou says, 
‘considering that the process is as old as humankind, crucial to human progress, and integral 
to the rise and decline of organised political entities, it is remarkable that virtually no society 
seems capable of managing it particularly effectively’, or at least developing a system of 
regulation with durable popular support (2003: 39). According to Breunig and Luedtke 
‘human migration has become perhaps the most pressing political problématique of the 
twenty-first century’ (2008: 123). 
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Immigration has the capacity to generate political volatility in any era, but particularly during 
one of high salience with respect to national security. The decisions of many nation states to 
selectively relax immigration controls for foreign workers in such a climate may seem a 
puzzling trend. However, it is not so curious when considered against the broader 
globalisation of economic and social activity in recent decades. This is central in explaining 
the recent labour immigration policy trends among developed economies. However, perhaps 
because of the inherent controversy surrounding immigration, the liberalisation of labour 
immigration was not anywhere near as great as the extent to which barriers to trade and 
capital flows were lowered (Facchini and Mayda, 2009: 1; GCIM, 2005: 9-10). 
 
After outlining the research question, this introductory chapter gives an overview of the recent 
wave of international migration and those that preceded it, looking in particular at the 
migration of labour. It then examines the various factors that contributed to the recent 
increase in international labour migration flows. An overview of the characteristics of 
immigration politics across developed states, and their utility in explaining recent labour 
immigration policy developments, follows. The central research question of this thesis is then 
explained more fully. A survey is then provided of the labour immigration selection and 
control policies of Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member 
states between the late 1990s and the global financial crisis of 2008. This discussion forms the 
basis for the selection of two case studies that will be comparatively analysed in later chapters 
to answer the central research question. The methodological approach of this thesis is then 
justified, followed by an overview of the chapter structure. 
 
The scope of inquiry of this thesis 
The central research question of this thesis is:  
 
What was the impact of immigration policy legacies on the processes and dynamics 
that shaped the labour immigration selection and control policies of developed states 
during the wave of migration between the early 1990s and 2008? 
 
For the purposes of present discussion, ‘policy legacies’ is taken to mean the way that past 
immigration experiences shape present policy-making contexts. A body politic’s past 
experience with immigration invariably conditions – but does not necessarily constrain – how 
it responds to future immigration. This is true whether previous immigration is generally 
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regarded as having produced negative, positive or indifferent outcomes. ‘Processes’ refers to 
the mechanisms through which labour immigration policy decisions are made. And 
‘dynamics’ means the actors and institutions involved in these processes, how they interact 
with each other through these processes, and how they interact with labour immigration 
policy, particularly in terms of their institutional preferences and level of interest and 
engagement.  
 
According to Jupp, there is ‘no single “scientific” analysis that is likely to provide a complete 
model for the politics of immigration policy’. Nonetheless, he argues that such an analysis 
needs to encompass various considerations, including the economic rationale behind the 
regulation of immigration, the organised and disorganised interests that seek to influence 
policy decisions, and the extent to which governments engage such interests. The roles of – 
and the relationships between – different national and sub-national governments and 
bureaucratic agencies, comparative international experiences and their influence, and the 
impact of other areas of public policy, also need to be explored (Jupp, 1993: 254-255). 
 
The formulation of labour immigration selection and control policies invariably involves a 
multiplicity of considerations, including the psychological and sociological dynamics behind 
the decisions of individuals to migrate and the subsequent social, economic and 
environmental impacts upon host communities. The literature on immigration tends to be 
dominated by accounts from economics and sociology that suggest (if only implicitly) the 
nation state, and national-level institutions and politics, to be secondary in importance to the 
international market forces and personal networks driving individual decisions to migrate 
(Hollifield et al., 2008: 9-10; cf. Stalker, 2000: 131-137). The importance of these dimensions 
cannot be disregarded and it is necessary for students of immigration policy to understand the 
pressures behind migration flows. But the principal concern of this thesis is to investigate and 
analyse the inputs and considerations behind labour immigration policy-making and, 
importantly, the politics underpinning such decisions. The research question is therefore 
approached from a political science perspective. 
 
This thesis is concerned with transnational migration, not migration within the nation state. 
While transnational migration is evidently influenced by global and international 
developments, the interest here is with policy at the national level. Its focus is on the ‘output’ 
or delivery stage of the policy process, rather than the ‘outcomes’ or post-implementation 
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impact stage (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 16-17; Hollifield, 2000: 146). Studies of 
immigration policy tend to distinguish between the regulation of immigrants’ terms of entry 
(i.e. control) and the regulation of their terms of settlement (i.e. the incorporation of 
immigrants into the host society) (Hammar, 1985: 7-9). While the two are not mutually 
exclusive, the primary concern of this study is with the former. The specific focus is on the 
selection and control of labour immigration: the categories of immigrants permitted entry by 
a nation state for the expressed primary purpose of employment, rather than on other grounds, 
such as family or humanitarian reasons. That said, there is overlap between these categories 
and it is common for immigrants entering on non-labour visas to be afforded the right to work 
(IOM, 2008: 167).  
 
Among the numerous studies undertaken on the politics of immigration policy and its sub-
components, remarkably few have systematically unpacked the ‘black box’ of policy-making 
(cf. James, 1997: 13-14). Some notable historical studies have undertaken detailed 
explorations of the reasons for immigration policy change during significant periods of reform 
(cf. Hansen, 2000). Political biographies also shed light on the reasons for why certain 
decisions were made (cf. Blunkett, 2006; Pollard, 2005). But there has been little empirical 
investigation of the decision-making process behind individual policies, particularly in 
relation to labour immigration. While there are some recent exceptions to this (cf. Menz, 
2009; Somerville, 2007; Spencer, 2006), ‘our knowledge of private sector groups that 
routinely participate in the policy process, the bureaucratic agencies that formulate and 
administer policy, and the issues involved in specific visa programmes is extremely thin’, as 
Freeman says (2006: 242).  
 
One possible reason for this is the weak epistemic foundations upon which immigration 
policy is often made (Geddes, 2005a: 726). It may be the case that policy-makers lack 
confidence in the strength or popularity of their decisions, and are thus reluctant to assist 
efforts to investigate the underlying processes. Another possibility is that the overlap with 
other policy areas makes it difficult to discern a neat labour immigration ‘policy network’, 
that is, an institutionalised pattern of interaction between interested actors and institutions 
within and outside of government in the making and administration of policy (Richards and 
Smith, 2002: 175-178; cf. Bressers and O’Toole, 1998: 218; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). 
Moreover, the ‘policy venues’ where networks interact in the making of labour immigration 
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policy may be more likely to shift, because of its complicated and multidimensional policy 
image (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 31-32).  
 
This thesis scrutinises these processes through an investigation of recent labour immigration 
policy reform against the backdrop of the increase in international migration between the 
early 1990s and 2008. Its focus is on why and how labour immigration policy change occurred 
with respect to two case studies. That is, it looks at both the reasons for reform and the 
manner in which reform occurred. This is intended to shed light on the dilemmas and 
complexities associated with labour immigration selection and control policy and its 
formulation. 
 
The recent wave of international migration and its antecedents 
International migration flows doubled in the quarter century preceding the global financial 
crisis of 2008. The stock of immigrants across all nation states increased from 99.8 million to 
195.2 million and those in developed states escalated from 47.7 million to 117.2 million 
between 1980 and 2005 (Martin, P. 2005: 9; United Nations, 2009). The immigration flows 
across virtually all developed economies were net positive and increasing by the mid 2000s 
(Freeman, 2006: 228; Münz, 2008: 4-5; Nickell, 2007: 15). With respect to international 
labour migration, there was marked increase in the inflows of foreign workers to most OECD 
member states between 1995 and 2007 (see Figure 1.1). There is some debate over the 
magnitude of these developments. Some claim that this recent wave was of an unprecedented 
scale (Markus et al., 2009: 21; Martin, J. 2008: 3), while others assert that the international 
migration flows of the early twentieth century were larger in relative terms (O’Rourke, 2002: 
72-73; Productivity Commission, 2006: 6).  
 
Migration is a process as old as human existence. It is possible to draw parallels between 
recent trends with those of earlier periods during the modern era. A series of migration waves 
from Europe to the ‘new world’ accompanied the growth of mercantilism and the 
establishment of colonies in the Americas, Asia, Africa and Oceania between the sixteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The nature of these large-scale movements varied across time and 
place. ‘Coercion and contracts were the chief means through which the New World recruited 
its labour force during this period’, according to Chiswick and Hatton (2002: 2). But while 
many were sent as convicts, indentured labourers or slaves to work on colonial plantations, 
many others migrated as agrarian settlers (Massey, 2003: 1). 
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Figure 1.1 Inflows of foreign workers into various OECD states, 1995 to 2007 (selected 
years) 
 
Note: The omission of other OECD member states is due to incomplete data sets for the relevant period 
Source: OECD (2003): 310; OECD (2007): 372; OECD (2009) International Migration Data 2009, Table A.2.1 
 
From the nineteenth century, free migrants began to significantly outnumber those moving 
under duress, a development that coincided with the abolition of the slave trade and the 
curtailment of convict migration. However, industrialisation was largely responsible for the 
huge growth in free migration from Europe, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century 
and continuing until the First World War. The United States was a prime destination, though 
many migrants went to other ‘settler societies’ that were seeking to attract more people in 
order to facilitate economic and population expansion, such as Argentina, Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand (Massey, 2003: 2-3). Cheaper transport and lower trade barriers generated a 
self-perpetuating cycle of increased migration. These land-rich societies gave incentives for 
people to move. This brought increased investment in their primary industries, which helped 
to develop their burgeoning manufacturing industries. More immigrants were later attracted to 
the opportunities afforded by industrial expansion (IOM, 2008: 25). Escape from famine and 
political upheaval was the main motivation for many of those emigrating at the beginning of 
this wave, but this later gave way to a movement more akin to ‘economic migration’. 
Advancements in ocean transportation made it increasingly easy for Europeans seeking to 
improve their lot in these ‘lands of opportunity’. While not on the same scale, there were also 
significant movements of people for employment-related purposes from Europe to South and 
East Africa and within both Europe and Asia. 
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After a large decline in international migration during the inter-war years, the three decades 
after the Second World War saw the advent of another wave of migration. Many people 
moved from Europe to the settler societies in the aftermath of the war. Foreign workers were 
recruited en masse to North America and the antipodes, and later in Western Europe, to fill 
labour shortages accompanying the post-war boom. Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom engaged workers from their former colonies or overseas territories. When 
these sources were depleted, or where colonial relationships did not exist, temporary or 
‘guestworker’ schemes were established. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany engaged foreign nationals (usually 
through bilateral agreements with various states) through these schemes on the basis that they 
would return home if labour demand contracted. Southern Europe remained a major source of 
migration for much of this period, although a number of states in this region encouraged 
labour immigration from the late 1960s. So too did several oil-producing states in the Persian 
Gulf, which required greater numbers of foreign workers to facilitate economic expansion, 
particularly after an escalation in their oil revenues in the 1970s (Chiswick and Hatton, 2002: 
2-12; Hansen, 2003: 25-26; Massey, 2003: 1-4). 
 
Accounting for the recent wave of international migration 
Many factors contributed to the upsurge of international people movement during the waves 
discussed above. However, Meyers claims that most significant pressure that has commonly 
led states to lower their barriers to foreign nationals has been ‘global economic cycles, 
produced by international economic interdependence’, and resultant increases in demand for 
labour (2002: 131-132). Economic growth and the internationalisation of market activity – in 
areas such as trade and capital flows – were common ingredients of the wave of international 
migration between the early 1990s and 2008 and those preceding it. Indeed, according to the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the most recent wave of international 
migration was ‘largely’ the cause of the acceleration of ‘the processes of economic and social 
integration that are collectively known as globalisation’ (2008: 2). The following chapters 
look at how this recent wave and the accompanying relaxation of labour immigration controls 
were mediated through national-level policy processes. It is important, however, to recognise 
that these do not exclude the operation of a multitude of underlying international pressures 
(Castles, S. 2004: 864; Freeman, 1992: 1145).  Because of the clear connection with labour 
market dynamics, it is helpful to think of these pressures in terms of a market-based 
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distinction between demand-side pressures (largely coming from within national labour 
markets) and supply-side pressures (largely coming from outside).1 
 
Demographic change was a significant demand-side pressure for the relaxation of labour 
immigration controls during the most recent wave of international migration. Fertility rates 
were in decline and life expectancy was rising in many developed states. These trends led to 
proportionate declines of people in paid employment, contributing to labour shortages, lower 
taxation revenue and the growth of forecast age dependency ratios (that is, the relative 
number of retirees dependent on state support) (Boswell, 2003: 34-35; Papademetriou, 2003: 
49). These trends were more problematic for some states than others and were widely 
predicted to exacerbate across the OECD in coming decades. In response, many states sought 
to increase their intake of younger, high-skilled immigrants (so desired because as higher 
income earners they are more likely to spend more and pay more income tax) as a measure to 
offset labour shortages and fiscal decline.  
 
Of course, the relaxation of immigration controls was not a panacea to population ageing, as 
young immigrants inevitably grow old and eventually require state support. But it had greater 
immediate impact and was perhaps politically easier2 than alternative policy measures 
designed to increase the relative sizes of their labour forces, including encouraging higher 
fertility rates, raising retirement ages, encouraging working-age residents not in paid 
employment back into work, reforming state pensions, and raising worker productivity. 
However, many states pursued these alternatives alongside immigration reform (Bongaarts, 
2004: 14-18; Markus et al., 2009: 22-26). 
 
A second demand-side pressure came from the expansion of new industries, most notably 
those associated with information and communications technology (ICT). By the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, ICT and associated ‘knowledge’ industries had become a major 
area of economic activity in all developed economies. Their growth also contributed to 
                                                
1 Much of the literature categorises these pressures into ‘push’ factors, that propel people to migrate from 
sending nations, and ‘pull’ factors, that entice them towards particular receiving nations. A distinction has also 
been made between ‘causal’ factors, that arise out of complex interactions between socio-economic variables, 
and ‘enabling’ factors, that prompt or facilitate decisions to migrate, such as major political and technological 
changes (cf. Chiswick and Hatton, 2002: 13; IOM, 2008: 3). 
2 Or at least easier in the short-term, and so long as policy-makers could successfully depoliticise high-skilled 
immigration as a ‘technical’ issue (cf. Favell, 2009: 176-177). 
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revolutionary changes in many other industries and professions, particularly through the 
computerisation of production processes. This led to high demand for ICT and related skills in 
many states. The growth of new technologies also helped to internationalise production 
processes and supply chains. At the same time, a breakdown of national trade barriers spurred 
an increase of foreign-owned companies with transnational workforces and flexible labour 
requirements. Furthermore, the growth of international recruitment agencies and labour hire 
companies, together with the proliferation of global communication, broke down barriers 
between supply and demand across the international labour market (IOM, 2008: 56). The 
widespread removal of controls on foreign capital across the OECD led to a growth in capital 
markets and increased demand for financial services, which contributed to burgeoning 
international financial centres. Governments eager to attract foreign investment became more 
willing to accommodate demands for greater labour flexibility by, for example, allowing 
companies to transfer managerial, professional and technical personnel within their 
transnational operations. These factors acted as a further demand-side pressure on labour 
immigration policy across developed states (Abella, 2006: 11; Boswell, 2003: 30-32; Khoo et 
al., 2007: 481-482).  
 
The rapidly growing demand for newly established ICT and financial service occupations 
made it difficult to regulate professional standards at a national level, but allowed workers to 
easily transfer their skills across borders (compared with more established professions such as 
medicine and nursing) (Iredale, 2002: 144-145). Professionals in these areas were in relatively 
constant demand across the OECD and demand often far exceeded supply, which resulted in 
‘a global competition for talent’, according to the IOM (2008: 38). States commonly sought to 
poach such workers from abroad through various incentives such as looser visa restrictions 
(Productivity Commission, 2006: 10).3  
 
The growth of international education was a related development. Many developed states 
enticed foreign nationals to undertake tertiary-level courses, particularly for high-demand 
professional qualifications. The number of international tertiary students studying abroad 
                                                
3 The widespread demand for skilled ICT specialists in the late 1990s exemplified the global competition for 
talent. The US government’s decision to raise its quota for temporary skilled visas in response to the ICT boom 
attracted many skilled workers from across the globe. This led to an exodus of ICT professionals in many 
developed economies at a time of increased domestic demand for workers with such skills. These developments 
generated large labour shortages, which in turn became a catalyst for the relaxation of skilled visa restrictions in 
a number of states (Favell and Hansen, 2002: 591; Iredale, 2002: 145). 
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tripled between 1984 and 2004 (IOM, 2008: 105-106). Relaxing work visa controls for 
foreign graduates gave states the ‘first pick’ in the global competition for talent. It also 
facilitated a major increase in revenue for many national education industries. Furthermore, 
allowing students to work while studying provided an additional short-term labour supply 
(Chaloff and Lemaitre, 2009: 24-26; Kuptsch, 2006: 39-50; OECD, 2002a: 5). 
 
These developments had implications for the lower skilled end of the labour market. Steady 
economic growth and rising education and income levels contributed to a ‘vacuum effect’ in 
many developed states (Rudolph, 2003: 603). As more resident workers moved into emerging 
industries and professions, fewer were willing to undertake menial occupations. This resulted 
in structural lower-skilled labour shortages, particularly in lower-paid and arduous jobs in 
seasonal industries and those subject to market fluctuation, such as agriculture, hospitality and 
construction (Boswell, 2003: 33; IOM, 2008: 39). Entrenched demand for lower-skilled 
workers effectively created supply-side pressures on labour immigration control policies. 
Many people from less developed states were attracted to the prospect of better opportunities 
than those offered in their homelands, but the availability of lower skilled visas was generally 
limited. This contributed to an increase in irregular and clandestine migration and people 
falsely claiming asylum, which eroded the capacity of receiving states to control their borders. 
While consolidating border controls and dismantling people-trafficking networks were 
common responses to increased migration pressures, a number of states also tried to reduce 
irregular entry by relaxing controls for lower-skilled foreign workers (Boswell, 2003: 35-36).  
 
Numerous other factors underpinned the growing supply of international labour migration. 
First, various major political developments triggered large emigration flows (IOM, 2008: 3; 
Papademetriou, 2003: 40). In particular, a number of communist and socialist states lifted 
their restrictions on emigration in the late 1980s. The end of the Cold War further accelerated 
outward migration from these states. China’s increased international engagement likewise 
removed constraints on the movement of many millions (Massey, 2003: 19-20; Meissner, 
1992: 66). Wars and conflict in the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans in the 1990s and 
2000s led large numbers of people to seek entry to developed states (Bauer et al., 2000: 4-5; 
Hollifield, 2004: 898-900). Second, technological progress contributed to increased 
international migration. Advancements in media communication created greater awareness of 
the opportunities available abroad. And an expanding and increasingly competitive 
international airline industry served to reduce transportation costs and helped facilitate 
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aspirations for migration (ILO, 2004: 96). Third, there was an increase of chain migration 
through growing diasporas and networks of friends and relatives in receiving states. This 
reduced risks and potentially lowered costs, particularly those associated with settlement, thus 
removing barriers to individual decisions to migrate. While chain migration is not specific to 
the contemporary era, the perpetual growth of migrants in virtually all developed states since 
the end of the Second World War made this pressure increasingly relevant. It largely accounts 
for the persistent and path dependent nature of specific migration streams between sending 
and receiving states (Castles, S. 2000: 272; Hansen, 2002: 270-272). 
 
Categorising the immigration politics of developed states 
The impact of internationalised pressures in supply and demand was more evident in some 
states than others. The trend towards more liberal labour immigration regulations nevertheless 
transcended traditional comparative distinctions. Scholars categorise the immigration policies 
and politics of developed states into three broad models. First, traditional destination states, 
which used consistently large immigration intakes to increase the size of their populations. 
This helped to build a culture of tolerance that became institutionalised in these states’ 
immigration politics. Second, reluctant immigration states, which allowed reasonably large 
immigration inflows during certain epochs, but are often ingrained in their scepticism towards 
immigration. The tendency of immigration to challenge the strong sense of cultural 
homogeneity present in many of these states contributes to these reservations. And third, 
recent immigration states, which were once more closely associated with emigration, but have 
recently become net receivers of migration. These states nevertheless share many of the 
institutionalised characteristics of their immigration politics with the reluctant states (Bauer et 
al., 2000: 1-6; Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004: 24-39; Freeman, 1995a: 881-882; Messina, 2009: 
2). 
 
Traditional destination states 
‘All countries are, in the long sweep of history, nations of immigrants’, according to Harris, 
but this is most apparent among the traditional destination states, namely Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States (1993: 23). These states are all products of mass 
colonisation or settlement. Immigration was used as a major and successful instrument in their 
establishment, and later in the expansion and development of their populations and 
economies. Successive waves of immigration (of increasingly diverse national origins, 
particularly after the Second World War) resulted in high proportions of residents being 
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immigrants or the immediate descendents of immigrants. Immigrant assimilation in these 
states has often been engendered through the official promotion of permanent settlement, the 
celebration of diverse ethnic heritage and the relative ease of citizenship attainment based on 
shared values and civic participation. The annual quota-based programmes that often 
accompany these policies serve to ‘make immigration a routine and permanent feature of the 
nation’s life’, according to Freeman (2005: 231).   
 
Largely owing to these positive associations, immigration is acknowledged by each traditional 
destination state to be central to its collective identity and social fabric. Sustained institutional 
and cross-party support for large and steady immigration intakes in recent decades is another 
common feature. Although not universally popular and occasionally an issue of social and 
political division, immigration is generally more welcomed – or at least tolerated – by a 
greater proportion of the population in these states than elsewhere, and the conflicts that do 
arise tend to be relatively less severe. Underpinning this acceptance is the existence of long-
established bureaucracies with experience of managing new arrivals and their economic and 
social impact, which helps to cushion the political effects of immigration. The presence of 
organised interest groups is another institutionalised feature, particularly those representing 
business groups and migrant communities, which routinely press governments for expansive 
immigration intakes (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004: 24; Freeman, 1995a: 887-889; 2006: 228). 
 
Reluctant immigration states 
The states of Western and Northern Europe fall into the category of reluctant immigration 
states. Immigration has formed an important part of the modern history of many of these 
states, but few are keen to celebrate its contribution (cf. Geddes, 2006: 616). Most reluctant 
states first experienced mass immigration in a post-development context, when their 
economies were already industrialised and their collective identities more rigidly formed. As 
such, the role of immigration in nation building or national identity formation is not as 
apparent as in the traditional destination states. When immigration is officially encouraged in 
these states, it is generally considered an exceptional rather than routine development 
(Coleman, 2002: 47). Temporary entry is preferred over permanent settlement and there are 
greater barriers to immigrant incorporation within settlement and citizenship policies (Martin, 
P. 2003a: 3).  
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The immigration politics of the reluctant states are characterised by conflict and volatility. 
Majority public opinion is depicted as sceptical of governments’ capacity to control borders 
or manage immigration in the national interest. The social changes brought by immigration 
are often resented. Political parties tend to be ambivalent or opportunist in their treatment of 
immigration and any institutionalised support, such as in the form of organised interests 
advocating expansive policies or established bureaucracies to manage the impact of 
immigration, is generally weak (Bauer et al., 2000: 1-2; Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004: 28; 
Freeman, 1995a: 890-892). 
 
Recent immigration states  
Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, the Republic of Korea and Spain are examples of recent 
immigration states. A number of these states were major sources of emigration until the 1970s 
and only became predominantly receiving states from the 1980s (Penninx, 1986: 957-960). In 
terms of their immigration politics, the recent immigration states share many of the 
institutional hallmarks of the reluctant immigration states. Pro-immigration lobbies and 
bureaucratic mechanisms for planning and managing immigration tend to be fragile. These 
states generally do not see themselves as ‘nations of immigrants’, nor celebrate their 
immigration histories. This can be explained by the relatively low proportion of foreign 
nationals, but is perhaps also due to more defined national identities and stronger cultural and 
ethnic homogeneity in these states. In any case, weak settlement policies and restrictive 
naturalisation policies do little to encourage the incorporation of immigrants into the new 
immigration states, an ambivalence that is reflected in the measures of public opinion 
(Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004: 32-33; Freeman, 1995a: 893-894; 2004c: 961). 
 
Traditional destination states versus reluctant states 
Traditional destination states, in which immigration has been seminal to the development of 
nationhood and collective identity, can be distinguished from reluctant immigration states and 
recent immigration states, in which immigration is not acknowledged as playing such a role. 
Indeed, as Morjé Howard says, states in the latter two categories ‘have been very conflicted 
about having immigrants in their midst’ (2007: 237). They tend to see immigration as ‘a 
fundamental threat to national unity’, in the words of Meissner (1992: 70-71), or at least as a 
challenge to their ‘territorial, organisational and conceptual boundaries; to their ways of 
thinking about themselves and others’, according to Geddes (2003: 4). Because the reluctant 
immigration states and new immigration states share these attributes, for the purposes of the 
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present discussion they will be treated as one category and hereafter referred to as reluctant 
states.4 
 
Even if we accept these two comparative models to be generally applicable, variation exists 
within each category (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004: 16). While permanent immigration 
programmes are a common trait among the traditional destination states, temporary work visa 
schemes have existed in Canada and New Zealand since the 1970s (Ongley and Pearson, 
1995: 777-779), and the United States maintained a low-skilled guestworker programme from 
1942 to 1964 (Chiswick and Hatton, 2002: 34). Organised interests have tended to have much 
more influence over immigration policy in the United States than elsewhere (Parkin and 
Hardcastle, 1993: 51-54). Immigrant incorporation policy also differs in the US, where the 
onus is placed on families and employers (and labour market regulations that make it 
relatively easy to find work) to facilitate the process of immigrant integration. By contrast, 
government-supported settlement programmes are the norm among other traditional 
destination states (Martin S., 2003: 147). 
 
The tendency of reluctant states to pose barriers to immigrant incorporation seems to be borne 
out with respect to Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Switzerland. However, easier access 
to citizenship and a greater openness to multiculturalism have been observed in Sweden and 
the Netherlands. These states, along with France and the United Kingdom, have also posed 
fewer barriers to family reunion migration (Castles and Miller, 2003: 249-253; Freeman, 
2004c: 961; Schierup et al., 2006: 26).5 
 
These details aside, a number of fundamental differences existed between the immigration 
policies and politics of traditional destination and reluctant states prior to the 1990s. While 
immigration’s role in the formation of national identity can help to explain this, developments 
after the global economic downturn of 1973-74 reinforced these differences. The traditional 
destination states continued to encourage labour immigration on a relatively consistent scale 
                                                
4 Cornelius and Rosenblum have redrawn the original three-pronged comparative classifications along the same 
lines over the willingness of traditional destination states to accept immigrants on a permanent basis against 
reluctance of European and East Asian states to do so (2005: 110). 
5 The existence of larger minority populations among reluctant states that were formerly imperial powers 
gradually shaped popular attitudes, according to Hix and Noury. They claim that these states are therefore 
generally more liberal in their acceptance and treatment of immigrants than those without colonial histories 
(2007: 186; but see Breunig and Luedtke, 2008: 130). 
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over the following two decades (Ongley and Pearson, 1995: 787; Tichenor, 1994: 357-358). 
By contrast, the economic downturn precipitated a virtual cessation of labour immigration 
among the reluctant states until the 1990s.  
 
In Western European states, this occurred in part because of the unintended consequences of 
post-war labour immigration programmes. In the short-term, these programmes largely 
delivered the outcomes that they were designed to achieve. Short supplies of labour and the 
existence of labour market bottlenecks and rigidities had arisen during the post-war economic 
boom. In this context, the engagement of large numbers of foreign workers by employers 
across Western Europe (often with official encouragement from their governments) acted as a 
buffer against inflation. Increased immigration efficiently filled job vacancies without 
significant wage rises and thereby allowed a sustainable rate of economic growth (Hollifield, 
1992: 50-51; Messina, 2007: 20-21; Zolberg, 1989: 407-408). Seen in this context, ‘recruiting 
workers in a labour-surplus country to work temporarily in a labour-short country seemed to 
make eminent economic and political sense’, according to Philip Martin, and this remained 
the case until economic conditions deteriorated in the early 1970s (2003b: 11). 
 
These initially positive evaluations shifted when governments realised that the foreign 
workers would not necessarily leave as soon as labour demand diminished. While the 
economic downturn prompted Western European governments to end their labour 
immigration schemes, a large number of labour immigrants living in these states opted to stay. 
Despite their entry being supposedly contingent on returning home, legal decisions allowed 
foreign workers to settle and be joined by immediate family members. This development 
instigated a subsequent wave of family immigration (Castles, S. 2006: 743; Messina, 2007: 1-
2).  
 
With migrant populations increasing and economic conditions failing to improve, 
immigration became a volatile issue across Europe through the 1970s and 1980s. Fringe or 
opportunistic mainstream political parties in a number of states manipulated growing anti-
immigration sentiment (Boswell, 2003: 3; Fassmann and Münz, 1992: 461; Hansen, 2003: 26, 
31).6 A surge in predominantly asylum-seeking migration compounded these issues, 
                                                
6 Admittedly, government efforts to stem immigration flows were also thwarted by the courts in traditional 
destination states such as Australia and the United States. This generated political pressure for more immigration 
control, but perhaps not to the extent evident in the reluctant states (Hollifield, 2004: 896-897). 
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following the collapse of communist and socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe and 
conflict in the Balkans. Asylum seekers had been largely welcomed in the political context of 
the Cold War. But public attitudes turned sour in Western Europe due to the magnitude of the 
increase (from 118,000 in 1981 to 695,000 in 1992) and perceptions that many were 
‘economic migrants’ using asylum as a pretext. Only a fraction of those applying for asylum 
were accepted, but lengthy appeal processes and barriers to deportation allowed many to 
remain nonetheless (Geddes, 2003: 18; Martin, P. 2003b: 11-13; Schierup et al., 2006: 31-32).  
These developments shaped the immigration politics of reluctant states and significantly 
diminished their enthusiasm for further dalliances with labour immigration. With the capacity 
of states to limit family and humanitarian immigration often constrained, many adopted ‘zero 
immigration’ positions. Foreign workers intakes consequently diminished (Givens and 
Luedtke, 2005: 4-5).  
 
The economic downturn of the early 1970s compounded differences between traditional 
destination and reluctant states and precipitated contrasting policy trends thereafter. However, 
there are a number of reasons why it should not be interpreted as a ‘critical juncture’ (cf. 
Thelen, 1999: 388-392) in shaping their respective politics. First, a number of states in the 
latter category (namely those regarded as new immigration states) possess similar ingrained 
reservations towards immigration without having experienced mass post-war labour 
immigration. Second, divergent policy paths could not be solely attributed to varying labour 
market requirements, since the two decades after 1973 were pockmarked by recession for 
states in both categories. Third, different philosophies about the role of labour immigration 
were also at play. A belief that a certain level of labour immigration (and immigration more 
generally) should be encouraged irrespective of short-term labour market needs shaped 
policies in a number of the traditional destination states.7  
 
The reluctant states also overlooked immigration as a solution to labour shortages, but 
reached different conclusions. Following increased labour demand in the late 1980s, policy-
makers in several Western European states refuted calls for the relaxation of labour 
immigration controls on the grounds that such a move would generate longer-term social and 
economic costs (Hammar, 1989: 631). The existence of stronger social security systems 
                                                
7 For instance, New Zealand and Australian governments between the mid and late 1980s held that immigration 
would fuel longer-term economic growth through increased investment and consumption (Ongley and Pearson, 
1995: 787) 
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perhaps gave many reluctant states relatively less capacity than traditional destination states to 
accept and absorb newcomers (Hammar, 1989: 633-634; cf. Martin and Houstoun, 1982: 37-
38). 8 But the residual impact of post-war labour immigration may have also influenced these 
views (Messina, 2007: 20). The growth of secondary immigration out of the post-war labour 
immigration schemes contributed to the development of a ‘sceptical and overwhelmingly 
negative view’ towards immigration, according to Hammar (1989: 632-633). While not 
creating negative immigration policy legacies among reluctant states, the episode nonetheless 
helped to consolidate them. 
 
Explaining the central research question 
The tensions and dilemmas associated with immigration policy are found to varying degrees 
across all developed states. However, they appear to be relatively weaker among traditional 
destination states, where previous experience with immigration has helped to build a ‘positive 
folklore’ that generates greater receptivity towards new immigration, according to Freeman 
(1995a: 887; cf. Breunig and Luedtke, 2008: 130-131). Schmidt’s research on political 
discourse suggests that policy reform can be implemented more easily if it is readily 
compatible with a state’s policy legacies (2002: 65-66). Nonetheless, various signs suggested 
that the differences between the traditional destination and reluctant states blurred during the 
recent wave of international migration. As the United Nations Secretary General remarked in 
2006, ‘more countries are now significantly involved in, and affected by, international 
migration than at any time in history. And they are no longer so easily divided into “countries 
of origin” and “countries of destination”. Many are now both’ (Annan, 2006: 964).  
 
On the issue of labour immigration selection and control, the distinction between the two 
categories began to erode in late 1990s (IOM, 2008: 51). However, there was no definitive 
convergence towards one particular policy model. On one hand, both traditional destination 
and reluctant states adopted policies aimed at attracting foreign professionals and high-skilled 
workers, a liberal development identified more with the former. On the other hand, traditional 
destination states widely adopted temporary labour immigration programmes more commonly 
                                                
8 At a glance, the fiscal impact of post-1973 immigration indeed appears to have been more negative in the 
reluctant states, but more generous welfare provision many not have been the only reason for this. It appears that 
differences in immigration selection policy were also a factor. Philip Martin says that while the employment 
levels of foreign nationals in Germany declined from roughly two-thirds to one-third from 1972 to 1995, this 
perhaps unsurprising since the vast bulk of immigration during this period was non-labour immigration (2003b: 
11-12). Employment outcomes tended to be better in the traditional destination states, which Bauer and 
colleagues attribute to the greater use of skills and human capital selection criteria (2000: 14). 
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associated with the reluctant states. A central objective of this thesis is to assess the extent to 
which the recent changes in labour immigration selection and control transcended the 
orthodox comparative distinctions not only in terms of policy, but also in the institutionalised 
processes and dynamics underpinning the making of policy.  
 
This thesis accepts Freeman’s claim that ‘immigration politics takes distinct forms in 
countries with dissimilar immigration traditions’ (2006: 228). He argues that national 
differences in policies, community attitudes and the dispositions of actors and institutions are 
products of a nation’s historical experience with immigration. Thus, different policy legacies 
are what account for variations in the immigration politics of traditional destination and 
reluctant states (Freeman, 1995a: 881; 1995b: 909). This thesis also accepts Boswell’s 
argument that the prevailing ‘ideologies of immigration’ within a state, defined as ‘patterns of 
political and social thought which shape thinking’, will ‘delimit the range of legitimate and 
feasible responses to migration’ (2003: 6).  
 
This thesis argues that these two notions are complementary: a state’s policy legacy will be a 
key factor shaping its dominant ideologies of immigration, which together shape its 
immigration politics. However, a tension exists between Boswell and Freeman’s arguments, 
owing largely to differing assumptions. Boswell claims that ideologies of immigration are not 
necessarily rigid, but rather may shift in response to changing events or contests between 
actors and institutions holding different ideologies (Boswell et al., 2005: 39). Freeman, 
however, claims that immigration politics have a residual impact and will not be altered by 
changes in a state’s immigration policy. In other words, just because a state pursues changes 
to immigration policy in a manner inconsistent with its immigration politics, this will not 
necessarily imply a change in those politics. Rather, ‘distinct modes are likely to persist’ 
(Freeman, 1995a: 896). Examining the reasons for the liberal shifts in labour immigration 
selection and control policy in both traditional destination and reluctant states will shed light 
on whether immigration politics are rigid or flexible. This thesis assesses the extent to which 
reluctant states that relaxed labour immigration controls moved closer to the traditional 
destination state model of immigration politics. It also looks at whether this model remained 
resilient among traditional destination states departing from their commitment to permanent 
settlement.  
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In investigating the policy-making processes and dynamics underpinning reform, this thesis 
pays particular attention to: the roles played by key state actors such as political elites, the 
relevant ministries and divisions of the executive branch and other relevant government 
institutions; the roles played by organised interests and relevant stakeholders; the influence of 
popular attitudes, electoral considerations, ‘focusing events’ (cf. Birkland, 1998: 53-55) and 
the channels through which these factors are conveyed and mediated (such as the media); and 
the influence of related arenas of public policy (such as macroeconomic, labour market, 
welfare and security policies). It questions the degree to which labour immigration reform 
impacts upon these processes and the roles and behaviour of stakeholders and other possible 
agents of influence. It thereby examines whether labour immigration politics shapes policy 
and whether policy change in turn shapes politics.  
 
This thesis explores this interplay by looking at how similar labour immigration policy 
developments unfolded in, and were shaped by the politics of, states with different legacies. It 
thus tests a core premise of historical institutionalists that, in the words of Pierson and 
Skocpol, ‘once established, patterns of political mobilisation, the institutional “rules of the 
game”, and even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often generate 
self-reinforcing dynamics’ (2000: 6-7; cf. Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942). 
 
Case study selection 
The following discussion provides a brief overview of the labour immigration policy 
developments in the largest traditional destination and reluctant states during the recent wave 
of international migration. This discussion forms the basis for the case study selection. In 
order to select suitable cases for comparison, smaller and newly developed states are not 
considered. 
 
Traditional destination states 
From the late 1990s onwards, many of the traditional destination states oversaw rather 
dramatic relaxations in their mechanisms for selecting labour immigrants. Among the main 
states in this category, Australia undertook the most notable reform of its labour immigration 
controls. Since the 1970s, Australian governments had focused on attracting permanent 
immigration with a balance between family and labour categories. This began to change in the 
late 1990s, when government policy shifted decisively in favour of the latter. Permanent 
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labour immigration steadily increased over the following decade and small temporary work 
visa programmes were markedly expanded (Phillips, 2006; 2007).  
 
Labour immigration policy followed a similar trajectory in Canada. Various policy changes 
were made in the first half of the 2000s. These reforms were designed to attract young, highly 
skilled applicants and foreign students wishing to transfer to work visas, alongside the 
relaxation of other temporary and permanent labour immigration controls (OECD, 2007: 238; 
Reitz, 2004: 106-107). However, the Canadian policy adjustments did not go as far as those in 
Australia and gave relatively greater priority to social and settlement criteria in immigration 
selection (Bouchard and Wake Carroll, 2008: 248-252; Richardson and Lester, 2004: 17-19). 
 
Since the mid-1960s, US immigration policy controls had been more heavily weighted to 
family over labour categories, although admissions in the latter remained high in absolute 
terms. The Immigration Act 1990 doubled the annual quotas for work and business visas, but 
there were few subsequent relaxations of labour immigration controls. A notable exception 
was the brief expansion of temporary work visas in the early 2000s, a reform that was later 
wound back (Kahn, 2004: 506; Martin, P. 2004a: 56-58). The US therefore represents an 
anomalous case to the trend towards liberalisation among the main traditional destination 
states. 
 
Reluctant states 
There was considerable variation in the labour immigration reforms implemented among the 
main reluctant states. Some states oversaw only minor policy change. For instance, Japan 
implemented policies broadening the scope of highly skilled and professional temporary work 
visas. There was no official allowance of low-skilled immigration, although the opening of 
various ‘side-doors’, through expanded trainee and entertainer visa schemes, fed an increase 
in unauthorised foreign workers (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004: 449-454). France introduced 
policies permitting temporary high-skilled immigration, as well as seasonal lower skilled 
guestworkers, although on a rather limited scale (OECD, 2007: 246). Germany introduced 
several seasonal lower-skilled programmes during the 1990s, a green card scheme for high-
skilled ICT workers in 2000, and a more inclusive high-skilled visa programme in 2004 
(Martin, P. 2004b: 239-241; OECD, 2002b: 183; 2004: 198-199).
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The Netherlands produced more considerable policy change. Its governments introduced 
several reforms to the work permit system between the late 1990s and the mid 2000s that 
made it easier for skilled and professional foreigners to work (Muus, 2004: 270). It also 
partially opened its labour markets to nationals from the new European Union (EU) member 
states after the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 (OECD, 2006: 200; 2007: 268), as did Spain 
and Italy. The numbers of immigrants working in Spain sizeably escalated from the mid 
1990s, but this was largely due to a series of regularisations (one of which, in 2005, officially 
increased the immigrant population by 30 per cent) (IOM, 2005: 147; OECD, 2006: 204). The 
number of work permits issued remained relatively constant and large numbers of 
unauthorised immigrants were engaged in areas of structural shortage, such as domestic work 
and agriculture (Cornelius, 2004: 400-403). Italy also had large numbers of unauthorised 
foreigners working in informal sectors (Calavita, 2004: 353-354). While the legal channels for 
labour immigration remained tight in Italy, there were minor relaxations of low-skilled 
immigration controls in the late 1990s, and an expansion of work permit quotas in 2006 
(OECD, 2002b: 203; 2007: 256). 
 
Among the main reluctant states, the most significant relaxation of labour immigration 
controls occurred in the United Kingdom. It was alone among the large member states to 
immediately open its labour market when the EU expanded in 2004, which resulted in almost 
500,000 Central and Eastern Europeans registering to work over the subsequent two years. 
The UK also introduced a series of major reforms loosening selection mechanisms for higher 
and lower-skilled foreign workers, predominantly through temporary schemes (OECD, 2003: 
285-288; 2007: 101). 
 
Australia and the UK were the two states among the main traditional destination and reluctant 
states where the relaxation of labour immigration controls was most pronounced in the period 
between the mid 1990s and 2008. This finding is supported by other comparative research 
into recent labour immigration policy change. For instance, Lowell’s study for the United 
Nations Population Division found these two states to have among the most liberal temporary 
and permanent labour immigration controls across the developed economies (Lowell, 2005: 8-
10; cf. Abella, 2006: 14-15; McLaughlan and Salt, 2002: 4).9 Since the context of this study is 
                                                
9 A lack of internationally comparable data makes it difficult to quantitatively assess the impact of selection and 
control policies on migration flows (Productivity Commission, 2006: 10) (although the OECD recently sought to 
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a cross-national trend of liberalisation, Australia and the UK are thus the two most 
appropriate cases for comparing the processes and dynamics of policy decisions in traditional 
destination and reluctant states.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis utilises a small-n approach. This was prejudged as the most effective way of 
‘process tracing’ the multifaceted dynamics of labour immigration policy in order to make 
causal inferences about the reasons for reform (Hall, 2008: 6; Landman, 2003: 29-34). The 
level of depth required to adequately perform this task made undertaking more than two cases 
unfeasible in the context of the research timeframe and word-count constraints.10  
 
Most comparative studies of immigration politics have examined either traditional destination 
states (cf. Adelman et al., 1994; Freeman and Birrell, 2001; Freeman and Jupp, 1992; 
Hawkins, 1991; Ongley and Pearson, 1995) or reluctant states (cf. Boswell, 2003; Freeman, 
1979; Geddes, 2003; Hammar, 1985; Menz, 2009; Messina, 2007; Penninx, 1986), but rarely 
both. Givens and Luedtke have called for more comparison between European and non-
European cases (2005: 17) and Freeman has argued for greater exploration of ‘the interplay 
between national models and policy types’ (2006: 242). But with some notable exceptions (cf. 
Hammar, 1989; Haus, 2002; Money, 1999a), very few studies of immigration selection and 
control policy have directly compared states in both categories.  
 
Selecting cases with different legacies and contexts presents some problems of comparison. 
As well as differences in the post-war immigration legacies of Australia and the UK, there are 
also dissimilarities in their labour immigration policy-making structures. There is a minister 
and government ministry solely devoted to immigration in Australia, while in the UK it is but 
one function of the Home Office and its ministers. In terms of the main stakeholders, 
organised business and labour in Australia have traditionally taken a strong interest in labour 
immigration (Freeman and Betts, 1992: 87), while their UK counterparts have not been as 
                                                
address this by standardising the definitions used to measure migration flows among its member states (cf. 
Lemaitre et al., 2006)). 
10 The issue of comprehensiveness was another reason for the chosen sample size. Menz’s ambitious six-country 
study of the political economy of immigration policy in Europe is founded on rather weak empirical grounds, 
which leads to some dubious conclusions on the nature of policy-making dynamics. For instance, his assessment 
of the UK, which is based on a small number of elite interviews, overstates the influence of organised interests, 
in particular business groups, in shaping key policy decisions (Menz, 2009: 156-164). 
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engaged in this area of policy. The differences in the geopolitical status of the two states also 
have implications for their respective labour immigration policies. Membership of the EU 
gives the UK little control over immigration from other member states, whereas Australia 
faces no comparable constraint aside from an agreement with New Zealand that provides for 
the free movement of labour between the two states. 
 
Border control capacity is another key difference. The UK is subject to far greater irregular 
immigration pressures than Australia which, due to its geographical position, can effectively 
control immigration to a virtually unmatched degree (Salt, 2006: 280-282). Despite these 
differences, there is sufficient ‘functional equivalence’ (Landman, 2003: 43-46) between 
Australia and the UK to allow for a thorough comparison. Largely as a result of the former 
once being a colony of the latter, the two states share a common language and many cultural 
elements, similar parliamentary and executive systems, as well as similar market regulations 
(cf. Hall and Soskice, 2001: 19). 
 
The methodological approach used in this thesis is primarily qualitative, as this is more 
effective than a quantitative approach in gauging the impact and influence of actors, 
institutions and events on the policy processes. According to Devine, qualitative methods ‘are 
good at capturing [the] meaning, process and context’ needed to understand complex policy-
making dynamics (2002: 199). Specifically, a ‘systematic process analysis’ was conducted in 
this study to ascertain the dynamics of policy formulation in each case. According to Hall, 
‘process analysis can be particularly useful when several theories alluding to rather different 
causal processes have been proposed to explain the same phenomenon, because it mobilises 
multiple observations to reach fine-grained assessments about the presence of a specific 
causal process’ (2008: 11). The diversity of explanations for why labour immigration policy 
change occurs (see Chapter 2) made this the most suitable method for investigating the 
research question.  
 
Leach claims that within a particular policy domain, it should be possible to ‘map’ the actors 
involved and the nature of the relationships between them (1995: 44). Accordingly, the first 
step of the process analysis was to undertake a mapping exercise of the institutions and 
stakeholder interests involved in the labour immigration policy domains of Australia and the 
UK. This initially involved a content analysis of the coverage of policy developments in each 
state’s major national and metropolitan daily news periodicals between January 1990 and 
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December 2007. Sources were selected in order to represent a variety of ownership, locality 
and publication format.11 This analysis was conducted using the Factiva database. To ensure 
that the content analysis was sufficiently accurate and representative of the media coverage of 
labour immigration, ‘immigration’ was used as the exclusive search term.12 
 
This process facilitated the creation of a detailed timeline of labour immigration policy 
developments over the period examined for each case study. From this, a map was devised of 
the government ministers, parliamentarians, government ministries, civil servants and 
ministerial advisers, organised interests and their representatives, and all other relevant parties 
and stakeholders identified as being involved in these developments. Relevant primary and 
secondary documentation – such as Hansard transcripts, ministerial speeches and press 
releases, the reports of parliamentary committees and ministries, and the press releases, 
reports and position papers of organised interests and other stakeholders – was then collected 
and analysed. Due to the 30-year restrictions on Cabinet papers and the archives of 
government ministries in both cases, it was not possible to access all of the desired 
documentation. 
 
Following the mapping exercise, in-depth interviews were conducted with individual 
participants and representatives of organisations identified as having had involvement in 
labour immigration policy developments. In total, 55 interviews were conducted in Australia, 
the majority during a four-month research visit between December 2007 and April 2008, and 
42 interviews in the UK, mainly between September and December 2007 and August and 
November 2008 (see Appendices A and B). The interviews were conducted in person or via 
telephone, most lasting for between 40 and 60 minutes. They were tape recorded and then 
fully transcribed.  
 
These interviews enabled detailed insights to be gained into the considerations, inputs and 
deliberations behind the key policy decisions. According to Sabatier, participants in the policy 
                                                
11 The Advertiser (Adelaide), The Age (Melbourne), The Australian, the Australian Financial Review, the 
Canberra Times, the Courier-Mail (Brisbane), the Daily Telegraph (Sydney), the Herald-Sun (Melbourne), the 
Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian (Perth) were the sources selected for the Australian case. The 
Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph, the Financial Times, The Guardian, The Independent and The Times (and their 
respective Sunday versions) were chosen for the UK case. 
12 The reason for this is that media outlets use a range of terminology when referring to labour immigration. 
Phrases such as ‘foreign workers’, ‘migrant workers’, ‘immigrant workers’, migrant labour’, immigrant labour’, 
‘work visas’, ‘labour migration’, ‘migration’ and ‘immigration’ are often used interchangeably. 
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process often seek to ‘propagate their specific “spin” on events’ (1999: 4). The perspective of 
policymakers and stakeholders involved in policy processes is invariably interpretive rather 
than objective, and there is a risk that interviewees may aggrandise or downplay their own or 
their organisation’s role (Richards, D. 2008: 7-9; Richards and Smith, 2004: 784, 789). The 
information obtained from interviews was therefore used cautiously and triangulated with 
data gathered from the other aforementioned sources, as well as with published diaries and 
memoirs and reviews of secondary literature, to interpret the reasons for policy change in 
each case study. 
 
A relatively small number of individuals and organisations approached for the Australian case 
study rejected interview requests. Of these, one was a government minister, one was a 
government adviser, two were senior civil servants, two were from business groups, one was 
a trade union official, and one was from a migrant community organisation. A larger number 
of requests were declined for the UK case. These included five government ministers, three 
senior civil servants, three business group officials, and two trade union officials. The most 
frequently cited reason in these cases was lack of availability, although two government 
ministers (Robert Ray in Australia and David Blunkett in the UK) declined on the basis that 
they had already spoken to previous researchers on similar topics. Since the vast majority of 
interview requests were accepted in both cases, these rejections did not serve to overtly bias 
the data sample. However, the difficulties in gaining access to UK government ministers 
meant that some periods under inquiry were analysed without direct ministerial input – 
although these could be supplemented by interviews with ministerial advisers and first-hand 
accounts in the form of memoirs and biographies. 
 
The Australian interviewees spoke with slightly more candour than those in the UK. The most 
plausible explanation for this is that these interviews were conducted in Australia in the 
months immediately following the Howard government’s November 2007 election defeat. By 
contrast, in the UK, the Labour government was still in office during the period of research 
(albeit under a different leader). While the majority of those interviewed agreed to speak on 
the record, a number (mainly active civil servants) did not wish to be individually attributed. 
Again, this was more prevalent in the UK. However, all interviewees agreed to their 
organisational affiliation being attributed. The decision was therefore taken that all interview 
citations would protect individual anonymity and ascribe organisational affiliation, except in 
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the case of government ministers who agreed to speak on the record and whose attribution 
could not be disguised. 
 
Thesis outline 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines the literature on the politics of labour 
immigration selection and control. It looks at the complexities of labour immigration policy-
making and reviews various the theories and accounts that offer explanations as to why states 
might opt to relax labour immigration controls. These accounts differ according to the 
significance they attach to the state’s engagement with immigration policy, the respective 
roles of organised interests, institutions and political parties, the function of migrant labour 
and the structure of market regulations. This discussion informs the development of 
secondary research questions for investigation in the six subsequent case study chapters.  
 
Sections II and III examine the two case studies. These sections are largely self-contained and 
each consists of three interconnected chapters: the first provides historical and institutional 
context for recent labour immigration policy reforms; the second explores the specific detail 
of the reforms and the reasons why they were implemented; and the third marries the themes 
discussed in the previous two chapters to analyse why the factors that underpinned reform 
were influential. 
 
Section II examines reasons for the contemporary relaxation of labour immigration controls in 
Australia. Chapter 3 begins this exploration through an examination of immigration policy 
and politics prior to the recent period of liberal reform. This provides context for the 
discussion and analysis contained in the following two chapters. The development of 
immigration policy between 1788 and 1996 was characterised by three hallmarks, which were 
important in generating support across the major institutions, stakeholders and the broader 
community for consistently large immigration intakes. First, the centrality of immigration to 
population and economic expansion showed its use as an instrument for nation-building. 
Second, the state played an effective role in immigration selection and control in order to 
encourage the entry of ‘desirable’ categories of immigrants, while erecting barriers to those 
deemed ‘unwanted’. And third, Australia’s relatively low population base and geographical 
isolation enhanced the first two features, by providing a sound rationale for increasing 
immigration and aiding the state’s capacity to select and control immigration in accordance 
with the national interest.  
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Chapter 4 looks at the Howard government’s reform of labour immigration controls between 
1996 and 2007, which took place in three distinct categories. The policies within each 
category are examined, as are the reasons why specific decisions were made. The government 
made labour market success among applicants, employers and regional areas the main basis 
for immigration selection, which facilitated a large expansion of labour immigration intakes. 
The Howard government used labour immigration reform to meet objectives in other policy 
areas, and business groups and State/Territory governments helped to influence its direction. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses the structural and institutional economic and political factors that 
underpinned the Howard government’s reforms. Sustained labour demand, generated by a 
protracted economic boom and structural and regulatory change, was the principal reason for 
relaxing labour immigration controls. This was aided by the government’s astute use of 
political strategies to increase public confidence in its handling of immigration policy. The 
Howard government’s liberal labour immigration reforms can largely be explained as an 
adaptation of the three hallmarks of Australian immigration policy to contemporary contexts. 
It also reflects a consensus among stakeholders and the broader community that immigration 
is beneficial to the national interest, so long as it is properly controlled and fulfils a clearly 
defined need.  
 
Section III examines the factors underpinning labour immigration policy liberalisation in the 
United Kingdom between 2000 and 2004. Chapter 6 provides context through a sketch of the 
historical background, and introduces the institutional themes behind recent policy shifts. 
Liberal labour immigration policies were introduced between 1946 and 1962, largely at the 
instigation of the executive branch and as by-products of various other policy objectives. A 
series of restrictive labour immigration policies were subsequently implemented and remained 
in place until the election of the Blair government. Circa 1997, the UK’s immigration politics 
were characterised by ingrained restrictionist mentalities, but the economic climate was 
conducive to a liberal shift in policy. 
 
Chapter 7 details the Blair government’s labour immigration reforms, which occurred in three 
distinguishable segments. This chapter argues that policy change in each segment was the 
incidental product of broader policy objectives relating to microeconomic reform, border 
control, and foreign policy. As with earlier periods, the executive branch – rather than 
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business groups or other actors – was mainly responsible for driving policy change, but as is 
demonstrated, this was implemented in a rather disorderly and uncoordinated manner. 
 
Chapter 8 looks in greater depth at the reasons for the liberal shifts in UK labour immigration 
policy. It argues that while fulfilling a clear economic need for more workers, there were also 
structural labour market factors that made the relaxation of immigration restrictions a more 
rational option for policy makers. Labour immigration was largely free of the sensitivities that 
characterised other immigration issues during the period of policy change, which partly 
explains the rather haphazard nature of reform. There was a move back towards restrictionism 
after 2004, which occurred partly in reaction to the unintended consequences of the policies 
of the liberal period. It is concluded that despite the liberal reforms in the period from 2000 to 
2004, the UK’s immigration politics still remain closer to the reluctant state model. 
 
Chapter 9 draws together the lessons gleaned from the two case studies to answer the central 
research question. It argues that the policy legacies of both Australia and the UK had a 
significant impact on the processes and dynamics that shaped labour immigration selection 
and control decisions. The respective immigration politics of the two states provided 
constraints and opportunities to the Howard and Blair governments, which affected their 
ability to justify liberal labour immigration policy change. A positive immigration policy 
legacy allowed the Howard government to successfully construct a coherent narrative for the 
necessity of reform and its consistency with principles of national interest. This facilitated a 
broad degree of institutional, stakeholder and popular support for its agenda. The absence of 
such a positive legacy inhibited the Blair government’s attempt to construct such a narrative, 
which contributed to a subsequent backlash against its liberal labour immigration policies. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that a nation’s past immigration policy experiences 
shape its policy-making structures, as well as its institutional and stakeholder policy 
preferences, which in turn shape its immigration politics. As will be demonstrated throughout 
in the following chapters, the relationship between immigration policy and politics is self-
reinforcing, but will adapt to changing contexts. 
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CHAPTER 2  
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE POLITICS OF LABOUR IMMIGRATION 
SELECTION AND CONTROL 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on the politics of labour immigration selection and control 
and sets up the key research questions to guide the analytical focus of the following case 
study chapters. In the context of recent policy developments, it initially looks at the reasons 
for the inherent complexity of labour immigration as a public policy issue. A survey of the 
literature on the politics of labour immigration selection and control follows this analysis. Six 
perspectives are examined. First, state-centred theories focusing on the tensions and dilemmas 
posed by labour immigration are discussed. These theories suggest that states may relax 
labour immigration controls in pursuit of their responsibility to facilitate wealth accumulation. 
Second, group politics accounts that variously consider the roles of organised interests such as 
business groups and trade unions in the regulation of labour immigration are explored. Third, 
accounts concerned with the potential impact of particular national-level institutions are 
reviewed. Fourth, an overview on the literature on political parties assesses whether centre-
left or centre-right governments are more likely to relax labour immigration controls. Fifth, 
structural functionalist theories on the role of labour immigration in structuring labour 
markets are examined. And finally, comparative political economy accounts focusing on the 
role of market regulations in shaping policy choices are reviewed. 
 
Labour immigration policy: Caught between the market and the state 
The reasons given in Chapter 1 as to why states made it easier for certain types of foreign 
nationals to work during the wave of migration between the mid 1990s and 2008 can be 
further elaborated on, with specific reference to the reluctant states. The supposed hostility of 
these states to immigration, and the unintended consequences of past experience, made this a 
rather curious policy trend. Aside from the various demand and supply-side pressures already 
outlined, there are a number of other possible explanations. First, while population decline has 
been mentioned, there appeared to be a consensus among opinion leaders about the particular 
problem it posed for reluctant states and the need to resolve it. Immigration was widely cited 
as a necessary part of the solution. For example, the United Nations Secretary-General singled 
out this issue in 2004 when he asserted that there was ‘no doubt that European societies need 
immigrants’ (Annan, 2004: 188). 
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Second, European states may have been less reluctant to relax labour immigration controls 
due to the relatively unproblematic experience of intra-EU labour migration. The Treaty of 
Rome enshrined the provision for free movement of labour between member states. Upon the 
treaty’s enactment in 1957, it prompted a modest increase in labour flows within the single 
market, but movement thereafter remained relatively responsive to labour market demand 
(Straubhaar, 1988: 49-55). The expansion of the EU and the institutionalisation of the single 
market by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 made the free labour movement a condition of EU 
membership. This generated a pattern of internal mobility among the growing number of 
member states that provoked little discord (at least prior to the EU’s eastward expansion in 
2004) (Favell and Hansen, 2002: 582, 586).  
 
Third, contemporary policies stood in contrast to the post-war programmes in that they were 
much more targeted at high-skilled immigration, the economic contribution of which was 
likely to be much greater and therefore less politically risky (Castles, S. 2006: 760; Freeman, 
2006: 237-238, 241). Moreover, according to a recent study for the International Labour 
Organisation, ‘the majority of the movements of highly skilled workers take place within the 
internal labour markets of multinational corporations’ (Counihan and Miller, 2006: 272). This 
suggests that reluctant state policies facilitating such movements were made for a higher 
purpose, namely attracting foreign investment (Jordan et al., 2003: 202-203).  
 
Nation states tend to select and control immigration in a manner consistent with their national 
interests (Hiebert and Ley, 2006: 3). Ergo, it can be expected that they will discourage or 
deny entry to those without the attributes they desire and encourage those with such traits. In 
previous eras, race, ethnicity and national origin were the main principles for deciding which 
foreign nationals should be permitted or excluded from entering and settling. During the most 
recent wave, human capital and skills were the main selection criteria. As Zolberg observes, 
the narrow scope for entry provided by developed democracies for select categories of foreign 
workers are but ‘small doors’ within a much bigger ‘protective wall’ that keeps many others 
out (1989: 406). According to Menz, the recent era saw the state become increasingly 
sophisticated or ‘managerialist’ in labour immigration selection and control (2009: 2). Indeed, 
while the small doors became somewhat bigger, the protective walls in which they were 
located became increasingly fortified (cf. Geddes, 2003: 194-195).  
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A straightforward reason for this duality is that immigration is an inherently emotional policy 
issue. According to Boswell, immigration often acts as a ‘lightening rod’ for the articulation 
of disparate social tensions and problems (2004: 4-6). Writing in the Australian context, 
McAllister says that few other issues regularly elicit lower levels of non-commitment 
responses in public opinion surveys than immigration (1993: 161). Rudolph argues that 
immigration is a polarising issue because it potentially threatens ‘notions of stable national 
identities, culture, and ways of life’ (2003: 605).  Due to the multidimensional nature of 
immigration policy, it is common for states to create legal distinctions between its various 
aspects. For instance, separate visa classes often exist for labour, family and humanitarian 
immigrants. Managing flows according to ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ categories of immigration 
in this manner may help states to minimise political tensions (Hollifield, 1992: 12; Lahav and 
Guiraudon, 2006: 208). However, legal distinctions between immigration sub-categories can 
be rather artificial and unwittingly exacerbate political tensions. According to Sassen, ‘if a 
government closes one kind of entry category, recent history shows that another one will have 
a rise in numbers’ (1999: 189), as Chapter 1 showed with respect to the Western European 
post-war experience. In this manner, the supply of migrants is shaped by what Geddes terms 
the ‘organisational borders’ erected by the receiving state (2006: 611-613). This can serve to 
distort how labour immigration is broadly perceived, thereby muddling its ‘policy image’, that 
is, the way in which a policy is commonly comprehended and discussed in public discourse 
and policy-making arenas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 31). The considerations forming the 
basis of labour immigration control decisions may differ widely from those underpinning 
other areas of immigration policy. But they are not necessarily delineated as such in the minds 
of individual citizens or in the arenas shaping such opinions, such as the media. Policy 
changes intended to deliver short-term economic benefits may bring longer-term social and 
political costs. This may compound the political sensitivities of immigration and further 
complicate the policy processes underpinning labour immigration selection and control.  
 
Labour immigration has implications not only for markets, but also sovereignty, identity, 
social cohesion, the provision of public goods and infrastructure, and the natural environment. 
As such, it is an area of public policy underpinned by political consequences and 
considerations, as well as economic ones (Castles, S. 2000: 271; Freeman and Kessler, 2008: 
659-664). Labour cannot be treated in the same way as goods or money. Indeed, as Adam 
Smith once said, “man is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported” (quoted 
in Chiswick and Hatton, 2002: 1).  
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The growing association between immigration, crime and security made the politics of labour 
immigration increasingly complicated in the recent era. This relates to what has widely been 
termed the ‘migration-security nexus’, which is defined by Faist as ‘the discursive 
securitisation of migration and integration politics and policies in major immigration 
countries’ (2004: 1-2). Popular or elite views about the economic or cultural significance of 
immigration may differ widely, since they tend to be rooted in existing opinions or values. 
However, associations between immigration and security tend to be more universal because 
they are often grounded in the reality of ‘events’ (Faist, 2004: 853). Immigration was 
increasingly seen as a security issue in the wake of terrorist attacks perpetrated by foreign 
nationals or members of minority ethnic communities in the United States in September 2001, 
in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005. In relation to European states, Lahav 
and Messina argue that the attacks had the effect of not creating but rather consolidating an 
existing migration-security nexus. This nonetheless increased the salience of immigration and 
transformed it from a ‘low politics’ to a ‘high politics’ issue (2005: 853-854; cf. Rudolph, 
2003: 603).13  
 
The migration-security nexus underscores the imperatives of state control around 
immigration. Hannah Arendt observed that sovereignty is no more clearly evident than in 
matters relating to migration and nationality (cited in Messina, 2007: 1). Indeed, as Ellerman 
says, the regulation of these issues lie ‘at the heart of statehood’: 
 
Migration control is a fundamental expression of the state’s monopoly over the 
legitimate means of coercion. By regulating the movement of non-citizens across 
national borders, states set and enforce rules on who can reside within their territory, 
and defend the national welfare against individuals who may pose a threat (2006: 
293).  
 
According to Lahav and colleagues, the securitisation of immigration had the effect of further 
blurring the lines between labour immigration and immigrant settlement for policy-makers 
and stakeholders (2007: 1). 
 
                                                
13 Faist claims that the migration-security nexus is ‘vastly overstated’, since the impact of immigration and crime 
and security is rather inconclusive. However, this has not stopped the issues being institutionally bound together 
by policymakers, for instance through the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the EU (2004: 8). 
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The wide-ranging impact of the immigration-security nexus on all areas of immigration 
policy, including labour immigration, highlights the importance of public opinion to policy-
making. Public opinion on immigration is not monolithic and differs across time, place and 
context, and does not necessarily translate into collective action (Statham and Geddes, 2006: 
250). But comparative research by Simon and colleagues shows that in aggregate terms, 
majority public opinion tends to favour restrictive over liberal control policies and skilled 
over family immigration. They also suggest that public opinion is more positive towards 
immigration and more receptive to relaxing immigration controls during periods of economic 
expansion or prosperity (Simon and Lynch, 1999: 464-465; Simon and Sikich, 2007: 956-959, 
962). In broad support of this, the comparative study of Bauer and colleagues contends that 
public opinion will be more favourable to immigration if it complements the labour market 
needs of the receiving state (2000: ii). Citrin and colleagues find that symbolic attitudes 
relating to the impact of immigration on cultural and national identity are important in 
shaping popular attitudes to immigration, and that factors relating to economic self-interest 
are less important (Citrin et al., 1997: 874; Sides and Citrin, 2007: 477). However, research 
by Scheve and Slaughter suggests that a perception of immigration as negatively impacting 
upon wage levels is the main reason why stricter immigration controls are favoured most 
strongly among lower-skilled workers than other categories of voters (2001: 133). Sides and 
Citrin also claim that public opinion is influenced by focusing events and the messages 
promoted through the media and by politicians. This is supported by Givens and Luedtke’s 
findings that the salience of immigration, as measured by the extent of media coverage,14 is 
the most significant predictor of immigration control policy. They claim that an increase in 
salience is likely to result in an increase in restriction (Givens and Luedtke, 2005: 15-17). A 
number of theoretical accounts offer some insights into why states confronted with the 
political complexities and sensitivities of immigration would choose to relax controls for 
foreign workers. 
 
                                                
14 Epstein and Segal argue that press coverage is a reliable proxy for issue salience because it provides ‘a 
reproducible, valid, and transportable method of assessing whether the particular actors under investigation view 
an issue as salient or not’ (2000: 67). Moreover, Weaver claims that salience of an issue, as assessed by 
measures such as the extent of media coverage, can shape the nature and strength of individual sentiment and, in 
turn, political behaviour (1991: 65-66).  
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The literature on why states relax labour immigration controls 
State-centred accounts  
State-centred accounts posit that the inherently volatile nature of immigration is explained by 
its tendency to cut across core imperatives of sovereign states. However, they also suggest 
that in certain circumstances, relaxing labour immigration controls can help states to fulfil 
some of these imperatives. James Walsh invokes the work of statist theorists such as Skocpol 
to argue that states may use immigration selection and control policy to mould national 
identity in their desired image: 
 
The aim of state policies is not to obstruct human movement but, rather, to regulate it 
and define the conditions under which it may legitimately occur. Instead of 
entryways that are either open or closed, borders are better conceived of as filters 
that welcome those deemed culturally or economically desirable, while excluding 
those classed as “undesirable” (2008: 791-792).  
 
Boswell also uses state-centred perspective to show how states may use immigration policy to 
advance their own interests. She draws upon the theories of Habermas and Offe to argue that 
immigration policy can be understood in the context of the state’s efforts to uphold its 
legitimacy to govern. The state may incorporate the demands of different societal pressures 
and organised interests. But according to Boswell, ‘the power of these interests and 
institutions does not emanate from characteristics they possess… Rather, it is contingent on 
the resonance of these concerns with the functional imperatives of states’ (2007: 95-96). To 
maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the broader populace, the state has a number of core 
functional imperatives. It must provide the conditions for wealth accumulation and 
distribution, protect territorial sovereignty and the security of its subjects, safeguard their 
rights, and promote fairness.  
 
The state may relax immigration controls to increase the supply of labour as part of its 
accumulation function, either because insufficient supplies exist within the internal labour 
market, or to increase the stock of human capital. However, Boswell says that the decisions to 
increase immigration levels can be unpopular and incompatible with expectations of the 
state’s responsibilities to ensure equitable wealth distribution (if immigrants are perceived to 
take jobs away from residents or impose an undue welfare burden), or to control national 
borders (which is a core component of the state’s function of maintaining security and 
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territorial integrity). In such cases, relaxation of labour immigration controls may serve to 
undermine the state’s legitimacy, even if it helps to fulfil its accumulation function. One way 
for the state to overcome this tension, according to Boswell, is to create distortions between 
its actions and public perceptions. For instance, it may covertly open or maintain channels to 
foreign workers, while simultaneously seek to appeal to popular sentiment through overt 
restrictions on ‘unwanted’ categories of immigrants (Boswell, 2007: 88-93).  
 
Similarly, Guiraudon and Joppke argue that immigration creates an ‘economic-political 
control dilemma’ between economic pressure for liberal controls and populist pressure for 
tighter controls. In seeking to overcome this dilemma, states may use what has been variously 
termed ‘strategies of visibility’ or ‘symbolic instruments’, such as more vigilant border 
control or conducting factory raids to round-up illegal immigrants. This may help generate the 
perception (if not the reality) of increased control, in order to appease domestic political 
pressure (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001: 12-13; cf. Massey, 2003: 23-24). 
 
Lahav and colleagues use principal-agent theory to show how states (principals) seek to 
resolve the economic-political control dilemma by delegating authority to third parties 
(agents) through ‘remote control’ strategies. For instance, sanctions may be used against 
employers that hire illegal immigrants or transport companies carrying undocumented foreign 
nationals. Preserving state sovereignty is the logic underpinning such strategies (Guiraudon 
and Lahav, 2000: 187-188; Lahav, 2006: 291; Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006: 212). As 
Guiraudon and Lahav claim, shifting the liability for immigration control to third parties 
involves a calculation by the executive branch of the state that ‘the cost of relinquishing some 
of its autonomy over policy will be compensated by the benefits entailed: more efficacy in 
stemming unwanted migration and less judicial oversight – a reinvented form of control’ 
(2000: 190). According to Messina, such arrangements do not represent a permanent loss of 
sovereignty. Rather, they allow states to reclaim authority over delegated aspects of 
immigration control if they later need to (2007: 242). 
 
In sum, state-centred accounts suggest that states will relax labour immigration controls if 
they believe benefits relating to indirect wealth accumulation will outweigh the potential costs 
of such policies corroding popular confidence in other realms of legitimacy. But due to the 
tensions that often arise between their core functions, states may try to have it both ways by 
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implementing liberal labour immigration policies discretely or alongside other restrictive 
measures.  
 
Group politics approaches 
In contrast to state-centred theories, group politics approaches emphasise the roles played by 
organised interests in driving government policy. These pluralist-oriented accounts essentially 
regard the state as a neutral arena through which organised interests apply pressure for 
immigration control policies favourable to their objectives. Generally speaking, different 
groups are interested in different areas of policy, and groups representing producer interests – 
particularly business and labour – tend to be the most active with respect to labour 
immigration (Massey, 2003: 21). This is reflected in the attention paid to these groups by the 
group politics accounts. 
 
Freeman’s theory of client politics is the most influential of the group politics accounts. It 
seeks to explain why immigration controls are often more lax than popular opinion would 
otherwise allow. Freeman claims that immigration policies produce concentrated benefits and 
diffuse costs. Consequently, policies reflect the preferences of the organised interests that 
stand to benefit the most. The interests involved and the degree of benefits and costs differ 
across visa categories and according to the regulation of selection mechanisms. In any case, 
business groups representing employers and domestic consumption industries are likely to be 
the greatest beneficiaries of liberal labour immigration controls (Freeman, 2006: 231-233). 
Freeman claims that business has a greater stake than those groups standing to bear the costs, 
namely resident workers and the broader community in areas with high immigrant workforces 
and populations. Therefore, there is a greater incentive for business to form stronger 
organisational units to lobby politicians, who he regards as self-interested actors that seek to 
implement the preferred policies of the most organised groups in exchange for electoral 
support. Policy deliberations often take place out of public view through a clientelistic 
relationship between policy-makers and business lobbyists (Freeman, 1995a: 884-886). 
Freeman advances the notion of a ‘good times/bad times dynamic’, whereby the liberal 
policies produced by client politics are most likely to occur in periods of economic prosperity, 
when employer demand for labour is greater and opposition more muted. More restrictive 
policies will result during downturns when these pressures are reversed (Freeman, 1995b: 
910-911). But he also claims that the connection between economic cycles and immigration 
politics will be less pronounced in traditional destination states. Since liberal immigration 
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policies are more common in these states, this is where client politics arrangements are more 
likely to prevail (Freeman, 1995a: 887). It is therefore of interest to see whether his 
framework explains the reasons behind the contemporary liberalisation of labour immigration 
controls in reluctant states as well as traditional destination states. 
 
Like the client politics thesis, Money’s spatial-oriented account of immigration politics 
attributes liberal policies to business pressure. Policy change – be it expansive or restrictive – 
is explained by the disproportionate geographical impact of immigration, which will mobilise 
local organised interests. Politicians will respond to specific pressures if they are likely to 
have broader electoral significance, such as those emanating from marginal constituencies 
during tightly fought elections. Money argues that pressure from groups standing to 
disproportionately benefit from liberal immigration policies, notably employers operating in 
tight local labour markets, will be a catalyst for the relaxation of immigration controls. 
Restrictive policies will come about in response to the mobilisation of local communities with 
high immigrant populations. Economic conditions will shape the tenor of pressure for either 
liberal or restrictive labour immigration policies (Money, 1999a: ix-x, 9-10). 
 
Trade unions are another organised interest receiving attention from the group politics 
paradigm. In contrast to business, unions have historically been an agent for restriction, since 
increasing immigration can undermine the ‘monopoly’ power of unions over labour supply 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1979: 69-70), and thus lower the wages and employment security of 
those already working in a given labour market. A number of studies suggest that opposition 
from unions to liberal immigration controls has waned in recent years. This shift has stemmed 
both from diminished capacity of unions across developed economies to maintain monopoly 
control over labour markets, due to declining membership levels, their weakened political 
influence, and changing economic circumstances. Unions have come to realise the 
ineffectiveness of restriction in the context of increased international migration and 
internationalised production processes and labour markets. One consequence is that migrant 
workers are seen less as a threat and more as potential members. Furthermore, restrictive 
control policies often push migrant workers into the informal economy, which can undermine 
labour standards (Avci and McDonald, 2000: 206; Haus, 2002: 2-3; Watts, 2000: 12-13). 
Taking these studies into consideration, it is possible that shifts by unions away from 
restrictive policy positions removes a barrier to reform, thereby making it easier for 
governments to relax labour immigration controls.
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Institutionalist accounts 
In contrast to the group politics theories that essentially regard organised pressure as the 
catalyst for changes in immigration control, institutionalist accounts place more emphasis on 
the institutions that condition and refract such pressure. Institutionalists focus on the power of 
particular fragments within the state’s broader apparatus, unlike state-centred theories that 
comprehend state power in terms of its broader functionality. Institutionalist accounts may 
regard organised interests and other manifestations of community pressure to be relevant 
driving factors, but their influence is seen as contingent upon access to the national-level 
institutions that ultimately determine immigration selection and control policy (Hollifield, 
1992: 118-120). Hanson and colleagues claim that differences in the national political 
institutions ‘can affect the costs and benefits of alternative political strategies for various 
groups in society’ (2001: 91). The nature of institutional arrangements, the power of 
particular institutions (such as the executive, judicial and legislative branches, bureaucratic 
agencies, and ‘policy institutions’ such as foreign policy) and their autonomy from domestic 
political pressures will differ across nation states.  
 
Different accounts focus on the influence of different institutional attributes. For instance, 
Breunig and Luedtke argue that congressional systems with strong institutional checks, such 
as a high number of veto points, have a major bearing point on the immigration policy 
preferences of governing parties (2008: 139-143). Others contend that the manner in which 
government bureaucracies are arranged can also shape the direction of policy. Whether 
immigration control is the domain of one rather than multiple ministries may amplify or 
minimise possible tensions between different policy imperatives (such as between labour 
requirements and national security), or may alter the number of possible access points to 
organised interests seeking to influence decisions (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004: 14-15; van 
Selm, 2005: 10).  
 
As with organised interests, government ministries can also have institutional preferences for 
particular policy orientations. In her study of EU immigration policy-making, Boswell shows 
how ministries and government institutions often deploy ‘expert knowledge’ to acquire the 
‘epistemic authority’ to reinforce such preferences, legitimise policy decisions, or assert 
expertise in buttressing their domination over the policy process (2008: 471-473). The relative 
power of economic and labour ministries has particular implications for the direction of 
labour immigration control policy. While it may not seem obvious, a number of studies 
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suggest that the relative power of foreign ministries is another possible factor in this regard. 
For instance, foreign policy objectives in the context of the Cold War have been used to 
explain US governments’ decisions in the 1960s to end national origin quotas and relax 
immigration controls (Hollifield et al., 2008: 10-11). While these reforms centred mainly on 
family and humanitarian immigration, Rosenblum claims that guestworker programs between 
the 1940s and 1960s were implemented as a form of foreign aid by US governments to their 
migrant-sending allies (2004: 95).  
 
Political parties 
Accounts concentrating on the positions of political parties on immigration control policy fall 
between the group politics and institutionalist paradigms. According to Hall, parties (along 
with the media) act as ‘transmission belts between the state and society’ (1993: 288). While 
national-level institutional factors ultimately condition the influence of parties, the latter also 
serve as reservoirs of societal pressure. A number of studies examining the patterns of party 
preferences on immigration control conclude that it is an issue that cuts across both the 
philosophies and electoral support bases of both centre-left and centre-right parties 
(Hollifield, 1992: 4-5; Perlmutter, 1996: 377; Schain, 2008: 467-468). Bale claims that 
scholarly accounts overplay such tensions and that centre-left parties tend to be more liberal 
on immigration issues (2008a: 320). While this may be true with respect to integration and 
settlement policies, intra-party tensions are more manifest on the issue of selection and 
control (Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008: 433; Givens and Luedtke, 2005: 16).  
 
Centre-left parties face a dilemma between social liberal and social democratic principles with 
respect to immigration. They are generally portrayed as more sympathetic to expansive 
immigration policies. This is due to the greater tendency of these parties to implement pro-
immigrant settlement policies and gain higher levels of electoral support from immigrant and 
socially liberal voters. However, because of the potentially negative impact of immigration on 
the labour market prospects of residents, liberal policies – particularly on labour immigration 
control – can alienate working-class voters that form a traditional core of centre-left support 
(Messina, 2009: 5).  
 
Immigration also cuts across the beliefs of centre-right parties in free markets and cultural 
homogeneity. Because they are more likely to promote national identity preservation, national 
security protection and welfare minimisation, these parties are more often associated with 
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restrictive immigration policies (Bale, 2008a: 319). However, centre-right parties are more 
likely to advocate pro-market economic policies, particularly with respect to labour markets. 
They also tend to rely on support from business interests that may be inclined to press for 
looser labour immigration controls (Bale, 2008b: 463; Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008: 434). 
Therefore, the literature suggests that because it traverses the beliefs and electoral bases of 
both the centre-left and centre-right, neither party in government can be thought more likely 
to relax labour immigration controls. 
 
Structural functionalist theories 
Structural functionalist accounts focus on the particular role of immigrant labour in 
structuring labour markets (Zolberg, 1989: 408). While the primarily unit of analysis is 
economic institutions rather than political institutions or organised interests, these accounts 
offer insights into why states may implement liberal labour immigration policies. 
 
Various Marxists posit that employers and the state prefer immigration because it is a cheaper 
form of labour supply that can be used to undermine the industrial and political strength of the 
working class. For instance, Castells argues that immigrant workers generally receive lower 
wage rates and inferior conditions than their native counterparts. The vulnerability of 
immigrants in this scenario allows their employment and political rights to be easily 
suppressed. Employers and the state will thus be inclined to look to immigrants as a ‘reserve 
army of labour’ to undermine the collective power of the resident workforce (Castells, 1975: 
44-46). Also writing from a Marxist perspective, Castles and Kosack claim that employers 
and the state are prone to increase immigration during times of low unemployment because it 
enables low inflationary growth and can thus facilitate wealth accumulation. As with Castells, 
this argument is predicated on the assumptions that immigrants constitute a cheaper supply of 
labour, are concentrated in low-skilled jobs that are unattractive to resident workers and often 
lack the education and language capacity to advance their labour market position (Castles and 
Kosack, 1973: 5-6, 12-14). 
 
Piore’s ‘segmented labour market’ theory shares many of these premises. He also assumes 
that immigrant workers are more willing than native workers to work for lower wages, can be 
easily hired in periods of growth, and dispensed with during downturns. These features, along 
with their concentration in insecure and low-paid jobs in the secondary tier of the labour 
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market, allows immigrants to act as shock absorbers during periods of economic decline 
(Piore, 1979: 3, 35-38).  
 
Sassen’s ‘globalisation thesis’ also falls within the structural functionalist paradigm. Like 
Piore, she advances a link between segmented labour markets and immigration. Sassen argues 
that there are features of ‘global cities’ (or metropolitan centres of international economic 
activity) where the businesses operating within them generate demand for foreign high-skilled 
professionals in the primary tier of the labour market and low-skilled workers in the 
secondary tier (Sassen, 2001: 321-323). Sassen also claims that the increase of global 
economic activity, integrated markets, international regulatory institutions and regional 
trading zones have diminished state autonomy over immigration policy making: 
‘corporations, markets and free trade agreements are now in charge of “governing” an 
increasing share of cross-border flows, including cross-border flows of specialised 
professional workers as part of the international trade and investment in services’ (Sassen, 
1999: 177). Reduced transaction costs and growing migrant communities, particularly in 
global cities, have led more people to cross borders and reinforced established migration 
networks between sending and receiving states.  
 
In a similar vein, various studies suggest that liberal labour immigration policies and practices 
are driven by entrenched demand that is ‘structurally embedded’ in the relations between 
sending communities and employers in receiving states. In Cornelius’ study of Mexicans 
working in California, these relations became so deeply embedded that immigration flows 
remained resilient across the business cycle, despite the introduction of public policy 
deterrents, such as employer sanctions and stronger border controls (1998: 115-116, 125). In 
his study of low-skilled Japanese-Brazilians in Japan, Tsuda finds that structural 
embeddedness is consolidated by temporary employment regulation and the willingness of 
immigrants to work in such arrangements (despite their inherent instability). In this case, it 
was not immigration labour per se that was structurally embedded, but rather a consistent 
(relative) shortage of domestic labour supply for low-skilled temporary vacancies (Tsuda, 
1999: 697-703). In both the Japanese and Californian cases, structural embeddedness was 
compounded by a number of common factors. There was a long-term depletion of residents 
willing or able to undertake low-paid dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs, due to structural 
economic shifts and rising socio-economic aspirations. Additionally, immigrant workers 
became ‘socially embedded’ in their host community, migrant social networks helped to 
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deliver a reliable supply of job seekers, and employers held relatively positive perceptions of 
immigrant vis-à-vis resident workers (especially on the issues of work ethic and working time 
flexibility). This scenario contributed to labour market segmentation and structurally 
embedded demand for immigrant labour, even during economic downturns (Canales, 2003: 
758; Tsuda, 1999: 693-695). Along with the other structural functionalist accounts, these 
studies imply that, if present, the preconditions for structural dependence will generate 
pressure for the relaxation of labour immigration controls. 
 
Comparative political economy theories of market regulation 
Comparative political economy accounts utilising the ‘varieties of capitalism’ framework 
contain little mention of immigration. However, their focus on the nature of labour market 
regulation offers some prospective insights into why states may relax their labour immigration 
controls. Accounts using this framework seek to explain variations in national-level responses 
to the challenges presented by international economic pressures. In particular, they look at the 
ways that firms coordinate their activities with markets and other economic actors, such as 
employees and trade unions, investors, and other firms. In seeking to advance their 
competitive position, firms must work with these actors to secure access to finance, 
infrastructure and appropriately skilled workers, and maintain harmonious relations with their 
workforce (Hall and Gingerich, 2009: 450-452). The two ‘varieties’ most commonly cited are 
liberal market economies (LMEs), of which the Anglophone democracies are exemplar, 
where market relations are primarily competitive, and the coordinated market economies 
(CMEs) of continental Europe and East Asia, where market relations are more cooperative.15 
Owing to these differences in market relations, firms in LMEs primarily coordinate their 
activities through contractual relationships with other actors, whereas firms in CMEs are more 
reliant on collaboration (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 6-7).  
 
The interconnected nature of national-level market regulation is a key focus of this literature. 
The manner of regulation in one area is assumed to shape the regulatory character of other 
market institutions. In this respect, financial markets are a key institution. They are the major 
source of capital for LME firms, which generate a preoccupation with short-term profitability 
(Fioretos, 1996: 17-19; Gourevitch and Hawes, 2001: 5). By contrast, the greater reliance of 
                                                
15 Hall and Soskice, the pioneers of the varieties of capitalism framework, stress that CMEs and LMEs are ‘ideal 
types at the poles of a spectrum along which many nations can be arrayed’ (2001: 8). 
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CME firms on banks for access to capital means they can take ‘a more long-term view 
because the banks are more focused on increasing market share and company value rather 
than profits’, according to Schmidt (2002: 114). As a result, firms in LMEs are more inclined 
to compete on costs, while firms in CMEs are better equipped to compete on quality. The 
framework suggests that more competitive market relationships create greater pressure for 
market liberalisation in LMEs, where national comparative advantages are built around liberal 
markets (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 57-58). Furthermore, it implies that differences in market 
regulation will make certain policy options more attractive or viable than others in different 
economies. These arrangements have various implications for labour market regulation and 
the role of labour market actors. The more competitive market arrangements in LMEs means 
that labour market regulation is more liberal, which is exemplified by firm-based wage 
bargaining and weaker employment protection laws that make it easier for employers to fire 
workers. Moreover, industry associations tend to be weaker in LMEs than in CMEs, where 
inter-firm collaboration is greater (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 33).  
 
Immigration scholars have largely overlooked the varieties of capitalism framework. 
However, Menz uses the framework to argue that among CMEs, because comparative 
advantage is built on quality rather than costs, there is likely to be greater demand for high-
skilled immigration. By contrast, there is likely to greater demand in LMEs for selective types 
of high-skilled immigration and low-skilled immigration in industries structurally dependent 
on low-wage labour (Menz, 2009: 5). In this way, the impact of market regulation on 
production strategies will therefore shape the policy preferences of organised interests, which 
may serve to influence the direction of immigration selection and control policies.  
 
Conclusion 
The theories and accounts reviewed here suggest a range of possible reasons why states may 
relax labour immigration controls and the circumstances in which such decisions may be 
more likely. They provoke a number of questions about the processes and dynamics shaping 
recent labour immigration control policy decisions in Australia and the UK. 
 
• How do the states’ basic requirements to facilitate wealth accumulation shape labour 
immigration selection and control policies? How do the states reconcile such policy 
decisions with their other core imperatives, such as the duty to promote fairness and to 
protect their territorial integrity? 
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• What is the role of organised interests, particularly those predicted to benefit from or 
bear the costs of labour immigration (such as business and trade unions), in the 
making of policy? Do these interests influence policy decisions, and if so, how and 
through what means?  
• What is the role of particular national-level institutions (such as the respective 
branches of the state, government ministries responsible for immigration, labour and 
economic policies, or particular ‘policy institutions’) in influencing or shaping the 
direction of labour immigration selection and control policy? 
• Do centre-left or centre-right political parties in government shape the particular 
direction of labour immigration selection and control policy? 
• Are certain industries or employers structurally dependent on labour immigration? If 
so, how? What creates the conditions for this? 
• Does the character of market regulation shape labour immigration selection? Do 
national comparative advantages reinforced by market regulation shape the design of 
immigration selection mechanisms (for instance, preferences for certain skills)?  
 
These questions will guide the analytical focus of the following empirical chapters. But since 
the principal concern of this thesis is with the issue of policy legacy, it is necessary to first 
examine the history and contexts of immigration selection and control policy in the pre-
reform periods in each of the two case studies, starting with Australia.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLITICS OF AUSTRALIAN LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY PRIOR TO 1996 
 
Immigration has played a central role in the development of Australia’s population and 
economy ever since British colonisation. Between 1945 and 2001, immigrants and their 
descendents accounted for about 50 per cent of its population growth, which increased from 
some seven million to over 20 million during this period. According to Teicher and 
colleagues, ‘next to Israel no other country was so transformed by its post-war immigrant 
intake’ (2000: 3). With more than 25 per cent of Australia’s workforce foreign born, these 
developments have had a major impact on the national economy, the labour market, and many 
dimensions of public policy (Chang, 2004: 49). Compared to other developed democracies, 
large immigration intakes have not resulted in major social and political upheaval in 
Australia. Anti-immigration parties have not been able to gain an established political 
presence and broad consensus between the two major parties favouring a relatively expansive 
immigration policy existed for much of the post-war era (Collins, 1991: 15; Parkin and 
Hardcastle, 1994: 439).  
 
This was not the case in 1996. At this time, ‘Australia was no longer guided by a grand plan 
of immigration’, according to Eric Richards (2008: 297). Simmering public dissatisfaction 
with the size and composition of immigration intake contributed to uncertainty over future 
policy direction. As Hugo wrote in the mid 1990s, ‘no longer is there a widespread belief that 
immigration is in Australia’s national interest’ (1994a: 3). Indeed, vocal segments of both the 
main political parties questioned the social and economic wisdom of immigration selection 
policy (Parkin and Hardcastle, 1994: 433). Disagreement over whether attributes relating to 
economic and ‘human capital’ factors on one hand, or those based on social and ‘settlement’ 
factors on the other, should be the main criteria for immigrant selection under underpinned 
this discontent. 
 
This was the context in which the coalition of the Liberal and National Parties (‘the 
Coalition’) led by John Howard came to power in the Commonwealth parliamentary elections 
of March 1996. During its 11 years in office, the Howard government increased the 
immigration intake to its highest levels in Australian history and presided over what Hugo 
dubs a ‘paradigm shift’ in immigration selection policy, by making human capital criteria and 
successful labour market outcomes among applicants, employers and regional areas the basis 
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of immigration selection policy (2006: 108). Wide-ranging policy reforms aimed at attracting 
foreign nationals into the workforce was at the centre of these developments, which are 
explored in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
This chapter sets the scene for these developments through an analysis of the various phases 
of labour immigration policy in the post-colonial era. Immigration was consistently used as a 
policy for nation-building and the state maintained strong control over immigration entry and 
selection throughout this entire period. Australia’s relative geographical isolation shaped 
these features. They all form continuous threads in the development of immigration policy, 
including under the Howard government, as the next two chapters show.  
 
The first section of this chapter examines the years from 1788 and 1945, which saw 
Australia’s establishment as a ‘nation of immigrants’. The mechanisms through which 
immigrants were selected were founded during this period. From 1901, racially-based 
immigration control was one pillar in a series of interconnected protectionist social and 
economic policies that successfully established a political accord for nation-building. After 
1901, the Commonwealth government brokered consensus for immigration control by co-
opting the preference of business groups for a more liberal labour immigration policy, in 
exchange for concessions in the form of trade protection. The period between 1945 and 1972 
is explored in the second section. Changing policy priorities after the Second World War 
prompted the Commonwealth government to embark upon population and labour force 
expansion, which had huge implications for the scale, sources and selection of immigration. 
State-brokered consensus assisted a shift in immigration policy and neutralised trade union 
antagonism over the prospect of weakened control over labour supply. The Commonwealth 
government formed a specialised ministry devoted to immigration which, among other things, 
incorporated unions, business and other organised interests into immigration policy-making 
structures to facilitate this consensus. The third section looks at the 1972 to 1996 period, 
when the gradual replacement of protectionist and isolationist policies with liberal ones 
contributed to incoherence in immigration selection policy. The more evident impact of 
organised interests resulted in immigration politics entering a phase of pluralism during these 
years. The fundamental premise of immigration selection and control policy became the 
subject of increasingly intense debate. This historical discussion provides context for policy 
developments between 1996 and 2007. The fourth section sketches the broader institutional 
framework of immigration policy that the Howard government inherited. It looks at the 
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relevant themes pertaining to labour immigration and the roles and the nature of interaction 
between the main state institutions and organised interests.  
 
Labour immigration policy from 1788 to 1945: Race-based immigration control in the 
name of national unity 
Attracting more people was a guiding purpose of colonial governments from their inception. 
Dwindling inflows of convicts from the early nineteenth century, and the declines in 
indigenous population under the strain of imported disease and conflict, prompted the 
colonies to look further afield for people to populate and toil on their sparse and empty lands. 
However, as Blainey says, ‘the ocean and all of the disadvantages of isolation eliminated 
Australia as a goal for most emigrants who had to pay their own fares’ (1975: 94). It was 
therefore difficult to find Britons prepared to take the risks and financial burdens required to 
relocate their lives to an unfamiliar land in the Asia Pacific. Distance was a greater tyranny 
for the antipodean colonies than the North American states also seeking to attract immigrants 
during the nineteenth century.16 Colonial governments began to use financial incentives to 
attract more people and were able to subsidise their transportation relatively easily by selling 
cheaply the abundance of available land (Blainey, 1975: 100). From the arrival of the first 
‘free’ settlers in the late eighteenth century until 1940, around half of the 2.5 million 
immigrants that permanently settled in Australia did so with the aid of subsidised settlement 
and transportation costs (Baker et al., 1994: 3; Salter, 1978: 16).17 The exclusive availability 
of the assisted passage schemes to British subjects (in all colonies except Queensland) 
allowed the colonial populations to be expanded in accordance with policymakers’ racial 
preferences (Jupp, 2002: 17). 
 
Australia had among the highest per capita income levels in the world in the late nineteenth 
century, largely due to substantial foreign investment in its pastoral and mining industries. 
But a downturn in demand for Australian commodities in the 1890s led to economic 
depression. This in turn led to widespread industrial conflict and employers’ use of strike-
breakers and immigrant workers to undermine organised labour, which had established a 
powerful presence across the primary sectors (Castles, F. 1988: 101). Francis Castles argues 
                                                
16 The United States gave no financial assistance to immigrants (essentially because it did not need to), while 
Canada provided extended loans. New Zealand established assisted passage schemes, but on a scale smaller than 
in Australia (Jupp, 2002: 16). 
17 Assisted passages were largely curtailed in the 1870s due to declining revenue and increased resentment 
towards newcomers resulted, though they were continued in Queensland until 1919 (Blainey, 1975: 106). 
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that ‘the nexus between the supply and demand for labour was brutally obvious to all sections 
of society. Men could gauge their prospects of employment and their probable wages by the 
number of migrant ships moored at the quay’ (1988: 101). Trade unions sought to avoid a 
repeat of the 1890s by maintaining a scarce supply of labour for which, in the context of 
Australia’s geography and small population, they believed immigration control was a 
necessary precondition. Increasing levels of industrial and political power (through the 
formation of the Labor Party) over the following decade gave unions greater capacity to fulfil 
this goal (Castles, F. 1988: 122).  
 
When the six colonial governments federated to form the Commonwealth of Australia in 
1901, there was a pervasive desire to forge a sense of national purpose and insure against the 
vulnerabilities and class divisions that had arisen in the previous decade. It was widely agreed 
that industrial diversification was necessary despite the abundance of natural resources 
because, in the words of Australia’s second Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, “no nation ever 
claimed national greatness which relied on primary industry alone” (quoted in Kelly, 1994: 
6). The major political interests of the day agreed upon a series of interlocking policies aimed 
at promoting industrial expansion and neutralising class tensions. In order to stimulate 
secondary industry, trade barriers were erected to give local producers an advantage in the 
product market against foreign competitors. Employers agreed to pay a ‘fair and reasonable’ 
basic wage to all workers in exchange for the benefits derived from trade protection. The 
creation of an arbitration court with powers of compulsory dispute settlement acted as a 
warrantee for industrial peace. And to appease trade union concerns, racially selective 
immigration controls, commonly known as the ‘White Australia’ policy, protected the labour 
market position of the resident workforce. This policy accord became known as the 
‘protectionist settlement’ (Broomhill, 2008: 16; Castles, F. 1988: 93).  
 
The White Australia policy reflected broader social attitudes and its implementation was a 
commitment of all major parties at the 1901 Commonwealth election (Fitzpatrick, 1940: 116). 
The policy was underpinned by racialist attitudes and a desire to preserve the legacy of British 
colonialism, as well as economic arguments. The architects of the protectionist settlement saw 
racially selective immigration as a way of creating a cultural foundation for national unity 
based on British homogeneity (Lloyd, C. 2003: 406). Its implementation made it very difficult 
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for non-Britons to gain entry or the right to work (Hawkins, 1991: 14).18 Contemporary 
notions of racial hierarchy were also popular and further inflamed such sentiments. But they 
also stemmed from fears that this empty post-colonial outpost composed almost entirely of 
Britons would be easily overrun by the more heavily populated Asian neighbours to the north 
(Jupp, 2007: 8).19 
 
Non-Europeans composed only 0.25 per cent of the non-indigenous Australian population in 
1947 (Jupp, 2007: 10). However, the entry rights of would-be British labour immigrants were 
not carte blanche. They too had to meet certain entry requirements in the period between 
federation and the end of the Second World War (Blainey, 1975: 209). While not part of the 
White Australia policy, the Contract Immigrants Act 1905 served as a labour immigration 
control mechanism, by specifying that employers could only engage foreign nationals if they 
could prove that no Australian could fill the position. The Act also stated that foreign 
nationals had to be employed according to the legal wage and conditions benchmarks and 
could not be used to break industrial disputes (Crock, 1998: 92; Mitchell et al., 2001: 5). 
 
The Australian state thus had a strong role in immigration control prior to 1945. The 
protectionist settlement was the product of horse-trading between the main federation-era 
political parties representing various interests. But as Bell argues, the final product ‘was not 
just an historic class settlement, it also bore the clear imprint of state purpose and initiative’ 
(1993: 186). A strong state was required to effectively administer its wide-ranging and 
interlocking policy components. This strength invariably extended to immigration control and 
selection. The Commonwealth government had assumed legal responsibility for immigration 
from the colonies in 1901. The State governments (which took the place of the colonial 
governments) nonetheless retained responsibility for most of the components of the assisted 
                                                
18 The protectionist settlement was universalist, even if racialist, in application. The few foreigners that were 
able to immigrate in the post-federation decades enjoyed the same wage rates, working rights and benefits as 
Australian citizens. As Watson and colleagues argue, immigrants faced neither ‘economic marginalisation nor 
social exclusion’ (2003: 14). 
19 The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 formed the cornerstone of the White Australia policy and mirrored the 
pre-federation laws of a number of colonial governments. The Act did not explicitly stipulate which categories 
of foreign nationals were free to enter Australia (although convicted criminals and other ‘undesirables’ were 
barred). Rather, immigration officers had discretion to administer a dictation test to prospective immigrants, who 
had to render a passage of 50 words “in any prescribed language”. This was the means through which a racialist 
policy of immigration control was administered (Crock, 1998: 13; Cronin, 1993: 88-90). The Pacific Island 
Labourers Act 1901 was another component of the White Australia policy and ended the recruitment of Pacific 
Islander workers in the Queensland sugar and cotton plantations (after it had been initially permitted) (Hawkins, 
1991: 13-15). 
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passage schemes, such as the scale of immigration intakes and the recruitment of foreign 
labour. These arrangements remained in place until the after the Second World War (Salter, 
1978: 21).20 
 
Labour immigration policy from 1945 to 1972: Increasing immigration for economic 
expansion 
Australian immigration policy took a new course in 1945 when the Chifley Labor government 
sought to expand the immigration intake owing to its objectives of improving national 
defence capability and economic self-reliance.21 Australia had hitherto relied upon an alliance 
with the UK for protection against the prospect of invasion from its more heavily populated 
Asian neighbours. Japan’s southward advance during the Second World War exposed the 
flaws of this strategy. In the words of the first Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell, “if 
Australians have learned one lesson from the Pacific war … it is surely that we cannot 
continue to hold our island continent for ourselves and our descendents unless we greatly 
increase our numbers” (quoted in Kelly, 2009: 188). Low birth rates during the 1930s led the 
government to believe that other sources of population growth were necessary (Price, 1975: 
306). It therefore set an objective of a two per cent annual population increase, with 
immigration and natural growth each contributing one per cent (Holton and Sloan, 1994: 
281). 
 
The decision to relax immigration controls also complemented an agenda of macro and 
microeconomic expansion. The Chifley government (from 1945 to 1949) and centre-right 
Liberal/Country coalition governments (from 1949 to 1972) used Keynesian policies aimed at 
stimulating industrial growth to avoid a repeat of the era of recession and mass unemployment 
that had followed the First World War. Active state intervention was required to bring these 
objectives to fruition and came through modifications to the protectionist settlement. Trade 
protection was continued, large incentives were offered for foreign investment, primary 
export industries were generously subsidised, and the labour force was expanded through full 
                                                
20 However, the depression prompted a significant reduction in assisted passages, which ceased altogether with 
the outbreak of the Second World War (Salter, 1978: 22). 
21 There has been much debate over which of these two factors was the more significant driver of immigration 
policy change (cf. Collins, 1991: 20-21). However, as Holton and Sloan have concluded, rather than seeing one 
or other as predominant, the fortification of national security and economic expansion were distinct but 
nonetheless essentially compatible objectives that an expansionary immigration policy helped to accomplish 
(1994: 286). 
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employment strategies and increased immigration (Bell, 1993: 17-19; Broomhill, 2008: 20). 
Relaxing immigration controls provided the increase of labour supply necessary for major 
public works projects and the development of secondary industry. It also facilitated an 
expansion of the domestic consumer market (Blackton, 1953: 166; Economou, 2004: 427). 
 
The decision to expand the immigration intake generated two immediate demands. First, 
recruiting the foreign workers to match the labour requirements of domestic industry was 
beyond the existing bureaucratic capacities of Australian governments. In 1946, the State 
governments agreed to relinquish their remaining responsibility for immigration policy to the 
Commonwealth. An Immigration Department was established to administer the recruitment, 
selection and employment allocation of immigrants.22 The Immigration Department was also 
tasked with consulting the States and other Commonwealth ministries to determine how 
immigration should complement regional and national labour market requirements (Salter, 
1978: 24-25).  
 
The need to gain acceptance of the new immigration policy regime from organised interests 
and the broader community was the second demand that was required. There is no apparent 
evidence of hostility among the general community between 1945 and 1972, despite the 
challenge that relaxing immigration controls presented to British cultural homogeneity. The 
salience of immigration was low and there was no emergence of hostile political parties or 
pressure groups (Markus, 1984: 22). One reason for this is the bipartisan recognition that 
increasing immigration was necessary to meet the imperatives of defence and economic self-
reliance. Another is that the government (via the Immigration Department) established 
advisory councils to broker consensus among the major organised interests. These councils 
had no formal policy-making role but were nonetheless effective in abrogating potential 
opposition, particularly from trade unions, which remained industrially powerful throughout 
this period. According to Bob Hawke (a senior official for the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU) from the 1950s before becoming prime minister in 1983), the advisory 
councils were critical for gaining union support for the post-war immigration programme. He 
                                                
22 Prior to its establishment, the Department of External Affairs and the Department of the Interior had joint 
responsibility for immigration policy (Bruer and Power, 1993: 106). Originally conceived as the Ministry of 
Immigration, the Immigration Department (the term that will hereafter be used in this and subsequent Chapters) 
has been erstwhile named the Department of Labour and Immigration, the Department of Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs, the Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. 
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argues that the scale of post-war immigration could not have occurred without union support 
(Hawke, 1993: 6-7; cf. Jupp, 1998: 164; Warhurst, 1993: 181-182). Union opposition was a 
key factor in the restriction of immigration in 1901. The moderation of this position was thus 
crucial for the expansion of immigration after 1945. The government used the advisory 
councils to convince unions there would be no negative impact on wages and unemployment. 
A successful case was made that economic expansion would increase demand and that 
immigrants were needed for low-skilled jobs that residents were disinclined to take (Groutsis, 
2003: 69; Patmore, 1991: 200-1; Vasta, 2005: 8). Quinlan and Lever-Tracy claim that 
compulsory arbitration ‘restricted the capacity of employers to use immigrants as a “super 
exploitable” category of labour’ (1990: 161). The effectiveness of compulsory arbitration in 
providing secure wage and employment standards therefore further placated union concerns.23 
Other prospectively hostile groups such as returned soldiers and Catholic working class 
organisations were also mollified through the advisory councils. These groups were 
successfully persuaded to support immigration expansion on defence grounds, which 
appeared to further resonate in the context of the Cold War. The advisory councils also helped 
to generate broader community support, as member organisations often gave formal 
endorsement to immigration policy and were encouraged to promote its virtues to their 
constituencies (Warhurst, 1993: 181-182).  
 
The foreign workers recruited in the late 1940s and early 1950s were mainly young and semi 
or lower skilled and often placed in agriculture and construction. Many came via the 
Displaced Persons Program, which brought some 170,000 people from war-torn Europe  
(Hugo, 1994b: 54; Iredale, 2002: 139; Jupp, 2002: 12). Displaced persons were obliged to 
undertake a two-year employment contract at a prescribed location; conditions that other 
immigrants were not subject to (Collins, 1988: 10; Kabala, 1993: 16-17). Immigration 
selection shifted much more towards the higher skilled in the 1960s, and many immigrants 
went to work in the burgeoning automotive and ship manufacturing, iron and steel industries 
(Salter, 1978: 15). This partly reflected the way that industry and employer groups were able 
to use their representation on the advisory councils to shape the nature of immigration 
recruitment and selection (O’Donnell and Mitchell, 2000: 8).  
 
                                                
23 Unions nonetheless remained committed to the White Australia policy until 1965 (Freudenberg, 1991: 241). 
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Immigration selection in the initial post-war period largely reflected the racial preferences of 
the White Australia policy. However, the UK’s economic recovery made it a less reliable 
source of recruitment and prompted the Immigration Department to look further afield, 
initially to Northern Europe and later to Southern and Eastern Europe (Castles, S. 1992: 551). 
Between 1946 and 1970, the Commonwealth government established bilateral agreements 
with various European states, which facilitated the passage of around 1.7 million immigrants 
(Jupp, 2007: 138; Salter, 1978: 15). The White Australia policy was thus gradually ‘diluted’ 
to allow immigration from across Europe (see Figure 3.1), but an almost complete restriction 
on Asian nationals remained until 1966, when policy was relaxed to allow the entry of high-
skilled and professional non-Europeans (Callan, 1983: 124-125). 
 
Figure 3.1 Overseas-born population from regions of Europe in Australia,  
1947, 1961 and 1971 
 
Source: Markus et al. (2009): 55 
 
Labour immigration policy from 1972 to 1996: The post-protectionist dilemmas of 
immigration selection 
Race and nationality were abandoned as immigration selection principles by the Whitlam 
Labor government in the early 1970s. Automatic right of entry for UK, Irish and 
Commonwealth citizens was rescinded, and all foreign nationals now required entry visas 
(with the exception of those from New Zealand)24 (Ongley and Pearson, 1995: 772). 
Economic criteria had been a component of immigration selection since the 1950s, but 
became more predominant with the introduction of the Structured Selection Assessment 
System (SSAS) in 1973. SSAS was the first attempt at structured and ‘objective’ immigration 
selection. It attempted to fuse the existing system of qualitative assessments of personal 
qualities and the likelihood of social integration, with the Canadian system of awarding 
‘points’ for certain quantifiable economic and employment-based attributes (Hawkins, 1991: 
105-106). This period also saw the annual immigration intake decline from 107,401 to 52,748 
                                                
24 Reciprocal rights of free movement were established under the 1973 Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement, which 
allowed Australian and New Zealand citizens to work in and travel between each nation (Hawkins, 1991: 147). 
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following the global economic downturn of 1973-74, and remained at around this level for 
much of the decade (Jupp, 2002: 224). Economic growth between 1979 and 1982 resulted in 
greater labour demand and the immigration programme increased from 67,192 to 118,030 
during this period (Jupp, 2002: 224). Concerned that wage hikes and labour and skills 
shortages would cause the economic boom to end prematurely, the Fraser Liberal/National 
government adjusted immigration selection in line with labour market demand (Birrell, 1984: 
72).  
 
Economic and employment-based criteria were given greater priority with the introduction of 
the Numerical Assessment Scheme (more commonly known as NUMAS) in 1979, which 
moved further away from qualitative assessment and towards the quantitative-based Canadian 
points model. The immigration programme was also classified according to ‘skilled’ and 
‘family’ visa categories (Jupp, 2007: 144-145). NUMAS heralded a shift towards a ‘human 
capital’ model of immigrant selection. It assumed labour market success to be the most 
accurate measure of social integration and gave preference to applicants with skills and 
English language ability. NUMAS also represented the first expression of regional labour 
immigration policy by awarding additional points awarded to those committing to settle in a 
“designated growth” area (Birrell, 1984: 70-72; Hawkins, 1991: 142, 146). The introduction 
of various skilled visas in 1981 saw a further shift towards human capital selection. However, 
these reforms were soon reversed following an economic recession. The points-based 
Occupations in Demand visa was discontinued after it was found to be ineffective in matching 
applicants’ skills to domestic labour market demand (although it was revived a few years later 
in a modified form). The regulation of new employer-sponsored Employment Nominees visa 
was also significantly tightened (Baker et al., 1994: 7-8; Immigration Department, 1999). At 
the same time, the scope for family reunion immigration was substantially widened through 
provisions allowing residents to sponsor parents and siblings (Birrell, 1984: 73-78). 
 
The Hawke Labor government came to power in 1983 pledging to invest more in skills 
development and recruit fewer foreign workers (Birrell, 1984: 72). The skilled categories of 
the immigration programme were accordingly reduced from 38,363 in 1982-83 to 8,856 in 
1984-85 (Baker et al., 1994: 9). Employers wanting to sponsor immigrants to fill job 
vacancies now had to prove that no resident workers were available and that they had invested 
sufficiently in workforce training (Crock, 1998: 94-95). The Hawke government gradually 
increased the overall immigration intake to 145,316 and the skilled programme to 43,645 as 
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the economy recovered over the course of the decade (BIR, 1989). Selection policy was 
reformed in 1989 to give greater emphasis to human capital criteria and priority for skilled 
over family immigration categories. An adjustable pass mark also gave the government 
greater capacity to raise or lower the intake of points-based visas (Birrell, 1998: 2-3; Crock, 
1998: 95-96; Immigration Department, 1999). The intake of skilled visas was reduced from 
48,421 in 1990-91 to 12,794 in 1993-94 following another economic recession (Immigration 
Department, 2002a: 18). The skilled category intakes increased after the economy began to 
recover, although the family categories became more predominant. This partly reflected the 
government’s promoting of training, employment and active labour market policies in the 
wake of the recession. As articulated by Paul Keating (Prime Minister from 1991 to 1996), 
“in this recovery the complement to skill formation in the labour market is not going to come 
from migration. This time it has to come from training our own people, including those who 
are presently unemployed” (quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, 1995). As seen in Figure 3.2, 
the proportional rise in the skilled visas following 1989 reforms was undone by 1996. 
 
Figure 3.2 Annual permanent immigration programme intakes, major categories and sub-
categories, 1988/89 to 1995/96 
 
Source: BIR (1989) Immigration Update, December Quarter, AGPS: Canberra (for 1988-89); BIR (1991) 
Immigration Update, June Quarter, AGPS: Canberra (for 1989-90); DIMIA (2002) Consolidated Statistics 1999-
00 (for 1990-91 to 1995-96) 
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Three factors shaped immigration policy development over the period between 1972 and 
1996. First, economic and labour market fluctuations influenced the shifts in the priority 
given in immigrant selection policy to skills and human capital factors on one hand, and 
social and settlement criteria ‘settlement’ criteria on the other, and the balance between the 
skilled and family categories. The boom-bust nature of the Australian economy had a visible 
impact on the size and composition of the immigration programme over this period. The 
recessions of 1973-75, 1981-83 and 1990-92 coincided with dwindling immigration intakes 
(especially of the skilled categories), and the economic boom periods of 1979-81 and 1986-88 
with increased intakes (Lloyd, P. 1993: 73). But the relationship between macroeconomic 
trends and immigration was not so straightforward. 
 
Structural economic change was a second factor shaping immigration policy over this period. 
Despite unemployment levels remaining at reasonably high levels, the Hawke government 
increased the immigration intake in the mid 1980s because labour shortages had emerged 
across some industries (Collins, 1991: 27; Holton and Sloan, 1994: 305). This was partly due 
to the shifts in industrial composition. Significant weaknesses had emerged in the 
protectionist settlement model in the late 1960s. Secondary industry had flourished under 
trade protection, but prosperity of the post-war economic boom disguised structural 
inefficiencies. At the same time, rising commodities prices were helping to revitalise the 
Australian minerals and energy industries (Lloyd, C. 2003: 417-418). Support coalesced 
around the notion that a more liberal trade policy would provide a competitive stimulus to 
secondary industry and expand opportunities for international trade. In this context, the 
political consensus for protectionism began to erode (Castles, F. 1988: 149-150; Kasper, 
1983: 12-13).  
 
Various developments heralding the dismantling of the protectionist settlement had 
implications for immigration policy. Governments took various decisions that exposed 
Australian industry to greater international competition. In 1973, the Whitlam government 
lowered tariffs on all imported goods by 25 per cent. The Hawke government later initiated a 
reconstruction of the Australian economy after manufacturing industries almost failed to 
survive the recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s. It deregulated banking and financial 
markets, floated the Australian dollar, and announced that government would no longer 
support unviable industries (Capling and Galligan, 1992: 122-123; Stewart, 1994: 245). These 
and later economic reforms precipitated a significant growth in export-oriented minerals and 
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services industries on one hand, and the demise of secondary industry on the other. These 
structural shifts had a disruptive impact upon domestic labour markets, which created pockets 
of demand during periods of high unemployment. Immigration selection policy was adjusted 
to help meet this demand (cf. Birrell, 2003: 38-39). 
 
Growing international economic engagement was another development relating to the 
dismantling of the protectionist settlement that contributed to shifts in immigration policy 
between 1972 and 1996. While Australia had hitherto sought to insulate itself from Asia both 
militarily and economically, foreign policy realism and enticing trade opportunities with 
flourishing economies in its region saw a shift towards engagement in the early 1970s. 
However, states such as Japan and Singapore made it clear that they would not reciprocate 
until Australia ended racially discriminatory immigration selection (Tavan, 2004: 122-124). 
Foreign economic policy was not the only factor that led to the formal abolition of the White 
Australia policy. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam cited moral as well as geopolitical reasons 
for the reform (Crock, 1998: 34; Hawkins, 1991: 34). The Labor Party had become 
increasingly receptive to demands for racial equality from burgeoning social movements 
(partly for electoral reasons). The abolition of race-based selection by other states such as 
Canada and the US also made it difficult for Australia to maintain such a system 
(Ghandnoosh and Waldinger, 2006: 721). However, the transition from a political economy of 
defensive protectionism to one of liberal engagement implied that ‘immigration had lost its 
role as an agent of defensive nation-building’, according to Birrell (2003: 36). The shifts 
between human capital and settlement factors as the predominant immigration selection 
criteria also reflected an uncertainty over the precise role of immigration in Australia’s future 
political economy.  
 
Increased pressure from organised interests was a third factor for immigration policy change 
between 1972 and 1996. Changing immigration policy-making structures was a key reason 
for this. A proliferation of bodies to advise on various immigration and related policy areas 
replaced the advisory councils of the post-war years. Additionally, a formalised consultation 
process for determining the size and composition of the annual immigration intake was 
established. The immigration minister typically used this process to hold public meetings 
around Australia with organised interests and the general public. This consultation, and 
dialogue with other Commonwealth ministries and State governments, informed the 
immigration minister’s Cabinet submissions. The consultative nature of policy-making 
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invariably made government decisions on the immigration programme highly politicised 
(Castles and Vasta, 2004: 156; Jupp, 1993: 243; Parkin and Hardcastle, 1994: 428-437, 441). 
Crock claims that it ensured that immigration remained ‘sharply prominent in the public 
mind’ (2002: 54). As with previous eras, business and unions retained influence over policy 
direction. Business groups representing employers and the housing and development 
industries appeared to sway the Fraser government’s decisions to increase immigration and 
give greater weighting to human capital selection criteria (Birrell, 1984: 69; Freeman and 
Birrell, 2001: 532; Rubenstein, 1993: 148). Trade unions were able to influence policy 
towards the opposite direction under Labor governments. Pressure from unions can partly 
account for the decline of immigration under the Whitlam government and reductions in the 
skilled stream in the wake of recessions in the early 1980s and early 1990s (Parkin and 
Hardcastle: 1994, 437-438). 
 
A number of newly emerged organised interests also had an impact on immigration policy 
during this period, most notably ethnic community organisations. Their growing number was 
a consequence of large numbers of immigrants settling during the post-war decades. 
Commonwealth and State governments encouraged the formation of ethnic community 
organisations from the mid 1970s through direct financial assistance, representation on 
advisory bodies, and the establishment of ethnic media outlets (all part of the promotion of 
multiculturalism as the official immigrant settlement policy) (Hardcastle et al., 1994: 116).25  
According to Birrell, ‘these measures increased the power base and legitimacy of ethnic 
interests in the migration debate’ (1984: 75). It is widely contended that ethnic community 
organisations used their supposed sway over foreign-born voters in marginal electorates as a 
tool for negotiating favourable policies with both the major parties (Betts, 2003a: 171; 
Hardcastle et al., 1994: 116; Kabala, 1993: 15; Vasta, 2005: 9-10). Writing in the mid 1980s, 
Birrell went so far as to argue that ‘party competition for the migrant vote has become the 
dominant factor in migration policy’ (1984: 79). Even Jupp, who asserts that the influence of 
ethnic community groups was exaggerated, claims that immigration ministers under the 
Hawke and Keating governments were often referred to as the ‘minister for winning the 
ethnic vote’ (1993: 235; cf. 2002: 79). Various writers claim that ethnic community 
organisations used their leverage to successfully press for policy shifts such as the expansion 
                                                
25 Ethnic communities were often organised locally and regionally around individual ethnic communities. Peak 
organisations such as the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia (FECCA) gave them a vehicle 
through which to exert political pressure. 
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of family category intakes and the Hawke government’s weakening of human capital 
selection criteria (Birrell, 1984: 65, 79; Lloyd, P. 1993: 78). 
 
These particular policy changes partly reflected tensions over whether immigration selection 
should be weighted more towards economic or human capital criteria on the one hand, or 
social or settlement factors on the other. Arguments in favour of the latter essentially regarded 
immigration selection as an extension of settlement policy. The ethnic community 
organisations were the most prominent supporters of this view and it had support within both 
major parties, including from various immigration ministers. They held that immigrants were 
more likely to integrate if they had family members already resident in Australia. Policies 
such as prioritising the reunification of settled immigrants with their families over labour 
immigration, greater weighting towards qualitative social attributes over quantitative human 
capital attributes, and the broader promotion of multiculturalism tended to be associated with 
this position. 
 
The dominance of settlement criteria in immigration selection policy attracted considerable 
criticism. This was symbolised by an authoritative independent report by the Committee to 
Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policy (CAAIP) commissioned by the Hawke government 
in 1988. The CAAIP’s 1988 report was highly critical of the priority given to settlement over 
human capital criteria in immigration selection. It argued that this had contributed to 
‘widespread mistrust’ in immigration policy: ‘the programme is not identified in the public 
mind with the national interest, and must be given a convincing rationale. Selection methods 
need a sharper economic focus, for the public to be convinced that the programme is in 
Australia’s interests’ (CAAIP, 1988: xi). The report recommended more emphasis on human 
capital attributes such as skills, youth, entrepreneurship, and English language competency 
(CAAIP, 1988: xii-xiii). The CAAIP argued that the pluralisation of policy formulation was 
the cause of growing incoherence and diminished public confidence in immigration policy. 
Popular perceptions that ‘immigrant networks’ had captured the Immigration Department and 
skewed the direction of policy away from the interests of the broader community were cited 
in support (CAAIP, 1988: xi, xv). This characterisation was widely supported in academic 
debate (cf. Kabala, 1993: 16).  
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Labour immigration policy contexts inherited by the Howard government 
The pluralisation of immigration politics signified the erosion of the consensus that had 
formed around immigration policy. When the Howard government was first elected, the 
secondary industries that had recruited much of the immigration in the 1950s and 1960s were 
in decline. The shift from a protectionist and defensive model of political economy to one of 
liberalism and international engagement meant there was no longer a clarion call to ‘populate 
or perish’. Finding workers to facilitate industrial expansion was an agreed basis of ‘national 
interest’ upon which the principles of immigrant selection were built from 1945. But changes 
in Australia’s economy and social composition, and its relationship with the wider world, had 
brought changes to the national priorities. And this contributed to discord about what should 
be the fundamental tenets of immigration selection, which became increasingly entrenched 
between 1972 and 1996. According to Hugo, ‘few had questioned the importance of 
immigration’ during the post war years, but this was no longer the case 50 years later (1994a: 
3). Indeed, in the words of Holten and Sloan, ‘not only did the objectives of immigration 
policy span a much wider canvas than previously, but the extent of disagreement increased 
markedly’ (1994: 289).  
 
Bob Hawke claimed that the expansion of immigration after the Second World War was the 
one instance where the major political parties had forged a common position “to advance the 
national interest ahead of where they believed the electorate to be” (quoted in Healy, 1994: 
40). By the mid 1990s, the extent of disagreement over the direction of selection policy was 
straining this bipartisan commitment (Hugo, 1994a: 3). This contributed to high levels of 
public dissatisfaction. Opinion polls conducted between 1990 and 1996 showed that clear 
majorities believed the immigration intake to be too large (see Figure 3.3). Furthermore, 
consistent preference for the Coalition as better party to handle immigration issues reflected 
popular dissatisfaction with the policies of the Labor government (see Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.3 Respondents views on the size of the current immigration intake (%), 1990 to 
1996 
 
Source: McAllister and Clark (2008): 71 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Respondents nominating the party they think would best handle immigration, 
March 1990 to January 1996 (%) 
 
Source: Newspoll (2010) ‘Political and issues trends’, www.newspoll.com.au, 28 March 
64 
Tensions over immigration policy were apparent both within and between the major political 
parties. The pluralisation of immigration politics at a national level had played out on a 
smaller stage within the Labor Party (Hardcastle et al., 1994: 123). While it had once been a 
staunch supporter of the White Australia policy, Labor’s views on immigration had softened. 
This was partly due to an expansion of its support base beyond working class voters and 
towards the liberal middle class from the late 1960s. The party later became increasingly 
adept at gaining the support of ethnic community groups (Betts, 2003b: 37; Hardcastle et al., 
1994: 116). Reflecting the preferences of its broadened constituency, Labor governments 
between 1983 and 1996 became more favourable of immigration programmes dominated by 
family over skilled categories, as well as multicultural settlement policies. The overt hostility 
of trade unions towards immigration moderated considerably over the course of the twentieth 
century (Collins, 1991: 274; Grattan, 1993: 142; Parkin and Hardcastle, 1994: 437). The legal 
protection of employment standards through the compulsory arbitration system played an 
important role in placating union attitudes. Compulsory arbitration meant that employers 
could not engage immigrant labour to undercut wage benchmarks, and was a pillar of the 
protectionist settlement still intact in 1996. Unions still called for reduced labour immigration 
intakes during periods of rising unemployment. But a more ethnically diverse workforce, and 
the growing pervasiveness of social liberalism within their leadership ranks, saw unions 
increasingly supportive of large humanitarian and family immigration intakes. The ACTU 
used its strong ties to Labor governments to exert influence over the direction of immigration 
policy, particularly between 1983 and 1996 (Hardcastle et al., 1994: 114; Quinlan and Lever-
Tracy, 1990: 159-161). Despite receiving trade union support, Labor’s pursuit of high family 
immigration intakes during economic downturns and its promotion of multiculturalism 
disenchanted many socially conservative working class voters (Betts, 2002: 40-41; 2005: 31). 
Criticism of these policies also came from within Labor’s parliamentary ranks. One minister 
said that the Hawke and Keating governments used immigration “as a tremendously important 
element in building up a long-term political constituency” (Barry Jones, quoted in Sheehan, 
1998: 110). Another minister claimed that ethnic community pressure for higher family 
intakes led the government to regularly exceed the planned intake levels (Walsh, P. 1995: 
186).  
 
The Coalition had grown increasingly critical of the direction of immigration policy by the 
mid 1990s and happily received such disparagements. The Liberal and National Parties (and 
their antecedents) had given broad support to the tenor of immigration policy since its initial 
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incorporation into the protectionist settlement. Their preference for skilled and European 
immigrants and incremental changes to the ethnic composition of the programme reflected a 
generally cautious approach (Birrell, 1984: 70; Rubenstein, 1993: 145). However, the Liberal 
Party became a microcosm of wider political tensions over immigration during the 1972 to 
1996 period. The Liberal Party’s liberal wing supported settlement criteria as a basis for 
immigrant selection policy, while its conservative wing took a more doubtful position. 
 
Despite having stronger links with the Liberal Party, business groups (particularly those 
representing employers and the housing and construction industries) consistently made a case 
to both Coalition and Labor governments for higher skilled category intakes (Collins, 1991: 
106). But the effectiveness of business lobbying was constrained by a lack of organisational 
cohesion. Industrial fragmentation, distinct regional economies, a culture of competitive 
lobbying, and a large overlap in the membership domains of the various representative bodies, 
had fragmented the political power of Australian business (Eccleston, 2000: 313). One 
Immigration Department official says that the Hawke and Keating government ministers 
regularly invited business groups for input in policy deliberations, but ‘they could rarely get 
their act together and one employer group would say this and another employer group would 
say the other’ (interview, Immigration Department official AU36; cf. Hardcastle et al., 1994: 
121). However, direct encouragement from the government for a more organised business 
lobby and changing economic circumstances had led business to become more organised by 
the mid 1990s (Bell, 1994: 146).  
 
According to Money and Cole, governing parties in Australia are ‘virtually unconstrained by 
legislation or the previous government’s policies’ in determining the composition and size of 
immigration intakes and determining selection criteria (1999: 159). However, the 
longstanding existence of a dedicated immigration ministry served as another source of 
executive branch influence over policy direction. Even within the Immigration Department, 
there was a conflict over whether a selection policy that prioritised human capital or 
settlement criteria was more complementary to the ‘national interest’. But from the mid 
1980s, the prevailing internal view within the ministry became more aligned with the business 
preference for a generous and skilled-oriented immigration programme. The senior ranks of 
the Immigration Department undertook to make immigration policy more positive in its 
economic impact on account of a series of developments during this period. The ministry was 
criticised for the way in which it developed and administered policy, particularly for the 
66 
weight supposedly given to the views of organised interests over public interest imperatives 
(cf. Jupp, 1993: 253). Prominent historian Geoffrey Blainey went so far as to assert that a 
‘secret room’ existed within the Immigration Department, where policy was made beyond the 
purview of the broader public (Blainey, 1984: 101). Budgetary imperatives and a growing 
liberal economic orthodoxy were also having a greater impact on policy-making within the 
Commonwealth public service (cf. Pusey, 1991: 74). And the Immigration Department’s 
economic credentials were under intense scrutiny from the Treasury and the Department of 
Finance (interview, Immigration Department official AU37).  
 
Following these developments, senior Immigration Department officials concluded that 
immigration selection needed to give greater preference to applicants more likely to deliver a 
net economic benefit and gain professional employment, rather than those likely to be welfare 
dependent. As such, an institutional preference emerged for human capital attributes to be 
given greater priority. The CAAIP’s recommendations that selection policy should focus 
more on economic criteria thus broadly reflected conventional views within the ministry, if 
not the government (interviews, Immigration Department officials AU31, AU37, AU42; 
Bruer and Power, 1993: 118-121; Jupp, 2002: 48-49). The establishment of a ‘human capital 
orthodoxy’ within the Immigration Department was the product a normative belief in a large 
immigration programme, rather than the merits of economic rationalism (Hardcastle et al., 
1994: 97). Indeed, adjusting immigration selection mechanisms in this manner was viewed as 
the most likely way of restoring and maintaining community confidence. As a ministry that 
had been created to administer such an expansive immigration policy, many officials within 
the Immigration Department were committed to ensuring that this remained the case (Hugo, 
2004: 3). The rising levels of public dissatisfaction with existing policy fuelled concerns 
about the long-term political viability of an expansive programme. One senior official says 
that ‘the prevailing mood in the Department was: “we’ve moved too far off the centre line. If 
we don’t bring this thing back, the reaction will shut down immigration”’ (interview, 
Immigration Department official AU42). In this context, a human capital orthodoxy emerged, 
because it was ‘an easier thing for the Department to defend… You can more easily defend 
immigration if it is easily seen that immigrants are adding to the economic welfare of 
Australia’, according to another official (interview, Immigration Department official AU31). 
 
The necessity of strong border control for the maintenance of credibility and confidence in the 
immigration programme was another article of faith within the Immigration Department 
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(Freeman and Birrell, 2001: 546-547). According to Bruer and Power, ensuring strong border 
control and ‘fairness in the allocation of scarce places’ were central and constant functions of 
the Immigration Department from its inception (1993: 122). Mandatory visas for all foreign 
nationals (except New Zealanders) was key to the operation of this control function, and was 
refined with the introduction of a codified system of immigration law in 1989 (Jupp, 2007: 
144). This system specified that anybody not meeting the stated criteria for visa attainment, or 
who did not conform to the rigidly defined procedures of visa allocation, would be 
categorically refused entry, regardless of their individual circumstances. To do otherwise 
would not only be unfair, but would also undermine the system’s credibility.  
 
Increasing scepticism towards the immigration policy status quo from the Immigration 
Department, the incoming Coalition government and the broader community did not 
necessarily signal a more restrictionist policy orientation. Other forces were coalescing for a 
shift towards a liberal approach. As stated above, there had been shifts in industrial 
composition from manufacturing to services, in market regulation from protectionism to 
liberalism, and in market orientation from domestic to international markets since the early 
1970s. An influential report for the Commonwealth government in 1989 spelled out the 
implications of these shifts for immigration policy. Australia and the Northeast Asian 
Ascendency (often referred to as ‘the Garnaut report’, after its author) argued that a further 
move away from defensive protectionism and towards greater engagement with Asia was 
integral to Australia’s economic and geopolitical future. It set out various liberal economic 
policy prescriptions for how this could be achieved, such as lowering trade protection, 
encouraging international investment, and lowering barriers to skilled immigration. The 
Garnaut report argued that encouraging international students to Australian universities would 
facilitate significant trade in tertiary education (Kelly, 1992: 673-674). Birrell says that these 
prescriptions complemented a broader trend in government thinking that ‘if Australia was to 
sell value added goods and services (rather than commodities) into the booming Asian region, 
it needed to boost its intellectual resources. Immigration could play a part through an infusion 
of disciplined, clever and entrepreneurial migrants, especially from Asia’ (2003: 37). The 
Hawke and Keating governments embraced many aspects of the Garnaut report, but its 
recommendations for immigration policy would have to wait for a more accommodating 
economic and political environment. 
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Conclusion 
The direction of immigration policy was highly contentious when the Howard government 
came to office in 1996. This was partly the consequence of a widespread perception that 
organised interests exerted undue influence over policy. Australian politics is reasonably 
pluralistic by comparative standards (Bell, 1995: 25-26), but immigration was evidently not 
an issue where sectional agendas could be seen to dominate. Between 1901 and 1972, 
consensus existed among the main political parties, organised interests and the broader 
community over immigration policy. Commonwealth governments were the main drivers of 
policy during this period, even if consensus was only achieved through protracted negotiation 
with key stakeholders. This was particularly the case after it assumed authority from the 
States and established a dedicated ministry after the Second World War. Commonwealth 
governments set the broad direction of policy, determined intake size and composition, 
recruited and selected immigrants, and facilitated their integration into society and the labour 
market (Hardcastle et al., 1994: 121-122). A strong state thus characterised Australian 
immigration politics, at least until 1972. 
 
The disappearance of the ‘nation-building’ agenda with the dismantling of the protectionist 
settlement precipitated the pluralisation of immigration politics. These developments allowed 
organised interests to cast more effectively their increasingly diverse objectives onto 
government policy. From the time the British decided to stop exporting convicts, Australian 
immigration policy was continually readjusted to select the immigrants most compatible with 
the ‘national interest’, however so defined by the government of the day. While many agreed 
that the entry of immigrants should continue to be permitted, immigration policy lost its 
coherent rationale from 1972 essentially because there was growing disagreement over which 
category of immigrants should be given priority. In other words, consensus eroded for how to 
define the national interest upon which selection policy was based. This indecision was 
complicated by the three recessions that occurred from 1972 to 1996. Nonetheless, there was 
considerable contention over whether the integration of immigrants into Australian society 
was facilitated more effectively by the presence of family connections, or the likelihood of 
labour market success. By establishing a human capital orthodoxy and making successful 
labour market outcomes among applicants, employers and regional areas the premise of 
immigration selection policy, the Howard government settled this debate after 1996, as the 
Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LIBERALISATION OF AUSTRALIAN LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1996-
2007 
 
The Liberal/National coalition government led by John Howard embarked upon a significant 
liberalisation of labour immigration between its first election victory in March 1996 and its 
defeat in November 2007. It reformed the parameters of immigration selection policy to 
favour applicants prejudged as likely to deliver a net benefit to the Australian economy, by 
using ‘labour market success’ as the basic tenet for selection. This resolved the dispute over 
the direction of policy that it inherited, which Chapter 3 discussed. The Howard government’s 
reforms led to a large increase in the number of foreign workers entering through the various 
permanent and temporary visa categories and under the working holidaymaker scheme (see 
Figure 4.1). These policy changes were wide ranging and to some extent overlapping, but can 
be distinguished according to three broad policy segments: 
 
(1) Greater priority for human capital criteria in immigration selection – the criteria 
for permanent immigration visas were regularly adjusted to give greater priority to 
young and highly skilled applicants with English language proficiency. International 
students were given concession to transfer to work visas, because they were considered 
likely to possess human capital attributes. Conversely, barriers were raised for the entry 
of applicants in the family and humanitarian permanent visa categories, because they 
were considered less likely to possess these attributes.  
 
(2) Employer-sponsored schemes – there was a sizeable increase in permanent skilled 
visas categories requiring sponsorship from an employer. There was also a large 
expansion of the previously small temporary work visa schemes, for which applicants 
also required employer sponsorship. Various other reforms relaxed restrictions on 
employer sponsorship for both permanent and temporary visas. 
 
(3) Regional schemes – there was a promotion of permanent visa categories 
encouraging foreign workers to settle in regional areas with low levels of population 
growth and density. Many of these schemes were based on sponsorship from a 
State/Territory government. Concessions were also introduced for various temporary 
visa categories to allow employers in regional areas to engage immigrants more easily. 
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This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first outlines the major components of 
reform within each of these three policy segments. The second draws upon primary 
documentation and interviews with policy-makers and stakeholders to analyse the principal 
factors accounting for these changes. As this chapter investigates, reform occurred for a range 
of reasons. Many of these reasons overlap between the various policy segments, making them 
rather difficult to isolate in discussion. Fiscal considerations, demographic concerns, the 
expansion of new industries, and party-political competition are all factors that explain the 
human capital criteria reforms. Considerations relating to labour shortages, inflationary 
pressure, and the internationalisation of the Australian economy all contributed to the 
expansion of employer-sponsored schemes. And the differing demands of State/Territory 
governments and regional labour shortages account for the various reforms to regional 
schemes. Accommodating business interests is a central theme of policy reform across all 
three segments. 
 
Figure 4.1 Annual labour immigration intakes in Australia by category, 1995/96 to 
2007/08  
 
Source: DIMA (2002) Consolidated stats 1999-00 (for permanent category 1995-96 to 1999-00); DIAC (2009) 
Population Flows: Immigration Aspects 2007-08, Figure 2.4 (for permanent category 2000-01 to 2007-08); 
DIMIA (2002) In Australia’s interests: A review of the temporary residence program, Table 4 (for temporary 
category 1995-96 to 1996-97), Joint Standing Committee on Migration (2007) Temporary visas … permanent 
benefits: Ensuring the effectiveness, fairness and integrity of the temporary business visa program, Table 1.1 
(for temporary category 1997-98 to 2005-06), DIAC (2009) Temporary Entrance Statistics, www.immi.gov.au/ 
media/statistics (for temporary and working holiday categories 2007-08); DIAC (2008) Population Flows: 
Immigration Aspects 2006-07, Table 3.16 (for working holiday category 1995-96 to 2006-07). 
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The main components of policy change 
Much of the labour immigration reform between 1996 and 2007 took place within the 
permanent immigration programme, which is regulated according to a composite annual 
target range. Smaller targets are established for the ‘skilled’, ‘family’, and ‘humanitarian’ 
categories within this composition range, each of which contains various visa sub-
categories.26 The Cabinet approves these annual targets on the advice of the immigration 
minister. In 1996, the main permanent skilled visa categories included:  
 
• The ‘Independent’ visa, a supply-driven programme under which successful applicants 
had to pass a points test. They were awarded points for possessing particular human 
capital attributes (though they did not require sponsorship from an employer, nor the 
prior arrangement of employment). 
• The demand-driven Employer-Nominated Scheme (ENS), which allowed employers 
to sponsor qualified foreign nationals for skilled occupations assessed to be in 
shortage. 
• The Concessional visa, another supply-driven scheme that enabled applicants that 
scored a specified number of points to be sponsored by a family member with 
permanent residency in Australia. This visa was initially part of the permanent family 
category, but was transferred to the skilled category in July 1997 and renamed the 
Linked visa. The greater weighting given to human capital attributes thereafter 
strengthened its status as a labour immigration scheme. 
• The Business Skills visa, another demand-driven scheme that offered permanent 
residency to foreign investors, executives and entrepreneurs with proven records of 
business ownership or asset management, and a commitment to manage or establish 
an enterprise in Australia. 
 
The intake levels for all these visa categories were nominally set according to target ranges. 
But the demand-driven nature of the ENS and Business Skills visas meant that they were 
                                                
26 Skilled permanent visa categories cannot be discussed without passing reference to the family and 
humanitarian categories, as the targets for each are determined concurrently within a singular policy-making 
process. The targets and the qualification criteria for each category are reviewed every 12 months, making policy 
adjustment constant and incremental (meaning that it does not conform to ‘punctuated equilibrium’ type models 
of policy change (cf. True et al., 1999: 97-99)). As such, there were scores of individual changes to the 
permanent immigration programme between 1996 and 2007. Holton and Sloan claim that ‘it is a daunting task to 
sort out the regulations as they existed and then changed’ (1994: 295). For this reason, and the sake of simplicity, 
this chapter concentrates on only the most significant instances of reform. 
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effectively uncapped and generally adjusted according to however many applicants met the 
requisite criteria (as was also the case with various family visas, such as those for spouses and 
dependent children). By contrast, the ‘supply-driven’ regulation of the Independent and 
Concessional/Linked visas meant that policy-makers could easily adjust the points 
qualification marks according to the size of the desired intake. This gave the government 
greater control over the intakes for these visas (O’Donnell and Mitchell, 2000: 10-11; Parkin 
and Hardcastle, 1994: 432).  
 
Priority of human capital criteria  
The annual permanent skilled visa intake rose from 24,100 to 108,500 between 1996 and 
2007 (see Figure 4.2). Intake levels remained modest during the first three years of the 
Howard government. However, there was a major recalibration of the permanent immigration 
programme during this period. The annual target for the family categories declined from 
56,700 in 1996 to 31,310 in 1998, and certain human capital criteria for family and skilled 
visas received much greater weighting as the result of policies changes in 1999. These 
developments resolved the conflict discussed in Chapter 3 and marked the establishment of a 
‘human capital’ orthodoxy as the primary basis for immigrant selection (Jupp, 2007: 55-56). 
 
The permanent skilled category intakes increased more markedly after adjustments to the 
Independent visa qualification criteria. These changes led to a rise in the Independent visa 
intake from barely 10,000 in 1996 to over 55,000 in 2007. A significant reform came in July 
1999, when applicants were awarded additional points for tertiary qualifications or work 
experience relating to skilled occupations in short supply, or proficiency in languages other 
than English (Immigration Minister, 1998). Additional points were again given in 2001 to 
applicants with skills in demand, a job offer in a shortage occupation, or higher-level 
qualifications from Australian tertiary institutions (Immigration Minister, 2001c). The 
removal of mandatory minimum requirements for age, general skills and English language 
proficiency represented another major reform to the Independent visa in 2005. It contributed 
to the single largest annual increase in the permanent skilled target range of 20,000 places (or 
25 per cent) (The Australian, 2005b). 
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Figure 4.2 Annual permanent immigration programme intakes, major categories and sub-
categories, 1995/96 to 2007/08 
 
Note: The qualifying criteria for the Concessional family visa was substantially modified in 1997, leading to its 
transfer to the skilled stream and being renamed the Linked visa 
Source: DIMIA (2002) Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics 1999-00, 18 (for 1995-96 to 1999-00); 
DIAC (2009) Population Flows: Immigration Aspects 2007-08, 26 (for 2000-01 to 2007-08) 
 
The widening of concessions to foreign nationals with Australian tertiary qualifications was a 
central feature of the human capital criteria reforms. The Howard government significantly 
strengthened the pathway from student to work visas through this mechanism. Birrell and 
Perry estimate that almost half of the recipients of permanent skilled visas in 2007-08 
originally went to Australia on student visas (2009: 65-66). The strengthening of the student-
work visa pathway came primarily through adjustments to the Independent and Linked visa 
criteria. In 1999, the government abolished the requirement that applicants to these visa 
schemes must have worked at least six of the previous 24 months in their nominated 
profession. This change greatly improved the application chances of international students 
and virtually guaranteed success for applicants possessing qualifications for occupations 
deemed ‘priority’ (Birrell, 1999: 52-55). In July 2001, reforms made it easier for international 
students to apply ‘onshore’ (i.e. without having to return first to their home nation) for 
independent visas. This further consolidated the route between student and permanent skilled 
visas. Applicants with Australian doctoral degrees and tertiary qualifications applicable to 
certain professional and trades jobs and occupations in short supply were now given scope to 
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apply immediately upon graduation without having to leave Australia (Immigration Minister, 
2001d). As such, international students made up around 50 per cent of all permanent skilled 
visa applicants within six months of this change coming into effect (Hawthorne, 2005: 686).  
 
Later initiatives further reinforced the student-work visa pathway. Foreign students 
graduating with a doctorate, masters or honours-level degree following the completion of a 
bachelors-equivalent qualification in Australia, were awarded additional points in April 2003 
(Immigration Minister, 2003b). And a reform in 2007 allowed students with two years recent 
tertiary study in Australia who did not otherwise qualify for an Independent visa to work 
without restriction for 18 months immediately on completion of their studies (Immigration 
Minister, 2007a). Achieving successful labour market outcomes among applicants was the 
main aim of all of the changes in this segment of reform. Improving the fiscal contribution of 
immigration, facilitating the growth of burgeoning knowledge industries, and longer-term 
demographic considerations were all factors that informed this objective. 
 
Employer-sponsored schemes 
The growth of employer-sponsored schemes was a related yet distinct development to the 
human capital criteria reforms seen in the development of the Independent and Linked visas. 
The increase of ENS visas from less than 5,000 in 1996 to almost 25,000 in 2007 contributed 
to the rise in the permanent skilled categories. A Migration Occupations in Demand List 
(MODL) was established in 1999 to allow employers to sponsor more easily applicants that 
possessed skills identified as being in shortage. The number of occupations of the MODL 
significantly expanded over the following years.27 Moreover, certain labour market testing 
obligations (i.e. where employers were required to locally advertise vacancies before 
engaging a foreign national) and eligibility requirements were also removed 
(DEEWR/Immigration Department, 2009: 11; Immigration Minister, 1999a). Additional 
reforms came in 2005 through the abolition of labour market testing obligations for employers 
wanting to sponsor temporary work visa holders on the ENS programme (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2005). Two years later, the ENS target was increased (Immigration Minister, 2007c). 
                                                
27 The MODL operated on the basis of a quantitative evaluation of shortages across the national labour market 
by the Department of Employment and consultations with business associations, trade unions and State/Territory 
governments. Only occupations assessed to be sufficiently skilled and in acute shortage could be placed on the 
MODL (DEEWR/Immigration Department, 2009: 9-10). 
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Australian immigration policy had almost been exclusively focused on permanent settlement 
prior to the election of the Howard government. However, the period from 1996 to 2007 saw 
a major expansion of temporary labour immigration schemes, most notably the Temporary 
Business Entry Long-Stay (Subclass 457) Visa (hereafter, the ‘temporary work visa’).28 Like 
the permanent ENS visa, the temporary work visas operated on the basis of employer 
sponsorship, for a maximum period of four years.29 No annual cap existed for temporary work 
visas, unlike the target-regulated permanent skilled categories. The demand driven nature of 
the scheme meant that employers could freely sponsor foreign workers under the scheme as 
long they fulfilled certain regulatory obligations. Regulatory adjustments facilitated an 
increase in the temporary work visa intake from 22,812 in the 1995-96 financial year to 
110,570 by 2007-08, which represented a larger increase than the permanent skilled 
categories over the same period.30 
 
The expansion of the temporary work visa scheme followed the Howard government’s 
adoption in August 1996 of virtually all the recommendations of an inquiry into the scheme.31 
The most significant recommendation of the inquiry was that employers should no longer be 
required ‘test’ the labour market before sponsoring a foreign worker performing a ‘key’ 
activity (Immigration Minister, 1996c). A ‘key’ activity was defined as one that the 
Immigration Department deemed to be essential to an employer’s operations. It needed to be 
skilled, but excluded trades occupations and, as such, applied predominantly to professional 
and managerial activities (Roach Committee, 1995: 4-6). Labour market testing requirements 
were maintained for the sponsorship of workers performing ‘non-key’ activities. Employers 
also had to demonstrate that they had made some commitment to skills or infrastructure 
                                                
28 There was some, albeit limited, scope for temporary labour immigration prior to 1996. Temporary work visas 
existed almost exclusively for high-skilled and professional workers and there was virtually no prospect for 
subsequent transfer to permanent visas. Employers could also collectively engage a defined number of foreign 
workers on a temporary basis through a Labour Agreement, but only if the Commonwealth government and 
relevant trade unions formally agreed that no resident workers were available to undertake the required tasks. In 
addition, students and working holidaymakers had some working rights, and social/cultural temporary work 
visas existed for entertainers and religious workers (Brooks et al., 1994: 6-8; Sloan and Kennedy, 1992: 777). 
29 A visa holder’s right to residency was contingent upon keeping their nominated job with their sponsoring 
employer. This right was lost if the employment relationship was terminated. This arrangement differed from the 
permanent ENS visa, where a visa holder’s residency was not contingent upon the maintenance of the 
employment relationship with their sponsoring employer. 
30 The permanent and temporary labour immigration routes cannot be treated in complete isolation. Despite its 
status as a temporary scheme, various reforms allowed visa holders to transfer more easily to permanent skilled 
visas. The temporary-permanent visa pathway became more established from the late 1990s. 
31 The previous Labor government had originally commissioned the inquiry and announced in 1995 that it would 
adopt all of its recommendations. The Coalition government reviewed these recommendations shortly after 
coming to office in 1996, before announcing that it would implement them in full (Kinnaird, 2006: 50-51). 
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investment before using the scheme. The streamlining of various administrative procedures, 
including the introduction of a system of ‘pre-qualified sponsorship’ allowing certain 
businesses to sponsor an unlimited number of foreign workers, were among the other 
recommendations adopted (Crock, 1998: 119-120; Kinnaird, 1996).  
 
Temporary work visa regulations were further relaxed in July 2001. The distinction between 
key and non-key activities, and all remaining labour market testing requirements, were 
abolished. A statutory minimum salary threshold and specified minimum skill levels replaced 
the existing key/non-key regulations. Sponsoring employers no longer had to outline their 
attempts to use the domestic labour market to fill vacancies, even for activities previously 
defined as non-key. They also did not have to show evidence of a sufficient investment in 
workforce training prior to engaging foreign workers. Additionally, para-professionals and 
skilled trades workers could be sponsored on temporary work visas (Immigration Minister, 
2001d). Delivering successful labour market outcomes for employers was a central motivation 
for the expansion of immigration programmes based on employer sponsorship. Minimising 
inflation, an increasingly competitive market environment, and objectives relating to labour 
market efficiency were all factors behind this motivation. 
 
Regional schemes 
The creation and expansion of regional schemes was another contributor to rising labour 
immigration intakes under the Howard government. These schemes were predominantly sub-
categories of the Independent, ENS and Linked visas, based on sponsorship by a 
State/Territory government or a regional local authority or employer. The combined intake of 
these schemes rose from less than 4,000 visa holders in 2000-01 to over 27,000 in 2005-2006 
(Immigration Department, 2008a).  
 
The establishment of the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme in 1996 marked the first 
regional labour immigration reform. Skilled applicants with sponsorship from a regionally-
based employer (or family member) could use this scheme to gain additional points under the 
ENS or Concessional family visas (Immigration Minister, 1996a). The State/Territory 
Nominated Independent visa was created the following year to disperse immigrants more 
effectively to regions with labour or population shortages. State/Territory governments acted 
as sponsors under the scheme (Immigration Minister, 1997b). In 1999, the ‘contingency 
reserve’ scheme was established (and subsequently expanded) to allow regional employers 
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and State/Territory governments to sponsor Independent visa applicants that had narrowly 
failed to achieve the points qualification mark (Immigration Minister, 2000, 2002). Changes 
to the regulations of the State/Territory-sponsored Business Skills and Skilled Independent 
Regional visas in February 2003 and May 2004 promoted the settlement of business and 
skilled immigrants in regional and low-population growth areas. These reforms also aimed to 
deter immigrants from settling in high-density areas such as Sydney (Immigration Minister, 
2003a, 2004b). Further incentives for regional settlement came through the creation of another 
State/Territory government sponsorship scheme in 2003. International students that had 
studied in these areas gained bonus points, and the entirety of South Australia, including its 
major cities, was zoned as ‘regional’ under the scheme (The Australian, 2004). The allocation 
of visas under various regional schemes was tripled to 10,000 in 2005. Regional sponsors 
were given various concessions, and cities such as Perth and Adelaide were reclassified as 
‘regional’ areas under certain visa categories (The Australian, 2005b). A sub-category of the 
Independent visa was created to attract skilled applicants to regional areas of Victoria as part 
of this reform package. Additional visa places were allocated for those that had previously 
studied in regional or low population growth areas who agreed to continue working there for 
another two years (Immigration Minister, 2005a). 
 
Temporary work visa reforms also incorporated various regional provisions. The skill and 
salary requirements introduced through the abovementioned July 2001 changes did not apply 
to employers in regional areas (defined, for the purposes of this scheme, as anywhere outside 
of the metropolitan centres of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, the Gold Coast, 
Newcastle and Wollongong). The statutory salary minimum threshold was 10 per cent lower 
for regional employers, who were also allowed to engage workers in lower skilled 
occupations if they could not ‘reasonably’ fill a position from the local labour force (Joint 
Standing Committee on Migration, 2007). The significant result of these changes was that the 
temporary work visa scheme ceased to be an exclusively ‘skilled’ avenue of labour 
immigration for regional employers. 
 
Various regional reforms were also made to the Working Holiday Makers (WHM) visa. The 
WHM scheme was established in 1975 to promote cultural exchange, and originally permitted 
18 to 25 year-olds from certain nations to engage in ‘incident employment’ during their 
holidays (Immigration Department, 2007: 6). There were limits on the length and nature of 
employment that WHM visa holders were allowed to undertake. But a series of relaxations to 
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these regulations and eligibility restrictions precipitated an increase in the scheme from 
42,700 in 1995-96 to 154,100 by 2007-08. The Howard government raised the quota of the 
WHM scheme soon after coming to office and later increased the maximum age of eligibility 
from 25 to 30 years (Immigration Minister, 1996b, 1999b). An increase in the number of 
nations with which Australia had reciprocal arrangements significantly expanded the number 
of people qualifying for the scheme.32 Changes in November 2005 allowed WHM visa 
holders to apply onshore for an Independent visa. Those that had worked in agriculture in a 
regional area for at least three months became eligible for a second 12-month visa, which 
allowed them to work in other industries (Immigration Minister, 2005c). These reforms were 
extended beyond agricultural employment in July 2006, when WHM visa holders that had 
worked for three months in any primary industry in a regional area could also apply for a visa 
extension. Moreover, the maximum term that visa holders could work for a single employer 
was increased from three to six months (Immigration Minster, 2006). Improving immigration 
policy outcomes for regional areas was the common aim of all the policy changes in this 
segment, which were primarily driven by pressure from State/Territory governments and 
regional employers. 
 
The reasons for policy change 
The Howard government designed immigration selection policy primarily according to 
positive labour market outcomes. It believed that ‘selecting for success’ in this manner was 
the best way for immigration policy to be made in accordance with the ‘national interest’. 
This assumption underpinned all three segments of labour immigration policy change. There 
was some overlap in the motivations for reform across these segments. Increasing the stock of 
those most likely to make a greater measureable contribution to the Australian economy, on 
one hand, and decreasing the inflow of those predicted to have a deleterious economical 
effect, on the other hand, was the main aim of the human capital criteria reforms. Delivering 
benefits to the national economy also underpinned changes to the employer-sponsored 
schemes, albeit in a different manner. The assumption that pressure or demand from 
employers was an effective proxy for labour market demand informed the greater focus on 
employer sponsorship. The use of labour immigration policy to deliver net fiscal benefits and 
                                                
32 In March 1996, Australia had reciprocal WHM agreements with Canada, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, the 
Republic of Korea and the UK. By November 2007, agreements had also been made with Belgium, Chile, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Taiwan, 
Thailand and Turkey (Tan et al., 2009: 1). 
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meet labour shortages were dual motivations for the changes to regional schemes. The 
reforms in all three categories also reflected broader shifts in Australia’s economic 
composition, specifically the growth in export-oriented ‘knowledge’ industries, and in its 
political economy, from the protectionist model to one that was more open and liberally-
regulated. 
 
Priority of human capital criteria 
Selecting for applicant success to achieve net fiscal dividends 
The human capital criteria reforms between 1996 and 1999 reflect the Howard government’s 
belief that immigration selection policy should be designed to deliver positive labour market 
outcomes among applicants. The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) was 
the instrument through which this was achieved. As such, the Howard government readjusted 
the LSIA in 1996 to develop an immigration programme that would maximise ‘economic 
benefit’ to Australia. One senior official says that economic benefit was defined according to: 
 
The extent to which and the speed with which the individuals who are selected get a 
job, get a job related to their skills, and get a well-paying job. They were the three 
criteria we used. If we select a migrant who’s going to get a job quickly, get a good 
job, a job that uses their skills and that pays well, economically that’s got to be a 
bonus for Australia (interview, Immigration Department official AU27).  
 
Accordingly, the LSIA was used to analyse the labour market performance of immigrants to 
determine the individual attributes that immigration selection policy should prioritise. Philip 
Ruddock, the Immigration Minister from 1996 to 2003, says that the LSIA was ‘a very 
important tool for rigorously justifying the decisions that have been made’. In particular, he 
says that it informed the priority given to human capital criteria in selection policy between 
1996 and 1999 (interview, Immigration Minister AU32). 
 
Ruddock and senior Immigration Department officials claim that the identification of poor 
labour market outcomes and high unemployment rates among family visa entrants was a 
central reason for the reduction in the permanent family visas in 1996 and 1997 (interviews, 
Immigration Minister AU32; Immigration Department officials AU27, AU39). This factor 
also cemented the reform of the Concessional family visa in July 1997, which led to its 
transfer to the permanent skilled category (where it was renamed the ‘Linked’ visa). 
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Thereafter, Linked visa applicants had to meet mandatory minimum requirements relating to 
“the core employability factors of skill, age and English language ability” (Immigration 
Department, quoted in Hawthorne, 2005: 682). The establishment of these three core 
employability factors was critical in the subsequent affirmation of human capital criteria in 
the Independent and Linked visa reforms of July 1999. On one hand, they were used to 
discriminate against applicants that did not meet a series of minimum standards. Applicants 
had to be below 45 years, be qualified for an appropriately skilled occupation, and 
demonstrate vocational-level English competency. On the other hand, those possessing the 
core employability factors were given priority. Applicants with skills or experience relating to 
a shortage occupation, and that had recently attained skilled qualifications or work experience 
in Australia, were awarded bonus points (Jupp, 2002: 151). These reforms directly followed 
the Review of the Independent and Skilled Australian Linked Categories (an independently 
authored report commissioned by the Immigration Department). Evaluating “the 
effectiveness” of the Independent and Linked visas “in selecting skilled migrants who can 
quickly make a positive contribution to the Australian economy, labour market and budget” 
was the stated aim of the review (Immigration Department, quoted in Hawthorne, 2005: 681-
682). The review cited evidence from the LSIA of the budgetary impact of immigrants in the 
main visa categories to recommend greater priority to human capital criteria under the points 
system (see Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3 Contribution of immigrants in certain visa categories to the Commonwealth 
budget in the five years after arrival 
 
Source: Immigration Department (1999): 28 
 
The policy changes that the review prompted were justified on fiscal grounds. They aimed to 
maximise the inflow among the categories that produced a high net positive contribution to 
the Commonwealth budget (most notably the Independent visa) and reform those generating a 
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negative impact (such as the Concessional visa before it was reformed to become the Linked 
visa). The government invoked fiscal arguments to justify the further prioritisation of human 
capital criteria after it found that, as a consequence of these reforms, applicants were 
contributing more to the economy, by way of taxation and consumer spending, than they were 
taking, through consumption of public goods (Immigration Minister, 2001b). Ministers also 
claimed repeatedly that the policies of the Keating government were the cause of immigrant 
unemployment and welfare dependence (cf. Immigration Minister, 1996d; 1997a). There was 
some validity in such assertions, even if they were largely motivated by party-political 
competition. Various studies found that the labour market outcomes of recently arrived 
immigrants in both the skilled and family categories (as measured by unemployment, salary, 
job satisfaction and welfare dependency levels) significantly improved from the mid 1990s 
(cf. Bridge, 2001: 8-10; Productivity Commission, 2006: 166). Hawthorne says that the 
Howard government’s ‘determination to “select for success”’, according to its ‘redefinition of 
“acceptable” human capital’, produced these improvements (2005: 690). In the hope of 
achieving positive outcomes, the government’s decisions to make it easier for international 
students to gain work visas were a key component of these reforms. 
 
Facilitating the growth of knowledge industries 
The strengthening of the student-work visa pathway was a key component of the human 
capital criteria reforms. Three factors drove this development. First, it complemented the 
agenda of enticing prospective migrants likely to deliver a net positive return to the national 
economy. According to one of the authors of the Review of the Independent and Skilled 
Australian Linked Categories (which recommended bonus points for Australian tertiary 
qualifications), foreign students were less likely to be welfare dependent, and more likely to 
obtain skilled employment, possess the core employability factors, and quickly become 
socially integrated. She claimed that these were all factors that the Immigration Department 
considered to constitute “a good (skilled) applicant” (Hawthorne, 2005: 685-686). 
 
Second, the apparent persuasion of business groups also motivated the removal of skilled visa 
barriers to student applicants. The stagnation of the permanent skilled intakes between 1996 
and 1997 occurred despite business requests for higher intakes (Betts and Gilding, 2006: 40; 
Freeman and Birrell, 2001: 541-542). The Howard government’s rejection of these requests 
was often made on the grounds that such a move would invariably weaken the quality of the 
intake. For instance, Ruddock claimed that lowering the visa qualification criteria would 
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‘irreparably undermine the significant economic, budgetary and employment benefits of 
skilled migration’ (Immigration Minister, 1999a). The establishment of a path between 
student and skilled visas overcame this dilemma, since awarding bonus points for Australian 
qualifications increased the number of eligible Independent and Linked visa applicants. 
Various business and government officials claim that this idea originated within the business 
community. Interviews suggest that the proposal of concessions for student applicants was 
promoted across the business community and gained support from key peak-level business 
groups such the Business Council of Australia (BCA) and the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (ACCI), and a number of industry-level groups. The proposal 
supposedly appealed to Ruddock, and subsequently Cabinet, because it allowed the skilled 
migration intake to increase without lowering the points qualification threshold (interviews, 
Immigration official AU40; ministerial adviser AU44; BCA official AU54). 
 
The third and perhaps most significant factor was the role of the student-visa pathway in 
helping to facilitate the expansion of knowledge industries. The growth of the ICT industry in 
the late 1990s acted as the catalyst for the awarding of concessions to international students. 
One public servant claims that the initial decision to allow international students to apply for 
skilled visas onshore ‘was driven almost entirely by the panic that there were not enough IT 
people in the world’ (interview, Immigration Department official AU38). The high demand 
for ICT workers was also the main motivation for the 2001 policy change that permitted 
foreign graduates to apply onshore for Independent and Linked visas. Prime Minster Howard 
announced this reform as part of the Backing Australia’s Ability policy package for science 
and technological innovation. He justified this change on the basis that ‘often the skills we 
need may not necessarily be available in Australia to meet short-term needs’ (Prime Minister 
of Australia, 2001). In a joint statement, Ruddock and the ICT Minister said the reforms were 
‘aimed at attracting more highly-skilled ICT workers to Australia and retaining Australian-
educated overseas ICT students, ensur[ing] that Australia can build on its competitive skilled 
migration system and retain its leading position in the crucial global ICT skills marketplace’ 
(Immigration Minister, 2001a). 
 
The extent to which ICT-related considerations shaped labour immigration policy reflects the 
broader changes in Australia’s political economy, given the industry’s high degree of 
integration in international markets. Birrell argues that the decision to place virtually all ICT 
occupations on the MODL prior to the high tech crash came in response to business group 
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representations that their members were struggling to compete against intense recruitment 
from ICT employers abroad (2003: 41-42). Indeed, the government’s Business Advisory 
Panel (BAP) had recommended the relaxations of immigration restrictions on these exact 
grounds (The Australian, 1999a; 1999b). Moreover, the human capital criteria reforms of 
July 2001 occurred soon after the US government increased its work visa quota to 
accommodate large intakes of ICT workers (Sydney Morning Herald, 2000). The ICT crash in 
the early 2000s prompted the removal of most ICT jobs from the MODL, but concessions for 
international students transferring to work visas remained. In fact, the government further 
strengthened the student-work visa pathway after the crash, which Ruddock justified on the 
basis that it would ‘enhance Australia’s competitive advantage in attracting skilled people’ 
(Immigration Minister, 2003b). While this pathway had ceased to serve its original purpose of 
accommodating the surge demand in ICT workers, it assisted the expansion of another 
burgeoning knowledge industry.  
 
Tertiary education industry had become an increasingly important area of trade for the 
Australian economy. Its export value rose from A$1.2 billion in 1991-92, to A$5.0 billion in 
2001-02, and to A$10.1 billion in 2005-06 (DEST, 2007: 1). The government believed that 
the incentive of a prospective work visa for students gave Australia a comparative advantage 
in this increasingly competitive international industry (Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Immigration Minister, 2001; interview, Immigration Department official AU23). Foreign 
student enrolments in tertiary institutions increased from 160,245 in 2002 to 323,602 in 2008, 
following the 1999 and 2001 reforms that strengthened the student-work visa pathway (2009: 
65-66).33 
 
Demographic considerations 
As well as helping to meet more immediate-term economic policy priorities, longer-term 
fiscal considerations served as a further reason for a continued priority for human capital 
criteria. These factors became increasingly important from the early 2000s. The repeated 
increases of the Independent visa target range during this period coincided with publication of 
the Intergenerational Report (IGR), which showed that the ageing of Australia’s population 
and workforce in future decades would increase the age dependency ratio and impose large 
                                                
33 Increased supply of flexible labour was a further advantage of rising international student enrolments, as 
international students were given relatively broad scope to work (Markus et al., 2009: 12). 
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fiscal burdens on future generations (Treasury, 2002). There were numerous instances where 
immigration ministers cited such issues when justifying labour immigration policy changes. 
For instance, Ruddock said that longer-term demographic trends informed the government’s 
2001 decision to raise the Independent visa intake. He claimed that a higher skilled 
immigration intake was needed to offset falling fertility rates, population ageing and increased 
rates of emigration (Ruddock, 2001: 17-20). Amanda Vanstone (Immigration Minister from 
2003 to 2007) claimed that the 2004 decision to further expand the skilled intake would help 
to ensure ‘that Australia’s working age population will continue to grow past the middle of 
this century, rather than decline as it would without immigration’ (Immigration Minister, 
2004a). And Kevin Andrews (Immigration Minister in 2007) extensively cited Treasury 
arguments in explaining the government’s 2007 expansion of the labour immigration intake 
and claimed that the reform was a ‘necessary’ step for Australia to ‘meet future challenges 
such as the ageing of our society’ (Immigration Minister, 2007c). 
 
The concerns provoked by the IGR over the economic and labour market impact of 
population ageing helped to affirm the priority given to human capital criteria in immigration 
selection. The active lobbying of business groups over these issues in the years prior to the 
report’s publication may have contributed to this. From the late 1990s, peak business groups 
such as the BCA and the ACCI advocated for the implementation of various policies to offset 
labour force decline, including an expansionary immigration policy (cf. ACCI, 1999: 1-2; 
BCA, 2000). Industry associations such as the Housing Industry Authority (HIA) 
commissioned and published academic research highlighting how immigration could help to 
address long-term population dilemmas (cf. Castles, S. et al., 1999). The Victorian 
government with the support of the Australian Population Institute (a group comprised 
predominantly of the representatives of peak business and industry groups) organised a 
National Population Summit in February 2002, which served as a rallying point for the merits 
of a ‘population policy’. A number of prominent business leaders used the summit to call for 
the establishment of a policy focused using immigration as the main strategy for a long-term 
population increase (Sunday Telegraph, 2002, Sydney Morning Herald, 2002). This was the 
climate in which the Howard government grew increasingly agitated about population ageing. 
Ruddock cites the attention drawn to demographic concerns by business groups such as the 
BCA as an important factor in relaxing labour immigration controls (interview, Immigration 
Minister AU32). This signified not only the influence of business on the Howard 
government’s labour immigration policies, but also an overlap in their respective agendas.
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Employer-sponsored schemes 
Selecting for employer success 
Whereas good labour market outcomes among applicants provided a guiding principle of the 
human capital criteria reforms, good labour market outcomes among employers informed the 
expansion of employer-sponsored schemes. Again, the LSIA was used to measure such 
outcomes. According to one official, LSIA data showed ENS visa holders to be ‘absolutely 
the best migrants’ among the skilled visa categories: ‘they come in and have got a skilled job, 
because the job has to be on the shortage occupation list, and a lot of times there will be a 
relationship between the employer and the employee’ (interview, Immigration Department 
official AU38). This finding informed the policy changes that allowed an increase in 
employer-sponsored visas, particularly as labour shortages escalated from the early 2000s. 
 
The large expansion of the permanent skilled immigration programme in 2005 was delivered 
through increases across all of the visa categories, but the ENS visa accounted for the bulk of 
this increase. The weakening of the labour market testing requirements for sponsoring 
employers facilitated this expansion. The then Immigration Minister Vanstone said the 2005 
skilled immigration reforms centred on the ENS because “employers are the ones that know 
best the skills that their particular business requires” (quoted in The Australian, 2005b). The 
emergence of acute skills and labour shortages across the economy amidst a 30-year low in 
unemployment made ‘business requirements’ a pressing priority for policy-makers in early 
2005 (Collins, 2008: 246). In pre-empting these sweeping changes, Howard had said, “we 
have an economic need at the moment for more skilled people. You can’t generate them out 
of thin air in Australia. It takes a while to re-train people … If part of the solution to that 
problem is to bring in more skilled migrants, then I’m in favour of it” (Prime Minister of 
Australia, 2005). The then Immigration Minister Vanstone affirmed that labour shortages 
were a reason for the reforms (Sydney Morning Herald, 2006). In this manner, the 
government used employer pressure as a proxy for labour market demand. 
 
Business played an important role in drawing the government’s attention to the magnitude of 
these shortages and how it should respond to them. According to one report, peak and 
industry business groups ‘fiercely’ lobbied Vanstone to relax labour immigration controls in 
order to increase labour supply (The West Australian, 2005; cf. The Australian, 2005a; 
Canberra Times, 2005). Kevin Andrews explains that the increase of ENS visas in 2007 
occurred also because ‘we were being pressured by business because of the shortage of 
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workers. As unemployment came down, everywhere you went, employers were saying, “we 
can’t find workers” … So the question was really how much you increase it by’ (interview, 
Immigration Minister AU34). 
 
Labour shortages and inflationary pressures 
The advice of other authorities on the state of the labour market also informed the growth of 
employer-sponsored schemes. Warnings from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) (the 
central bank, which was responsible for setting monetary policy) that labour shortages could 
exacerbate wage inflation most likely enhanced the government’s inclination to relax 
immigration controls. In February 2005, the RBA Governor told a parliamentary committee 
that “inflationary pressures cannot be completely eliminated and can be expected to make 
their presence felt as the economy pushes up against capacity constraints”, such as labour 
shortages. He suggested that a higher immigration intake would help to dampen these 
pressures (Official Committee Hansard, 2005: 2, 25-26). In a subsequent statement, the RBA 
said that acute shortages in a number of sectors had increased ‘the likelihood of wage 
pressures building beyond what is factored into the inflation forecast’. The RBA Board 
explicitly cited such factors in its March 2005 decision to increase interest rates (RBA, 2005a; 
2005b). 
 
The 2005 ENS visa reforms that made it easier for employers to sponsor applicants therefore 
aimed to make labour supply more flexible. If high levels of labour demand precipitated wage 
inflation, there was increased risk of interest rates rising and the economy overheating, 
thereby turning the economic boom into a recessionary bust. Vanstone later justified this 
decision on the basis that “without skilled migration, Australian jobs would be at threat as 
business and industry struggled to fill orders and grow… In turn there would be intense wages 
pressure and consequent pressure on interest rates” (quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, 2006). 
The government hoped that relaxing ENS controls would diminish the likelihood of such a 
scenario. An increase of immigrant labour would notionally improve the allocation of supply 
according to employer demand, thus filling job vacancies more efficiently and dampening 
wages pressures.  
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The internationalisation of Australian markets 
The promotion of greater labour market flexibility also motivated the expansion of temporary 
work visas. In particular, it was hoped that such a move would facilitate structural economic 
reform. The 1996 expansion of the temporary work visa scheme came in response to the 
recommendations of a review commissioned by the Keating Labor government. In 
announcing the review, the then Immigration Minister Nick Bolkus said that the 
internationalisation of markets and business operations had rendered the existing temporary 
work visa arrangements arcane:  
 
Ideas, skills and technology are moving around the world more quickly than before. 
The policy objectives for this government [are] to place Australia, through our rules 
and regulations in this temporary migration area, in a position to benefit both now 
and into the future. If we are going to benefit fully by this exchange, it is crucial that 
we ensure the smooth movement of key personnel into and out of this country 
(quoted in Roach Committee, 1995: 15). 
 
The review’s terms of reference requested an examination of the effectiveness of existing 
temporary visa arrangements in the context of the government’s objectives to make the 
Australian economy more internationally competitive and integrated (Roach Committee, 
1995: 1). Brooks and colleagues suggest that the review was a direct product of the growth in 
foreign-owned firms that followed the dismantling of trade barriers. During the December 
1993 Uruguay Round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which 
established the General Agreement on Trade in Services), a number of Asian nations 
pressured Australia to expand the scope for temporary labour immigration because they 
perceived existing restrictions (particularly labour market testing requirements) to be ‘a non-
tariff barrier to the importation of labour services’ (Brooks et al., 1994: 55). After March 
1996 election, the Coalition continued much of the previous government’s twin agendas of 
liberal engagement and economic restructuring. This extended to the overhaul of temporary 
work visa regulations. Ruddock said that the recommendations of the Keating government’s 
review accorded with the Howard government’s commitment ‘to make Australia a more 
internationally competitive nation’ (Immigration Minister, 1996c). It believed that making the 
labour market more efficient, through labour immigration and other policy instruments, was 
central to the delivery of this commitment. 
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Facilitating improved supply of immigrant labour 
The alignment of temporary work visa regulations with the government’s ambitions for 
economic competitiveness translated into improving the scheme’s ‘procedural simplicity’ and 
efficiency for business (Roach Committee, 1995: 4). This meant removing labour market 
testing requirements and accelerating visa processing. According to the review, ‘business, 
economic and trade agencies were expressing concern that existing procedures were too 
complex and time consuming, and impeded business in becoming internationally competitive’ 
(Roach Committee, 1995: 1). It claimed that these reforms were needed because, with 
Australia becoming more economically reliant on trade-based service industries, employers 
could no longer be expected to source all of their required labour domestically (Roach 
Committee, 1995: 2). 
 
The imperatives of procedural flexibility for employers also drove the July 2001 decision to 
completely remove all remaining labour market testing requirements and abolish the 
distinction between ‘key’ and ‘non-key’ activities within temporary work visa regulations. 
The difficulties in enforcing these regulations had negative consequences for ‘both client 
convenience and good administration’, according to the internal Immigration Department 
review that recommended these reforms (Immigration Department, 2002b: 121-122). One 
Immigration Department official says that the key/non-key activity distinction was repealed 
because it created ‘a constant battleground between industry and the Department’ (interview, 
Immigration Department official AU23). According to another official: 
 
Almost all employers indicated that the position they sought to fill was a “key 
activity” even if it was of a relatively low skill… With labour market testing, 
employers with genuine high-skilled vacancies experienced unnecessary costs and 
delays to meet the bureaucratic requirements whilst non-genuine cases could usually 
arrange the job advertising to give the results needed (Rizvi, 2004: 46-47).  
 
The changes centred on serving the interests of business. Improving the ability of its ‘client’ 
(i.e. business) to use the scheme was the Immigration Department’s main objective in 
removing regulatory impediments. This decision suggests that a clientelistic relationship 
formed between business and government around labour immigration. This demonstrated, 
among other things, the Howard government’s belief that positive labour immigration 
outcomes for employers were a good measure of policy effectiveness. 
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Having said that, the principle of greater flexibility for applicants also guided the temporary 
work visa reforms. One official claims that the government believed that skilled workers had 
the prospect of working in a growing number of international destinations and therefore were 
less inclined to commit to permanent residency (at least initially) (interview, Immigration 
Department official AU24). Ruddock used this reasoning in foreshadowing the 2001 
temporary work visas reforms, which he justified on the grounds that – in the context of 
increased competition for skilled immigrants from other states – having an immigration 
programme centred on permanent settlement hindered Australia’s ability to attract applicants 
(Ruddock, 1999: 9-10).  
 
Improving flexibility for employers and applicants alike was a motive for the 2005 decision to 
strengthen the pathway between temporary work and permanent skilled visas. Vanstone 
defended this decision on the grounds that ‘as we are competing globally for skilled workers, 
it is essential that Australian employers have a competitive edge in this area’ (Immigration 
Minister, 2005b). Reflecting on these changes, she claims that government believed that 
strengthening the temporary-permanent path would allow prospective applicants to ‘try before 
they buy’, and thereby enhance Australia’s comparative appeal (interview, Immigration 
Minister AU55). Removing barriers both for employers to engage immigrant labour and for 
visa applicants was aimed primarily at facilitating improved flexibility in the supply of 
immigrant labour. This in turn would allow labour immigration to be used to meet the three 
abovementioned drivers of the reforms to the employer-sponsored schemes, that is, 
responding to labour shortages, offsetting inflationary pressures, and helping the Australian 
economy adjust to increased international competition. 
 
Regional schemes 
The competing demand of State/Territory governments 
If the Howard government viewed employer-sponsored schemes as the most effective way of 
increasing the supply of immigrant labour to match demand, it saw regional schemes based 
on sponsorship by State/Territory governments as the next best.34 The proliferation of 
regional polices between 1996 and 2007 came about in response to the considerable variations 
                                                
34 Vanstone expressed this sentiment when announcing the 2005 expansion of the immigration programme: 
“Employers are the ones that know best the skills that their particular business requires… The second focus will 
be with state and regional sponsorships because people in local areas know best the sort of skills they need” 
(quoted in The Australian, 2005b). 
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in regional demands, as well as local labour shortages. Pressure from State/Territory 
governments was a central factor in the Howard government’s adoption of certain regional 
reforms. According to Ruddock, ‘close partnership between the Commonwealth and State and 
Territory governments’ was decisive in the February 2003 policy allowing State/Territory 
governments to act as sponsors under the Business Skills visa (Immigration Minister, 2003a). 
Pressure from Premier Mike Rann was reportedly instrumental in the decision to classify the 
entirety of South Australia as ‘regional’ under State/Territory sponsorship schemes in 2003 
(The Australian, 2004). And Vanstone said she was acting on the recommendations of a 
report of the Commonwealth/Victoria Working Party on Migration in creating the Skilled 
Independent Regional visa (Immigration Minister, 2005a).  
 
In explaining the growth of regional schemes during his time as Immigration Minister from 
1996 to 2003, Ruddock claims that requests from the Victorian and South Australian 
governments to use immigration policy to address their population imbalances was a 
motivating factor (interview, Immigration Minister AU29). Vanstone also says that giving the 
States/Territories – again, particularly South Australia and Victoria – ‘a greater opportunity to 
have a say who came there’ was a driving force behind the proliferation regional schemes 
when she was the Immigration Minister from 2003 to 2007 (interview, Immigration Minister 
AU55). The governments of these two States exerted the most consistent pressure of the 
various State/Territory governments for greater shares of labour immigration under the 
Howard government. While the major parties controlled both States at various times between 
1996 and 2007, changes of government did little to alter their respective immigration policy 
preferences. The South Australian (Labor) Treasurer’s claim that “unless our state can 
populate, we will perish economically”, encapsulates the stance of both Coalition and Labor 
governments (quoted in The Advertiser, 2003). Fiscal imperatives, rather than labour 
shortages, seem to be the main impetus for pressure from these States. Various studies found 
that immigration selection focused on human capital criteria could deliver higher per capita 
revenue for State governments. Immigrants with such criteria contributed more on average to 
government revenue than any other population group (including native-born), paid higher 
taxes, and were less of a burden on education and welfare expenditure (cf. Econtech, 2004: i-
iv; Mathews, 1992: xx). 
 
The governments of Western Australia and Queensland also lobbied the Commonwealth 
government for more labour immigration. Labour shortages were the main concern of these 
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States. Such pressure was most apparent during the mining industry boom in the mid 2000s, 
which centred on these States (interviews, Immigration Department official AU27, 
Immigration Minister AU32). As the Western Australian government explained in its calls for 
more immigration in 2006, ‘the demand for mineral and energy products is so great that there 
is a substantial pent up demand for skilled workers, which is stopping projects from 
proceeding’ (2006: 3).  
 
The Howard government also introduced regional policies designed to constrain the 
geographical mobility of foreign workers. The New South Wales government adopted a 
consistently anti-immigration stance under Labor Premier Bob Carr. This opinion was based 
on a belief that the disproportionately high number of new immigrants moving to the State’s 
capital could not be supported by the city’s infrastructure and natural resources. For instance, 
in March 2000, Carr said that “Sydney would not benefit from a big increase in immigration”, 
because it was “bursting at the seams” (quoted in Sunday Telegraph, 2000). Various officials 
claim that Carr’s position was the reason for the incorporation of a mechanism into the 2003 
reform of the Business Skills visa aimed at deterring immigrants from settling in New South 
Wales, and instead directing them through incentives to the regions (interviews, Immigration 
Department officials AU27, AU49, AU50).  
 
Various legal anomalies can also partly explain the spread of regional policies under the 
Howard government. Qualified scope existed within Australian law for the right to internal 
free movement. This meant that schemes designed to entice visa holders to particular 
localities could not necessarily compel them to stay (Crock, 1999: 83-84). Since regional 
schemes could only act as incentive mechanisms, the New South Wales government’s 
attempts to deter immigrants and the South Australian government’s efforts to recruit them 
often had little effect. Indeed, 43 per cent of entrants that arrived in the permanent 
immigration programme of 2000-01 settled in New South Wales, compared to two per cent in 
South Australia. These rates were considerably disproportionate to the respective populations 
of both States. The States currently retain some capacity to determine which areas are 
classified as ‘regional’ or ‘urban’ in the application of immigration policy, even though the 
Australian Constitution legally deems it to be the domain of the Commonwealth. 
Accordingly, State governments used this capacity as regional policies proliferated to entice 
or deter immigrants as they saw fit. As Commonwealth one public servant claims, ‘the 
difference between the views of Bob Carr and Mike Rann were enormous, and so we had to 
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run policy which suited the views of both’ (interview, Immigration Department official 
AU27).  
 
The suite of regional schemes led to some rather bizarre policy outputs. The definition of 
‘regional’ differed according to individual programmes, and by 2007 five separate definitions 
existed. Melbourne (Australia’s second largest city) was even deemed regional for the 
purposes of one particular visa. Nonetheless, the orientation of labour immigration policy 
towards regional demands appeared to have the desired effect. By 2006-07, a greater 
proportion of immigrants had settled in the States/Territories where they were most wanted 
(most notably South Australia), and proportionally diminished where they were not (such as 
New South Wales) (see Figure 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.4 Distribution of population and net immigration by State/Territory (%), 2001/01 
and 2006/07 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2010) Australian Demographic Statistics, Catalogue 3101.0, available 
at: www.abs.gov.au (population figures); McDonald and Withers (2008): 8 (immigration figures) 
 
Responding to regional labour shortages 
The reform of labour immigration to meet regional demands was also evident through the 
introduction of temporary work visa concessions for employers in regional areas. One official 
involved in these reforms says that they were driven by the government’s concern that the 
existing arrangements did not sufficiently accommodate regional recruitment difficulties, 
particularly in the context of sustained demand in urban areas (interview, Immigration 
Department official AU23).  
 
While not exclusively intended as a regional scheme, the reasoning behind the expansion of 
the WHM visa also centred on regional labour demands. A parliamentary committee inquiry 
found that the WHM visa provided an ‘indispensable pool of labour’ to industries 
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concentrated in rural and regional areas, such as agriculture, hospitality and tourism, despite 
the restricted working rights (in terms of length of employment) for working holidaymakers 
(House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and 
Workforce Participation, 2007: 63). Working holidaymakers had in fact become ‘the single 
largest source of labour for seasonal producers’ in some parts of the horticultural industry by 
the mid 2000s, according to another inquiry (Senate Standing Committee on Employment, 
Workplace Relations and Education, 2006: 5).  
 
It seems that the WHM visa was expanded largely due to pressure from agricultural 
industries. It became increasingly difficult for employers in these areas to source labour in the 
context of the economic boom and declining unemployment. Senior Immigration Department 
officials closely involved in the reforms say that regional agricultural employers were 
particularly influential in driving the November 2005 policy changes to give visa holders an 
additional 12-month visa if they spent three months working in the sector. The geographical 
isolation and labour intensiveness of agricultural work made it generally much less appealing 
to working holidaymakers than non-rural industries. It was ‘a lot easier pulling beers in a 
holiday resort than picking grapes’, as one official put it. The reforms were therefore designed 
to give visa applicants a stronger incentive to work in agriculture (interview, Immigration 
Department official AU27). Lobbying from the hospitality industry employers was the main 
catalyst for the 2006 decision to extend the maximum duration that a visa holder could work 
for a single employer. These employers argued that they were investing too much energy into 
training WHM labour only for it to leave after three months. Moreover, the extension of the 
WHM changes across the primary sector was partly due to pressure from the meat processing 
industry, according to another official (interview, Immigration Department official AU23). 
Various officials also claimed that lobbying by regional industries and National Party 
parliamentarians (the smaller regional party in the Coalition) for labour immigration policy to 
be more accommodating of regional shortages was a factor behind these reforms (interviews, 
Immigration Department official AU23; Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) 
official AU48). Regional sponsorship was something of a hallmark of Howard government 
labour immigration policy, which is rather curious given that such schemes never featured 
prominently since the Commonwealth took command of immigration policy from the States 
in 1946. The growth of regional schemes reflected the government’s electoral considerations, 
as well as its labour market priorities, which are themes that are further explored in the 
following chapter.
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Conclusion 
There was broad agreement that Australian immigration selection policy lacked a coherent 
underlying objective when the Howard government came to office in 1996. Labor and 
Coalition governments had equivocated over how the parameters of immigrant selection 
should be set since the early 1970. The disagreement essentially centred on whether 
immigration selection should serve as an extension of immigration settlement policy, or focus 
more on delivering quantifiably positive outcomes to the national economy. The Howard 
government unambiguously resolved this dilemma in favour of the latter, by reforming policy 
parameters so as to select applicants principally on the basis of their likelihood of labour 
market success. In so doing, the government tacitly accepted the arguments made by the 
CAAIP in 1988. The resulting shifts in policy had a profound impact on the balance between 
the family and skilled categories of the permanent immigration programme between 1996 and 
2007.  
 
In different ways, ‘selecting for success’ was an overriding principle of each of the three 
segments of labour immigration reform. The human capital criteria reforms were aimed at 
delivering successful labour market outcomes among applicants, the employer-sponsored 
schemes at successful outcomes for employers, and the regional schemes at successful 
outcomes for regional areas. The Howard government’s adoption of selecting for success as 
the centrepiece of immigration selection was therefore, as one official described, ‘driven 
partly by evidence, but also partly by an ideological view that immigration is about the needs 
of the receiving country more than the needs of the individual seeking a new home and a 
better life’ (interview, Immigration Department official AU39).  
 
The premise that good labour market outcomes for business is the foundation of an efficient 
labour market signifies another ideological component of Howard government immigration 
policy. This was evident in the extent to which reform across all three segments accorded with 
business objectives, and was evident in a number of different respects. In some cases, direct 
pressure from business groups contributed to policy change. In others, the government drove 
reform in manner anticipated to benefit business, as with the 1996 temporary work visa 
reforms. And in others still, the government effectively treated business as ‘client’ and 
adjusted policy according to its desires, as seen in the 2001 temporary work visa reforms. The 
Howard government’s approach to labour immigration reform thus rested on an assumption 
that what was good for business was also good for government policy. 
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The promotion of employer sponsorship also indicates the use of immigration policy as an 
instrument of labour market and monetary policies. The expansion of employer-sponsored 
schemes aimed to keep the supply of labour in step with demand and thereby offset 
inflationary wage pressures. Other broad policy objectives also informed immigration policy 
reform. Strengthening human capital criteria demonstrated the use of immigration policy as a 
fiscal policy measure. Immigration selection mechanisms were restructured to favour 
applicants likely to pay more in taxes than they would receive in welfare, and thereby make a 
positive per capita income contribution.  
 
Some of the assumptions underpinning the Howard government’s reforms contained evident 
inconsistencies. As with employer pressure, the growth of regional schemes partly reflected 
the view that pressure from State/Territory governments acted an effective proxy for local 
labour market demand. This appears to be central to the growth of policy incentives to direct 
immigration to the regional areas where it was most needed. Despite the liberal market 
assumptions of the Howard government’s immigration policy, its regional schemes essentially 
served to correct market imperfections. Their use represented an implicit acknowledgement 
that, if left to its own devices, labour will not always go towards demand.  
 
How the Howard government was able to shift the parameters of immigration selection policy 
so resolutely, particularly given the contention surrounding the issue when it came to office, is 
explored in the next chapter. The Coalition’s use of electoral strategies to leverage public 
support for high immigration intakes is also examined. Using ‘selecting for success’ as the 
basis of immigration reform had various political advantages. For instance, it allowed the 
Coalition to criticise Labor Party policies, but this principle also permitted immigration to be 
promoted as an instrument for national self-interest. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses the various structural and institutional undercurrents of the Howard 
government’s immigration reforms. It picks up on many of the themes discussed in this 
chapter and explains why the issues identified as underpinning reformed impacted upon 
labour immigration policy in the ways that they did. The interconnections between 
immigration policy and macroeconomic and labour market policies are also further examined. 
So too is the impact of the further shifts in Australia’s industrial structure, and the transition 
from a protectionist defence model of political economy towards one of liberal engagement. 
Various institutional themes are explored in greater depth, such as the Howard government’s 
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relationship with business and other organised interests, the impact of party political 
considerations, the pressures of public opinion, and the relationship between Commonwealth 
and State/Territory governments. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF AUSTRALIAN POLICY 
CHANGE 
 
The Howard government ended the equivocation over what should be the guiding purpose of 
immigration policy that characterised the period from 1972 to 1996, by deeming that it should 
be based on the notion of ‘selecting for success’. Delivering successful labour market 
outcomes among applicants, employers and regional areas became the guiding principle of 
immigration selection. Reforming policy in this manner allowed the Howard government to 
claim that immigration delivered a net benefit to the Australian economy. Selecting for labour 
market success was not without precedent. As Chapter 3 showed, human capital criteria had 
been used in immigrant selection to varying degrees since 1973, and employer-sponsored and 
regional visas had existed since the NUMAS was introduced in 1979. But the Howard 
government made labour market success a much more central feature of immigration 
selection than had ever previously been the case (O’Donnell and Mitchell, 2000: 11).  
 
This chapter examines the structural and institutional economic and political factors that 
underpinned Howard government’s labour immigration reforms. This analysis helps to 
explain why the factors identified in Chapter 4 as the driving forces behind these reforms 
were influential. It argues that labour immigration controls were relaxed to accommodate an 
increased demand for labour that was fuelled by sustained economic growth. The Howard 
government used labour immigration reform to meet other policy imperatives, and business 
groups and State/Territory governments helped to influence the direction of policy change. 
The first section looks at the relationship between immigration policy reform and 
macroeconomic developments, before analysing the impact of changes in the dynamics of 
labour market supply and demand. The links between labour immigration policy changes and 
the government’s broader economic reform agenda is then discussed, with particular attention 
paid to the influence of fiscal and monetary policy objectives, and the impact of various 
dimensions of labour market reform and economic restructuring. An explanation of the 
political dynamics behind the main policy decisions follows, specifically those relating to 
party politics and public opinion. Attention then turns to the impact of relationships between 
State/Territory and Commonwealth governments. The roles of business groups and other 
organised interests in the reform process are then examined. An overview of policy initiatives 
since 2007 is then provided, and followed by a concluding analysis of the structural and 
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institutional undercurrents of the relaxation of labour immigration controls between 1996 and 
2007. 
 
Economic growth and structural change 
Increased labour market demand was the most important factor behind the relaxation of 
labour immigration controls between 1996 and 2007. It motivated reform in all three 
segments, albeit in slightly different ways. Short-term labour shortages drove the expansion of 
employer-sponsored schemes, locality-specific shortages partly prompted the regional 
schemes, and the anticipation of longer-term depletions of labour supply contributed to the 
human capital criteria reforms.  
 
When the Howard government was first elected, economic growth was sustained, but 
unemployment was at the relatively high rate of 8.2 per cent. The supply of resident labour 
thus accommodated much of labour demand, which diminished the need for labour 
immigration. Unemployment had fallen to 4.4 per cent by the time the government left office 
11 years later (and a mere two per cent among skilled labour market participants 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2007: 4)) (OECD, 2009: 251). This represented the lowest level 
of unemployment since the early 1970s. With the steady fall in unemployment levels and the 
corresponding rise in job vacancies, the economy became increasingly reliant on labour 
immigration (see Figure 5.1).  
 
An 18-year period of continuous economic growth (the longest in Australian history) 
stimulated this increase in labour market demand (Cahill and Stilwell, 2008: 5). The 
escalation of demand for commodities (fuelled primarily by the industrialisation of the 
Chinese economy) was the predominant driver of growth. This generated a major expansion 
of the Western Australian and Queensland mining industries (Edwards, 2006: 59-60). 
Minerals and energy exports increased from 29 per cent of all mechanised exports in 1999-
2000 to 44 per cent in 2006-07 (Lloyd, C. 2008: 35). These developments resulted in an 
increased reliance on labour immigration, as one mining industry representative explains:  
 
The price of these raw materials has gone up … and many companies are trying to 
take advantage of it. So they want to increase their production and they’re expanding 
their operations or building new ones… What’s delaying this is that skilled labour is 
just not available. Even semi-skilled labour is not available, at short notice at least… 
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All of those companies undertake training … but [new workers] just aren’t coming 
out fast enough (interview, Australian Mines and Metals Association official AU14). 
 
Figure 5.1 Total labour immigration intakes (main visa categories), job vacancies and 
unemployment in Australia, 1996 to 2007 
 
Source: OECD Statistical Extracts, Annual Labour Force Statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/ (for job vacancy and 
unemployment statistics); Figure 4.1 (for labour immigration intake statistics) 
 
Mining was not the sole reason for the sustained growth in economic activity. The 
proliferation of ICT across all industrial sectors led to further economic expansion, by directly 
contributing to improvements in labour productivity and capital investment (Edwards, 2006: 
50). Governments had encouraged the growth of knowledge industries such as ICT, tertiary 
education and business and financial services since the mid 1980s to offset the stagnation in 
manufacturing. Trade liberalisation accompanied this process of industrial change. Secondary 
industries represented around 35 per cent and services around 57 per cent of the Australian 
workforce when the Whitlam government began dismantling trade barriers in 1972. These 
proportions had shifted to 21 per cent and 75 per cent respectively by 2007 (see Figure 5.2). 
However, the domestic labour market was not always sufficiently equipped to provide the 
workers needed by these growing knowledge industries, directly prompting policy changes 
such as the creation of pathways between student and labour immigration discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
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Figure 5.2 Employment in the Australian economy by sector (thousands), 1956 to 2007 
 
Source: OECD Statistical Extracts, Annual Labour Force Statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
The proliferation of new technologies aided substantial change to production processes and 
work organisation, which further altered the labour requirements of business (Lloyd, C. 2008: 
50). These shifts led to major changes in the occupational composition of the labour market. 
For example, there was significant growth in higher skilled managerial, professional and 
associated occupations, as well as among trades and intermediate skilled service sector 
occupations from the mid 1980s (Richardson, 2007: 20-22). As seen in Chapter 4, the 
government repeatedly cited short-term labour shortages in justifying various labour 
immigration policy changes, particularly with respect to the employer-sponsored schemes. 
While industry and occupation-level data is limited, the later years of the Howard government 
saw knowledge industry occupations such as ICT professionals and accountants make up 
large proportions of the increased intakes in permanent labour immigration (see Figures 5.3). 
Workers in ICT occupations were also among the highest number sponsored on temporary 
work visas in 2007 (along with health professionals) (see Figure 5.4). At the industry level, 
growth industries such as communications, property and business services (in New South 
Wales and Victoria), and construction and mining industries (in Western Australia) were 
among the biggest sponsors of temporary visa holders (see Figure 5.5). The growth of labour 
immigration in these areas of the labour market reflected increases in labour demand. 
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Figure 5.3 Skilled Independent visas granted to primary applicants by nominated 
occupation, 2001/02 to 2004/05 
 
Source: Birrell et al. (2006): Tables 1.2, 1.4, 1.5 
 
Figure 5.4 Top 10 occupations for temporary work (sub-class 457) visas granted, by 
State, 2006/07 
 
Source: Immigration Department (2007) Commonwealth submission to the Joint Standing Committee on 
Migration inquiry into eligibility requirements and monitoring, enforcement and reporting arrangements for 
temporary business visas, Table 1.9 
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Figure 5.5 Temporary work (sub-class 457) visas granted, by industry sponsor and State, 
2006/07 
 
Source: Immigration Department (2007) Commonwealth submission to the Joint Standing Committee on 
Migration inquiry into eligibility requirements and monitoring, enforcement and reporting arrangements for 
temporary business visas, Table 1.9 
 
The impact of broader economic policy considerations 
Fiscal policy 
Chapter 4 alluded to the links that existed between labour immigration reforms and fiscal, 
monetary and labour market policy considerations. According to Kelly, these three policy 
domains formed the central planks of the Howard government’s economic agenda (2009: 265-
266). The government avowed to tighten fiscal policy in order to return the budget to surplus 
upon inheriting a large deficit from its predecessor (Gruen and Sayegh, 2005: 631-632). This 
partly explains the premium placed upon the likely net fiscal contributions of particular 
categories of immigrants, which led to the human capital criteria adjustments between 1996 
and 1999. The impact of population ageing on long-term government revenue projections had 
implications across a wide spectrum of economic and social policy. As such, the publication 
of the IGR in 2002 had a major bearing on the subsequent direction of fiscal policy (Gruen 
and Sayegh, 2005: 623-624). Raising the retirement age, and increasing labour force 
participation and labour productivity levels, were the central measures recommended by the 
report. The Treasury also suggested that the right mix of skilled and young immigrants could 
help to meet these objectives and thereby ‘slow the process’ of population ageing (Henry, 
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2004). The Treasury’s forecasts and prescriptions with respect to population ageing had a 
large impact upon the views of policy-makers across government (Gruen and Sayegh, 2005: 
629; Henry, 2003: 4; interview, PM&C official AU48), and particularly resonated within the 
Immigration Department (interviews, Immigration Department officials AU19, AU21, 
AU27). When the Treasury revised its projections in the subsequent Intergenerational Report 
2007, it found that increased fertility rates and ‘changes to government policy encouraging 
greater numbers of skilled migrants who are younger on average than the resident population 
… have led to a projection of a significantly larger and slightly younger population’ than had 
previously been anticipated (Treasury, 2007: 11). These changes were partly informed by the 
observations contained in the first IGR. 
 
The forecasted impact of population ageing was not a unique dilemma and was much less 
severe in Australia than in other developed economies (Tiffen and Gittens, 2004: 8). But it 
perhaps had a greater bearing over labour immigration policy than elsewhere (despite a 
considerable body of research suggesting that the impact of increasing immigration in 
preventing the ageing of the Australian population would be minimal at best (cf. Hugo, 
1994b: 60)). One possible explanation relates to a longstanding bugbear of Australian public 
policy: the tyranny of distance. Government ministers often lamented the loss of many high 
skilled residents through emigration when discussing Australia’s population dilemmas. 
Australia had long been regarded as a nation of immigration, but it was increasingly one of 
emigration. An estimated four per cent of the national population lived abroad at the turn of 
the twenty-first century (Hugo, 2004: 62-65). Around 75,000 residents permanently departed 
Australia in 2007, which was a significantly larger number than had departed on average per 
year over the post-war era. Moreover, people born in Australia accounted for an increasing 
number of those leaving (see Figure 5.6). A high proportion of emigrants were professionals 
with skills in demand, such as ICT specialists, scientists and engineers (Markus et al., 2009: 
65).  
 
Research found that Australia’s ability to attract skilled immigrants was contingent upon the 
policies of other states (Cobb-Clark and Connolly, 1997: 688-689). Indeed, government 
ministers acknowledged that there was stiffer competition from the traditional destination 
states, as well as a number of reluctant states that were increasingly using immigration policy 
to meet various objectives (cf. Ruddock, 1999: 9). Advances in passenger transportation had 
made it easier for people to move to and from Australia and, in this sense, the ‘tyranny of 
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distance’ factor had diminished. Nonetheless, as seen in Chapter 4, ministers felt that stronger 
policy incentives were required to entice prospective applicants to Australia. Interviews with 
various public servants and ministerial advisers indicate that geographical deterrents, 
increased competition from other states, and higher rates of skilled emigration, all combined 
to forge an institutional consensus that Australian governments needed to work harder to 
attract skilled immigrants (interviews, BAP member/Australian Industry Group (AIG) official 
AU09; Immigration Department officials AU23, AU36, AU39, AU40). This seems to have 
heightened the Howard government’s inclination to relax labour immigration controls. 
 
Figure 5.6 Permanent departures from Australia, settlers and Australian-born, 1968/69 to 
2003/04 
 
Source: Hugo (2004): 59 
 
Monetary policy 
The high demand for labour between 1996 and 2007 cannot solely be attributed to economic 
growth and structural change. Market regulatory changes also compounded the widespread 
emergence of job vacancies. Some business groups viewed the temporary work visa scheme 
as a ‘last resort strategy’, to be used only when labour could not be sourced locally (interview, 
Master Builders Association (MBA) official AU30; AIG official, cited Official Committee 
Hansard, 2007: 1). However, others saw the scheme as a ‘release value’ to alleviate short-
term wage pressures (ACCI official, quoted in Official Committee Hansard , 2007: 41-45). 
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This suggests that some businesses were using labour immigration to respond to shortages of 
labour willing to work for existing wage rates, rather than absolute shortages. 
 
These views existed not only among the business community. They also appeared to underpin 
the government’s heightened preoccupation with wage inflation. In 1990-91, Australia 
experienced its third and most brutal recession in the space of two decades. Minimising 
inflation had not been the guiding purpose of central bankers prior to the recession, even if it 
was nevertheless a desired policy outcome. However, low inflation targeting became the 
central priority of the RBA from the early 1990s onwards, and it pursued this objective with 
continued hawkishness after it was granted independence in 1996 (Bell, 2005: 71-74; Bell and 
Quiggin, 2008: 73-80).35 The boom-bust cycles that characterised the Australian economy 
between the early 1970s and the early 1990s greatly affected the political fortunes of the 
governments of this era. The RBA’s success in inflation targeting was a key ingredient in the 
sustained economic growth thereafter and the Howard government paid heed to its 
observations accordingly. As seen in Chapter 4, this had implications for immigration policy. 
Importantly, the removal of restrictions on employer-sponsored visas in 2005 directly 
followed the RBA’s warning that labour shortages were contributing to inflationary pressures. 
 
Labour market regulation 
Skills and training 
Changes in labour market regulation may have indirectly shaped decisions to relax labour 
immigration controls in response to inflationary pressures. Birrell argues that the Howard 
government’s relaxation of labour immigration restrictions to fill labour shortages was 
tantamount to ‘papering over the cracks in Australia’s domestic training system’ (2001: 28). 
Supporting this view, various parliamentary inquiries found that changes to labour market 
regulation undermined the stock of human capital in the resident workforce, thereby further 
compounding the magnitude of labour shortages (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration, 2007: 27-29; Senate 
Employment, Workplace Relations and Education References Committee, 2003: 15-16). 
                                                
35 According to Bell, a ‘new political economy of inflation’ emerged in Australia during this period, which arose 
due to various factors, including: ‘the effects of labour market insecurity in fostering labour discipline; the 
external pressure for low inflation from financial markets; the effects of rising competitive pressures in product 
markets, which makes employers less willing to grant wage increases and workers less able to win them; the link 
between rising productivity and low inflationary growth; and the link between rising business and household 
debt levels and inflation aversion’ (2005: 79). 
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Indeed, in evaluating the impact of temporary work visas on domestic skill formation, Toner 
and Woolley found the scheme had:  
 
The potential to adversely affect domestic rates of training in the trades [as it 
represents] a major addition to the annual flow of new tradespersons onto the 
Australian labour market and introduces new considerations into employer 
calculations about investment in training… As a result, employers are likely to have 
less incentive to train Australian apprentices than would otherwise have been the 
case (2008: 47, 50).  
 
Immigration was explicitly used to fill labour shortages in the decades after the Second World 
War (Mitchell et al., 2001: 5). There were few other practical means of finding the necessary 
labour to facilitate rapid economic expansion during this period, as unemployment was 
virtually non-existent. Unemployment under the Howard government fell to low levels by 
contemporary standards, but not to the levels of the post-war decades. Why, then, were labour 
immigration controls relaxed so readily? It is possible that labour market shortages may have 
been compounded by the impact of labour market regulatory reform. The introduction of 
workplace-level bargaining in place of a relatively centralised system of wage determination 
was designed to give the economy greater capacity to adapt to external economic shocks and 
minimise inflationary pressure. This represented another policy response to the recession of 
the early 1990s. The more liberal labour market created by this shift has been credited with 
aiding the recent period of continuous low-inflationary growth (Edwards, 2006: 47-51). But it 
also appeared to weaken the capacity of domestic labour supply to meet shortages. According 
to Mitchell and colleagues, the nature of labour market regulation has always shaped 
Australian vocational training policy (2001: 7). Briggs claims that the decentralisation of 
wage bargaining ‘represented a decisive “institutional break” that paved the way for further 
labour market deregulation’ (2006: 872). Following this, the shift in the determination of 
wages and employment conditions to the workplace level in 1993 appeared to make 
employers more reluctant to invest in training. The promotion of a competitive and market-
based training model was a by-product of this shift.  
 
Workplace bargaining encouraged managers and workers to make wage-based trade-offs on 
other employment issues, including on skills and training. The Keating government’s 
accompanying introduction of a more market-led training model invariably shaped the 
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outcome of workplace negotiations over training. However, these outcomes were tempered by 
the existence of established industry-based skills and national-based qualifications recognition 
frameworks. The Howard government’s extension of both workplace bargaining and market-
based training diminished the capacity of policy-makers to coordinate skills outcomes with 
labour market demand. Its market-based training reforms led to the abolition of a mandatory 
employer training levy and the allowance of private training organisations to compete with 
government vocational training colleges. These reforms may have better served the particular 
short-term labour demands of individual employers, but they also led to the erosion of 
transferable occupation and industry-specific skills, declining enrolments in many trades-
based apprenticeships, and stagnation in public and private sector vocational skills 
investment. With the onus for training now resting more heavily on individual employers, 
external recruitment – or ‘poaching’ – was increasingly used to meet skill and labour 
requirements. Poaching became a cyclical phenomenon that led to market failures. The 
prospect of trained workers leaving for other firms compounded the disincentive for 
employers to invest in skills development. Much of the training that employers did undertake 
was specific to their own operations and not readily transferable (Senate Employment, 
Workplace Relations and Education References Committee, 2003: xxv, 42-44, 181-182; 
Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 2005: 408-414).  
 
It appears that, as a consequence of these developments, employers became increasingly 
reliant on immigration rather than training to meet their labour requirements. In one study, 89 
per cent of employers cited an absence of suitable labour within Australia as an important 
reason for hiring foreigners on temporary work visas, and 26 per cent specifically cited a need 
for such labour ‘at very short notice … particularly for jobs that require training that may take 
some years’ (Khoo et al., 2004: 6). Furthermore, two separate parliamentary committee 
inquiries suggested that the increasing availability of foreign workers arising from reforms to 
the temporary work visa and WHM schemes discouraged employers in some industries from 
investing in training (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Workplace Relations 
and Workforce Participation, 2007: viii, 141-148; Senate Standing Committee on 
Employment, Workplace Relations and Education, 2006: vii-ix). 
 
Decline of permanent employment 
The shift from permanent and full-time employment, towards temporary and part-time 
employment, was another consequence of labour market regulatory changes that compounded 
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labour shortages. The vast majority of jobs created in recent decades were among those 
legally classified as ‘casual’ (that is, part-time jobs with fewer rights than those employed on 
permanent contracts). Casual employment increased as a proportion of the Australian 
workforce from 16 per cent in 1985 to 27 per cent in 2002. It was promoted as a more flexible 
form of employment that allowed employees to work on their own terms and move freely 
between jobs, and for employers to hire and fire workers with fewer legal constraints. The 
growth in casual employment was mainly due to the shift away from centralised bargaining 
and the dramatic decline in trade union representation (trade union membership as a 
proportion of the Australian workforce declined from 50 per cent in 1982 to 19 per cent in 
2007). Both of these features had preserved permanent and full-time work as the predominant 
modes of employment (de Ruyter and Burgess, 2003: 226-229; Watson et al., 2003: 48, 78).  
 
Workers employed on a casual basis were significantly less likely than those on permanent 
contracts to receive structured training. According to Sheldon and Thornthwaite, the growth 
of casual employment diminished employer ‘responsibilities for training and developing 
employees as part of a more enduring commitments towards employees… Wherever labour 
markets remain relatively tight, these trends also reduce employees’ sense of organisational 
obligation and commitment’ (2005: 405). An erosion of ‘internal’ labour markets was another 
consequence of declining permanent employment, which further exacerbated labour 
shortages. Whereas job vacancies could previously be filled with internal applicants, 
employers became more reliant upon external labour markets and poaching workers from 
other firms (Lewis, 2008: 4).  
 
Changes to labour market regulation were not the only contributing factor to the erosion of 
the skills base. The structural economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s also had a significant 
impact. Industries with high concentrations of full-time and permanent employment, where 
employees had good access to training, accounted for a high proportion of the jobs lost from 
industry restructuring. Casual and temporary jobs with limited training access were clustered 
in many of the areas of industrial growth (see Figure 5.7) (Watson et al., 2003: 50-54). 
Furthermore, state-owned and large private corporations had once played an important role in 
directly providing skills through the large-scale engagement of apprentices and trainees, who 
were subsequently disseminated across industries and down to smaller private sector 
employers. But the sweeping industry deregulation and privatisation of this period whittled 
these training structures away (Richardson, 2007: 19; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 2005: 409). 
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Figure 5.7 Characteristics of selected industries with job losses and job gains, Australia, 
1985 to 2001 
 
Source: Watson et al. (2003): 54 
 
Despite the decline of secondary industries that were once the largest providers of trades-
based training, the systemic labour shortages of recent years were concentrated amongst 
traditional technical trades. While much of the growth in temporary and permanent labour 
immigration came through knowledge professionals, Immigration Department statistics show 
that visas for trade occupations also sizeably increased, particularly from 2002 onwards 
(Immigration Department, 2005: 14; 2008b: 12-13). Moreover, the structural problems in 
training and skills development also pertained to occupations concentrated in burgeoning 
knowledge industries such as ICT (Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 2005: 408). These problems 
may have compounded the magnitude of the labour shortages that led the relaxation of labour 
immigration controls. 
 
Public opinion and party politics 
Public opinion 
Sustained economic growth not only increased the demand for labour, it also helped to 
engender an acceptance of the need for more immigration across the community. As Kevin 
Andrews (Immigration Minister in 2007) put it: 
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Australians will accept immigration and higher levels of immigration provided they 
see that it’s in the national interest… We moved from a period of high 
unemployment, where you were trying to find jobs for workers, to a period of low 
unemployment, where you were trying to find workers for jobs… As that changed, 
people were more accepting of immigration (interview, Immigration Minister 
AU34).  
 
Polling data shows that public attitudes in relation to intake size and the labour market impact 
of immigration became more favourable after 1996 (see Figure 5.8 and 5.9). McDonald and 
Withers claim that the record inflows of predominantly labour immigrants during the latter 
years of the Howard government occurred ‘without major opposition’ (2008: 3). While the 
healthy state of the economy undoubtedly contributed to this development, it was not the only 
factor.  
 
Public opinion polling suggests that immigration and related issues were relatively 
inconsequential electoral issues between 1996 and 2007. They did not appear to significantly 
shape voting patterns at Commonwealth elections, aside from refugees and asylum seekers in 
2001 (see Figure 5.10). The Howard government was nonetheless adroit at exploiting 
immigration to achieve desirable political and policy outcomes, an endeavour assisted by the 
manipulation of public opinion. To this end, Prime Minister Howard used Cabinet as a 
mechanism for exerting personal dominance within the government to direct attention 
towards political as well as policy considerations (to a much greater extent than his immediate 
prime ministerial predecessors) (cf. Rhodes et al., 2009: 82; Walter, 2008: 191; Weller, 2007: 
189). This was particularly evident with respect to two episodes. 
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Figure 5.8 Respondents’ views on the size of the current immigration intake (%), 1996 to 
2007 
 
Source: McAllister and Clark (2008): 71 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Respondents’ views on whether immigrants take jobs away from people born 
in Australia (%), 1996 to 2007 
 
Source: McAllister and Clark (2008): 72 
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Figure 5.10 Number of respondents citing the issues most important to them and their 
families during Commonwealth election campaigns (%), 1996 to 2007 
 
Source: McAllister and Clark (2008): 53 
 
Party political competition 
As discussed in Chapter 3, immigration is an issue that has historically cut across the political 
party divide. The Coalition parties were generally more liberal and the Labor Party more 
restrictive over labour immigration policy, whereas the reverse was generally the case with 
respect to family immigration (although these characterisations are far from universally 
applicable). The capacity of immigration to create tensions between the Labor’s blue-collar 
and social liberal support bases became apparent between 1996 and 2007. The Coalition’s 
courting of traditionally Labor-supporting working-class voters through appeals to patriotic 
sentiments on various policy issues, including immigration, was key to its electoral success 
during these years (Betts, 1996; Betts, 2005: 38). There were periods when neither major 
party had a decipherable advantage in public confidence in their immigration policies, but the 
Coalition held a clear lead from 1996 to 1997, and 2001 to 2004 (see Figure 5.11). There was 
more press coverage of immigration during these periods, which suggests that its salience as a 
political issue increased (see Figure 5.12). The Howard government used immigration to its 
clear political advantage on both occasions, and this had major consequences for labour 
immigration policy. 
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Figure 5.11 Respondents nominating the party they think would best handle immigration 
(%), January 1996 to June 2007 
 
Source: Newspoll (2010) ‘Political and issues trends’, www.newspoll.com.au, 28 March 
 
Figure 5.12 Number of articles containing the term ‘immigration’ in the domestic political 
news coverage of selected daily newspapers, July 1996 to December 2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data generated from Factiva.com 
Note: Periodicals selected on the basis of a variety of ownership, format, and locality. No data available for The 
Age and the Canberra Times prior to January 2001. 
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The restructuring of the immigration programme 
As outlined in Chapter 3, a lack of community confidence in the management of immigration 
policy emerged under the previous government. A series of opinion polls conducted in the 
wake of the 1996 election showing that consistently large majorities wanted lower intake 
levels indicated a continued dissatisfaction with the status quo (The Age, 1996a; The 
Australian, 1996; Canberra Times, 1996). The election of Pauline Hanson to the 
Commonwealth Parliament exemplified this vexation. The Liberal Party had endorsed 
Hanson as its candidate for a predominantly working-class electorate with a large Labor 
majority. She was deselected weeks before the election after expressing controversial views 
about welfare for Aborigines. Hanson ran as an independent candidate and was elected, after 
which she gained notoriety and support from a sizeable section of the community for her 
views on immigration, notably that too many people of Asian origin had been permitted entry 
under the immigration programme (Kelly, 2009: 365-369; Knightly, 2001: 321-326). The 
Howard government distanced itself from Hanson, but nonetheless claimed that its 
predecessor had prioritised family immigration in order to maximise electoral support from 
ethnic communities (see Chapter 3). This provided the Coalition with a political justification 
for the human capital criteria reforms between 1996 and 1999 (see Chapter 4). According to 
one senior minister, the Howard government had inherited an ‘ad hoc’ immigration 
programme that was not sufficiently focused on delivering positive labour market outcomes: 
 
If you’re going to run an immigration programme, it should be geared towards what 
is in Australia’s best interest, not what is in the best interests of some migrants who 
arrived here five or 10 years ago, which is what the family reunion programme was 
about. And frankly there was any amount of evidence that the Labor Party as a 
corporation was rorting this programme and feeding off being “the party friendly to 
migrants” to stack branches and win seats (interview, Cabinet minister AU28). 
 
The Coalition exploited division between the major political parties by claiming that its 
dismantling of Labor government policies reflected popular sentiments. Debate within the 
Coalition over the direction of immigration policy at this time proved to have a bearing on 
later developments.  
 
Philip Ruddock, the Immigration Minister during this period, had consistently been on the 
liberal side of the immigration policy divide within the Liberal Party (unlike Howard). He 
115 
was a self-professed ‘enthusiast for immigration’, and did not wish to see cuts to the overall 
intake level (interview, Immigration Minister AU32). Howard’s professed sympathy for 
Hanson’s view that immigration contributed to unemployment appeared to influence the 1996 
and 1997 Cabinet decisions to reduce and readjust the size and composition of the permanent 
immigration programme (The Age, 1996b; Daily Telegraph, 1997). Indeed, various officials 
claim that Ruddock was on the losing side of these debates within Cabinet (interviews, 
Immigration Department officials AU39, AU40). Ruddock nonetheless believed that policy 
adjustments were required to ‘restore integrity’ in immigration policy. He claims that ‘the 
“Hanson factor” wasn’t racial. It was about people being unhappy with migration selection 
generally, and the only way in which they thought they could deal with it was to support some 
more outspoken candidate’ (interview, Immigration Minister AU32). Ruddock argues that 
improving ‘the quality of migration’, through the human capital criteria reforms, ultimately 
aimed to improve public confidence in the immigration programme, thereby allowing intake 
levels to be increased as necessary (interview, Immigration Minister AU32). These views 
gradually began to resonate across the Howard government, as echoed by Treasurer Peter 
Costello in February 1999:  
 
In the long term, immigration is good for Australia and good for the economy… 
Australia was built on immigration and it will be built on immigration in the future. 
But the important thing is to get an immigration policy which is attuned to the needs 
of the moment and which enjoys public support … and we want to make sure that 
it’s balanced towards the economic needs in the future (quoted in Sydney Morning 
Herald, 1999).  
 
Asylum seekers and border control 
The second period where popular opinion clearly approved of the Howard government’s 
handling of immigration also ultimately increased its inclination to relax labour immigration 
controls. In August 2001, the government’s deployed the military to prevent a Norwegian 
freighter that had rescued a sinking boatload of asylum seekers from entering Australian 
territorial waters. This episode followed a relatively large increase in the number of people 
seeking unauthorised entry by sea (cf. Marr and Wilkinson, 2003). Howard later claimed: 
 
The community felt that Australia was losing control of her borders. They didn’t like 
that and they wanted their government to do something about it, and they wanted it 
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done in a decent manner, but they wanted it done effectively. What we were able to 
do in the second half of 2001 was to deal with the problem in a very effective way… 
The public was clearly saying: “look, you’re the government, you’ve got to do 
something about this”. And we did. And by the end of 2001, the problem was no 
more (ABC, 2008). 
 
These developments occurred shortly before the 2001 Commonwealth parliamentary 
elections. The Coalition had lagged in opinion polls through much of the year. But its support 
surged after the military deployment, which was compounded by Labor’s ambiguous response 
to the decision. The phrase that Howard used to defend the deployment – “we will decide who 
comes to this country and circumstances in which they come” – became the Coalition’s main 
campaign slogan for the election, which it subsequently won.  
 
The government’s border control policy represented a dominant attitude within the Howard 
government that ‘there’s proper way to come and there’s an improper way to come and 
there’s plenty of opportunity to come in the proper way’, in the words of one official 
(interview, Immigration official AU39). The stance was heavy-handed, but nevertheless 
popular in the broader community. It successfully channelled a ‘consistently low level of 
tolerance for what is seen as unregulated immigration and threat to national sovereignty’, 
according to Markus and colleagues (2009: 128; cf. Betts, 2005: 36-37). It is likely that the 
Howard government’s resolute stance on seaborne asylum seekers helped to negate public 
anxieties about immigration control more generally, and thereby increased support for its 
labour immigration policies.  
 
Following the increase in public support for its handling of immigration, a predominant 
outlook was established within the Howard government that it had more political capital to 
relax labour immigration controls. According to Ruddock, the government’s adoption of a 
‘hard line’ policy on border control and asylum seekers improved community confidence in 
its management of immigration flows: ‘tough border protection is a means to an end. It’s a 
means of building public confidence in the immigration programmes that you want to build’ 
(interview, Immigration Minister AU32). Vanstone also claims that these developments led 
the government to believe that it had more scope to relax labour immigration controls 
(interview, Immigration Minister AU55). This view ultimately extended to Howard. 
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Howard’s departure from his earlier restrictionist position on labour immigration followed the 
strengthening of labour demand at the end of the 1990s (cf. The Australian, 2000). A senior 
official in Howard’s department says that the government’s tough position on unauthorised 
asylum seekers in 2001 affirmed this view. ‘[It] made it then very much easier to accept high 
levels of immigration without it becoming a major political debate … because Australians had 
become persuaded that the borders were secure, [and] that meant they were much more 
willing to support higher levels of immigration’ (interview, PM&C official AU48). This was 
an important factor in the decision to facilitate the wide-ranging expansion of labour 
immigration controls in 2005. In the context of a tightening labour market and growing 
inflationary pressures, Howard accepted that ‘the immigration intake needed to be increased, 
as long as there was a strong focus on skills’, according to the official (interview, PM&C 
official AU48). This interpretation is supported by Howard’s biographers, who wrote prior to 
the defeat of the Coalition at the 2007 election: 
 
Howard is proud of the fact that his immigration and border protection policies have 
led to public acceptance of high levels of immigration. “People feel that the 
programme is under control”. There is evidence that Howard is right about his 
policies increasing public support for immigration. Much of that support, though, has 
been contingent on Howard’s tough stance on refugees (Errington and Van Onselen, 
2007: 373). 
 
The Howard government’s critics commonly characterised it as conservative and reactionary 
on immigration policy matters. Ruddock concedes that the government’s contrasting positions 
on labour and humanitarian immigration may have appeared ‘a little schizoid’ (interview, 
AU32 Ruddock). But there was broad consistency between the Howard government’s record 
and those of previous Coalition governments (see Chapter 3). That is, it was generally 
conservative with respect to the size and composition of the immigration programme (set in 
accordance with the national economic interest, social cohesion and the sovereign right of 
governments to determine the principles of immigration selection), but was prepared to be 
pragmatic in liberally adjusting these principles if circumstances required (Rubenstein, 1993: 
154-156). Despite its dogmatism on the sovereignty principle, the Howard government 
followed its Liberal predecessors by relaxing labour immigration controls as economic 
circumstances required. Whether its deft use of immigration control and asylum seekers to 
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manipulate public opinion and the political fault lines of the opposition were consistent with 
the record of its predecessors is another matter. 
 
Party political considerations were also a factor behind the growth of regional schemes. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the Coalition parties had a concentration of electoral support in 
regional areas and many areas of Howard government policy were tailored to regional 
demands.36 Accordingly, the increased number of regional schemes reflected the ‘high 
priority given under the Coalition to the needs of regional Australia’, in the words of one 
official (interview, Immigration Department official AU23). Not unlike the proclivity of the 
previous Labor government towards a family-oriented immigration policy, it is therefore 
possible that the Howard government was more attuned to regional demands because of 
electoral considerations.  
 
State/Territory governments 
The power vested by the Australian Constitution to the Commonwealth government over 
immigration did not preclude State/Territory governments from exerting influence over 
immigration policy between 1996 and 2007. As discussed in Chapter 4, the creation of 
numerous regional schemes proliferated in part from the adoption of a very flexible definition 
of ‘regional’. This gave State/Territory governments greater scope both to attract immigrants 
to the areas where they were needed, and deter them from where they were not. With the 
exception of New South Wales, all of the States/Territories consistently pressured the Howard 
government for more liberal labour immigration policies, particularly measures specifically 
directed at increasing their own immigration intakes.  
 
The responsiveness of the Howard government to the demands of State/Territory 
governments is something of an oddity. State/Territory governments had shown little active 
interest in immigration policy in previous decades. And most were Labor-controlled (Labor in 
fact won every State/Territory election between June 1998 and November 2007). However, 
the different political colour of the different tiers of government appeared to have little 
impact. Vanstone claims that party-political factors were irrelevant in the Howard 
government’s receptivity to the demands of Labor-controlled States/Territories. She says that 
                                                
36 For instance, a 2007 inquiry by the Commonwealth Auditor-General found that a disproportionate amount of 
the funding under the Regional Partnerships Program was allocated to Coalition-held electorates (cf. ANAO, 
2007). 
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these governments were viewed ‘as an information mechanism to guide us in selecting the 
right people for them. [We believed that] if it was the right people for them, it was the right 
people for Australia as a whole’ (interview, Immigration Minister AU55). According to this 
interpretation, pressure from State/Territory governments was taken as a proxy for regional 
labour market demand. This essentially represented a regional variation of the Howard 
government’s definition of the national economic interests that it used to design of aspects of 
labour immigration selection policy.  
 
Organised interests 
Trade unions and ethnic community organisations 
The pluralism that had characterised immigration politics since the 1970s abruptly ended with 
the election of the Howard government. Policy was implemented in rather a unilateral manner 
during its first three years in office and the influence of business increased thereafter. The 
formalised consultation process was maintained as part of the annual determination of the 
permanent immigration programme. But it was used primarily as a mechanism for selling 
predetermined policies, rather than guiding their direction.  
 
Organised interests that had previously been able to influence government decisions were 
engaged as part of the consultation process, but in a seemingly tokenistic fashion. A number 
of trade union representatives claim their input was either ignored or met with hostility by 
ministers and public servants (interviews, ACTU officials AU08, AU33). This partly reflected 
the declining industrial power of Australian trade unions, which diminished their capacity to 
exert political sway. More importantly, it signified the Howard government’s deep antipathy 
towards an institution that it believed held an unduly influential role over policy-making 
under the previous government (Kelly, 2009: 303-308). 
 
Ethnic community organisations such as the FECCA had been given prime access to the 
immigration policy-making process by the previous Labor government. However, Howard 
government ministers marginalised them. While these groups had once been courted by both 
major parties, the Coalition came to see them as more aligned to the Labor Party. Moreover, 
there was scepticism within the Coalition regarding the control that ethnic community 
organisations actually held over the voting behaviour of their constituents (interviews, 
FECCA official AU41, NSW Community Relations Commission official AU51). 
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Business groups 
In contrast to the inability of these organised interests to influence immigration policy, the 
institutional capacity of business increased under the Howard government. In the words of 
one senior public servant, business groups had an ‘extraordinarily strong’ influence over 
policy developments between 1996 and 2007. In particular, peak bodies such the ACCI and 
the BCA were ‘big drivers of policy-making’ (interview, Immigration Department official 
AU27). Indeed, interviews suggested that these and other business groups were granted a 
privileged position from which to influence immigration policy, and were often directly 
solicited for opinion or advice from senior ministers (interviews, BCA official AU07, BAP 
member/AIG official AU09, MBA official AU30, ACCI official AU43; Immigration 
Department officials AU19, AU23; ministerial adviser AU25).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, pressure from business contributed to reform in all three 
categories of labour immigration policy. Business was able to exert this influence for two 
reasons. First, it effectively utilised its close links with the Coalition parties. An expansionary 
immigration policy focused on labour immigration was a core policy objective of a number of 
business groups. In the words of a peak business group chief executive, a liberal immigration 
policy was one of the ‘key policy principles of the organisation’ (interview, ACCI official 
AU13). Segments of the business community grew concerned about the direction of 
immigration policy during the early years of the Howard government, when the immigration 
programme was cut and Hanson’s popularity was at its peak. According to one business 
official, there was a sense that ‘if the programme could not succeed under whatever guise was 
politically defendable, then the debate could be lost for a number of years’ (interview, HIA 
official AU46).  
 
The commitment to immigration was also driven by the liberalisation of market regulation 
following the breakdown of the protectionist settlement. The predominant response among 
business groups to these developments was to seek further liberal regulation, particularly in 
relation to labour markets (Boreham, 2002: 185, 194). Desire for relaxed immigration 
controls was an extension of this pursuit. 
 
Various senior officials suggest that business groups are given latitude to influence 
immigration policymaking irrespective of the party in government (interviews, Immigration 
Department officials AU19, AU27). But overlapping market philosophies and close 
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organisational relationships with the Coalition parties appeared to increase this scope. The 
Coalition was in unison with business groups in believing that government’s role was to 
facilitate free markets and, by extension, implement policies favourable to business. 
Moreover, business had good opportunity to lobby individual Coalition parliamentarians on 
immigration policy. As one senior Howard government minister put it: 
 
We are the party of business, we look for support from business and we have pro-
business policies. And the fact is that business in this country is typically pro high 
immigration… All our MPs go to dinners with business and they’re all saying, 
“you’ve got to increase the immigration programme”… And inevitably they get a 
sympathetic ear (interview, Cabinet minister AU28).  
 
The second reason business could exert influence on immigration policy was that the greater 
organisational coherence that business had established in the 1990s (see Chapter 3) increased 
their leverage over the direction of policy. Business groups (most notably the BCA) used this 
organisational strength to play key roles in bringing about major policy reforms, such as the 
decentralisation of wage bargaining in the early 1990s and taxation reform in the late 1990s. 
The success of business in both instances was the result of mobilising grass roots support 
from prominent corporations and business leaders, drawing upon research to bolster their 
position and utilising alliances with senior government ministers and officials to convince 
initially reluctant governments of the necessity of reform (Bell, 2006: 160-162; Eccleston, 
2000: 320).  
 
Business groups took a similar approach to population policy, which encompassed a relaxing 
of labour immigration controls. The BCA, the ACCI and various industry associations 
essentially formed a loose ‘advocacy coalition’ (cf. Birkland, 1998: 57) to make the case for 
reform. As with earlier campaigns, business groups frequently drew upon research to 
substantiate their arguments. This was seen as an important part of persuading those in the 
government and the broader community who might be otherwise sceptical (interview, BCA 
official AU54). The manner in which the case for relaxing immigration controls was 
advocated was also seen as crucial. One business official claims that ‘as a business 
community, we did not want to jeopardise the whole of the immigration programme by 
making outlandish calls for further immigration. You could only press the envelope so far and 
still retain community acceptance of the programme’ (interview, ACCI official AU43). 
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Another representative says that the prevailing mood in the community in the late 1990s 
meant that the issue had to be approached strategically and sensitively: ‘my objective at the 
time was to have a considered debate, establish some sensible policy parameters around how 
you would construct a sensible immigration programme, have a longer-term target, and then a 
method of getting there’ (interview, ACCI official AU13). These sentiments are echoed by 
another business group official, who claims that the inclusion of immigration expansion in its 
broader population policy campaign had to be handled ‘with kid gloves, because you did not 
want to trigger a political backlash. Rather, you wanted to trigger a measure of consensus, 
which I must say, over the course of the period, slowly started to emerge’ (interview, BCA 
official AU54). 
 
It is difficult to pinpoint the precise impact of these groups in influencing the Howard 
government’s labour immigration decisions. But as Chapter 4 demonstrates, business groups 
clearly played a role in the policy changes that occurred between 1996 and 2007. However, 
the Howard government was not prepared to countenance the calls by other segments of the 
business community for a doubling of Australia’s population. Construction industry groups 
and companies and other beneficiaries of product market growth (which Betts (1999: 3-4) 
dubs the ‘growth lobby’) were at the forefront of this campaign. Vanstone expressed the 
government’s view when the wide-ranging reforms of 2005 were followed by pressure for a 
further expansion: “immigration must always be in line with what the economy needs… The 
government doesn’t have any truck with people who want to set immigration levels 
irrespective of how secure and strong the economy is” (quoted in The Australian, 2005c). 
Thus, while the Howard government believed that delivering good outcomes for business was 
an effective measure for designing immigration policy, this belief was not an absolutist one. 
 
The Immigration Department 
The Howard government’s assertion of its immigration control prerogatives over unauthorised 
boat arrivals mirrored the prevailing attitude within the Immigration Department that its job 
was to ensure ‘strict enforcement of the rules to achieve integrity’, in the words of one official 
(interview, Immigration Department official AU39).  Indeed, the centrality of immigration 
control to the protectionist settlement necessitated a strong role for the state in immigrant 
selection (see Chapter 3). But as the protectionist settlement unravelled, the state adopted a 
less interventionist role in economic affairs, as evident in changes to the regulation of product, 
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financial and labour markets. This had implications for the state’s role in the control and 
selection of foreign workers.  
 
Commonwealth governments increasingly adopted the view that business knew its needs 
better than the state did, and that such an approach led to greater market efficiency. This was 
the premise for the adoption of a demand-driven temporary work visas policy in the 1990s. 
The scheme allowed employers to engage foreign workers more efficiently and without many 
of the administrative constraints of the permanent skilled categories. Employers were able to 
use temporary work visas as freely and extensively as they desired, as long as certain basic 
conditions were met. By giving employers control over an aspect of immigration selection in 
this manner, the Howard government was in effect delegating a longstanding preserve of state 
authority (Mares, 2009a). 
 
Serving employer objectives was a key purpose of the Immigration Department between 1996 
and 2007. This accorded with the Howard government’s proclivity for business-friendly 
policies. As seen in Chapter 4, removing regulatory burdens from business was a common 
pretext for liberal labour immigration reforms. But the Immigration Department went beyond 
this by entering a more clientelistic relationship with business, as demonstrated through 
various policy initiatives. From 2005, the Immigration Department conducted a series of 
foreign worker recruitment expos in partnership with the State/Territory governments, 
business groups and industry associations (The Australian, 2005d). According to an ACCI 
representative, this episode illustrated the Immigration Department’s responsiveness to direct 
requests from business to help them recruit workers from abroad (Official Committee 
Hansard , 2007: 42). Another scheme was established at the suggestion of business in 2005, 
whereby Immigration Department officials were seconded to industry associations to assist 
with visa sponsorship procedures. Dialogue between business and the Immigration 
Department was promoted through this programme (interviews, Immigration Department 
officials AU12, AU23). 
 
As well as aiding good labour market outcomes for business, the Immigration Department 
also accommodated the Howard government’s desire to see changes in immigration policy 
deliver good labour market outcomes among applicants. This was achieved by adjusting the 
parameters of the LSIA to increase selection among those most likely to have a positive fiscal 
impact. As discussed in Chapter 4, these adjustments were significant because of the extent to 
124 
which the Howard government utilised the LSIA to make its case for the human capital 
criteria reforms of 1999 (Richardson and Lester, 2004: 15-16). Boswell argues that the 
‘highly contested’ nature of immigration policy means that the credibility of ‘evidence’ will 
vary according to differing policy preferences (2008: 479). So while the LSIA was the 
‘evidence-base’ upon which policy change was justified, the evidence was gathered 
selectively, according to the government’s particular definition of the national interest. 
 
The assumptions underpinning the Howard government’s immigration policy preferences – 
that good labour market outcomes, for employers and immigrants alike, equal good 
immigration policy – thus faced minimal obstruction from the Commonwealth bureaucracy. 
Two factors can explain this. The first relates to the entrenchment of a human capital 
orthodoxy within the Immigration Department in the late 1980s (see Chapter 3). Jupp claims 
that this development was ‘not influential enough to produce a major shift away from the 
family reunion and humanitarian programmes’ at the time, but nevertheless ‘laid the basis for 
such shifts upon the change of government’ (2002: 59). The Immigration Department found 
agreement from other ministries in the execution of the Howard government’s policies, 
according to various officials. The Treasury and the Department of Finance, which had been 
critical of the Immigration Department’s lack of economic rigour in the 1980s, were 
particularly supportive (interviews, Immigration Department officials AU19, AU39).  
 
Secondly, the Immigration Department willingly implemented the Howard government’s 
agenda because of its ‘very, very strong culture’, with respect of the view that ‘the elected 
government of the day sets the policy and our job is to find ways to do it’, in the words of one 
official (interview, Immigration Department official AU39). The tendencies were amplified 
by the demise of tenured employment for senior public servants, which served to increase the 
political control by governments over the bureaucracy (Verspaandonk and Holland, 2003: 3-
4). This development began in the 1970s and accelerated in the years leading up to the 1996 
election (Weller, 2001: 24-34). It was further advanced when the Howard government sacked 
the heads of six government ministries within days of assuming office, including the secretary 
of the Immigration Department. While not tantamount to a wholesale politicisation, it did 
serve to make the public service – particularly its senior ranks – more attentive to the agenda 
of a new government (Mulgan, 1998: 7-8; Rhodes et al. 2009: 38; Tiernan, 2006: 322). This 
responsiveness evidently permeated through the ranks of the Immigration Department. 
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Discussion 
The shift in Australia’s political economy can partly explain the widespread support that an 
expansive and business-friendly labour immigration policy received within the executive 
branch of the Commonwealth government and from the State/Territory governments and 
business groups. The transformation from a protectionist to a liberal and internationally 
integrated economy was profound. Australia’s level of external trade as a proportion of GDP 
rose from 13 per cent in 1970 to 21 per cent in 2008 (Lloyd, C. 2008: 37). This period saw a 
large increase in the export of services such as tourism and education, particularly to Asia, 
which by 2006 accounted for more than half of Australian exports (Edwards, 2006: 40, 53-
54). Francis Castles and his colleagues claim that ‘the repercussions of this process of active 
engagement with global economic forces have been felt to varying degrees in all policy areas’ 
(2006: 132). Immigration policy was no exception. 
 
The integration between Australian and Asian markets signified a major change from the days 
of the protectionist settlement and had implications for immigration policy, as well as 
economic and geopolitical relations. The 1989 Garnaut report said that increased trade with 
Asia in knowledge-based service industries would mean more people of Asian origin visiting 
and immigrating to Australia. Indeed, there was enormous growth in immigration among 
people born in various parts of Asia in recent decades, even if Britons and Europeans still 
accounted for the largest segments of settlers (see Figure 5.13). By 2007, the days of an 
immigration policy that explicitly discriminated on the basis of national origin were truly 
over. 
 
The replacement of protective with liberal market regulations accompanied greater 
international economic engagement (Lloyd, C. 2008: 32). This had consequences for 
immigration policy. As discussed in Chapter 3, labour market regulation and immigration 
controls have a longstanding interconnection within Australia’s model of political economy. 
Under the protectionist settlement, the existence of labour market regulation that protected 
workers’ wages and employment rights and conditions was contingent upon restricting labour 
supply through immigration control. As the protectionist settlement was progressively 
dismantled, policies designed to improve workers’ employability and their capacity to move 
freely between jobs gradually replaced protective employment laws. Removing these 
protections, and the regulatory constraints they placed on employers, would also theoretically 
add to business dynamism (Mitchell et al., 2001: 15-17). This shift aimed to enhance labour 
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flexibility in order to match labour supply with labour demand more efficiently in a national 
economy that was becoming more integrated in competitive international markets. As labour 
market regulation was interconnected to immigration control under a defensive protectionist 
political economy, so too were they linked in one of liberal engagement. The premium placed 
on human capital criteria in immigration policy to select the applicants most likely to succeed 
in the labour market complemented the government’s objective to improve worker mobility. 
The promotion of employer-sponsored and regional schemes permitted businesses to fulfil 
their labour requirements efficiently and relatively free of the constraints of domestic labour 
supply. This reflected a shift in the national policy priorities that underpinned the nature of 
labour market regulation. When the guiding principle of Australia’s political economy was to 
neutralise class division and promote national unity in the years following federation, tight 
labour immigration controls had reinforced a model of labour market regulation aimed 
primarily at protecting the position of resident workers. Now that the political economy had 
shifted to promote market freedom and international engagement, immigration controls were 
relaxed to support a labour market regulatory model designed to advance the position of 
business. 
 
Figure 5.13 Overseas-born population in Australia by region, 1971 and 2006 
 
Source: Markus et al. (2009): 57 
 
The equation of good immigration policy with good labour market outcomes for business led 
to the large expansion of the temporary work visa scheme. By 2007-08, the number of people 
permanently settling in Australia had reached a 20-year high. Skilled visas accounted for 
much of this growth. However, ‘long-term’ immigration – a category used to define arrivals 
that are not short-term visitors, but not necessarily intending to settle permanently – had 
increased exponentially. Figure 5.14 shows that the large increase in those arriving on 
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temporary work visas contributed to this growth. The growth of temporary work visas is 
significant for two reasons. First, Commonwealth governments had consistently rejected 
temporary labour immigration throughout the post-federation era (Hugo, 2004: 17). Employer 
exploitation of indentured guestworkers in the plantation industries during the late eighteenth 
century had ingrained a deep and widespread preference for permanent over temporary 
immigration (Maclellan and Mares, 2006: 27-29). Second, temporary work visa regulations 
were relaxed to improve the efficiency with which employers could engage foreign workers. 
Facilitating business activity in the context of a liberal and open economy motivated this 
reform, which was the catalyst for increased intakes under the scheme. Giving employers 
their capacity to, in effect, self-regulate their use of the temporary work visas was consistent 
with both the Howard government and the Immigration Department’s definition of good 
immigration selection policy. But this development is somewhat incongruous with the lengths 
that Commonwealth governments have traditionally gone to maintain authority over 
immigration selection and control. 
 
Business groups had close political and ideological affiliations with the Coalition parties. 
However, the Howard government’s adoption of labour immigration policy reforms that 
accommodated business interests did not necessarily indicate that it was in thrall to business. 
Rather, it was a reflection of the confluence in their respective objectives. Business was 
attracted to employer-sponsored schemes because their demand-driven regulation meant they 
could be utilised quickly in response to short-term labour shortages. The government was 
attracted to them because their sensitivity to labour demand helped to contain wage growth 
and minimise inflationary pressure. The liberalisation of financial markets and the floating of 
the exchange rate in the 1980s had heightened the imperative of containing inflation, but 
diminished the capacity of Commonwealth governments to do so. However, sponsorship-
based labour immigration could act as a possible lever in this respect because it allowed the 
supply of labour to be increased in response to demand. Business and government goals also 
overlapped with respect to the human capital criteria reforms. An increase in the overall 
stock of skilled workers followed these reforms, which to an extent helped to supplement the 
waning commitment of business to workforce training. The reforms also delivered a 
proportionate growth in workers likely to make a net positive contribution to the national 
accounts, thus complementing the government’s fiscal policy objectives. The expansion of 
labour immigration therefore came about not simply because of business pressure. The 
Commonwealth government also used immigration policy as an effective macroeconomic 
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policy instrument.37 In essence, the confluence of business and government objectives was the 
main driving force behind the relaxation of labour immigration controls between 1996 and 
2007. 
 
Figure 5.14 Settler and long-term arrivals and permanent and temporary labour 
immigration intakes, 1976/77 to 2007/08 (selected years) 
 
Note: ‘Settler’ arrivals include visa-holders that intend to settle permanently; ‘long-term’ arrivals include 
temporary visa holders (excluding returning residents) intending to stay longer than 12 months 
Source: Figure 4.1 (for permanent skilled and temporary work visa statistics); DIAC (2009) Emigration 2008-
09, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Tables 1 and 2 (for settler and long-term statistics) 
 
Post-script 
The Howard government faced few institutional obstacles in implementing its labour 
immigration policies, and major opposition to its agenda was not evident during its time in 
office. Green groups that voiced concern about the environmental impact of increased 
immigration levels gained little traction. Ethnic community groups occasionally called for a 
larger allocation of the immigration intake for the family rather than labour and skilled 
categories, but to no avail. While often expressing similar sentiments, the opposition parties 
did not use Parliament to obstruct the government’s major legislative initiatives. Nevertheless, 
                                                
37 Immigration policy was used to such a large degree in this respect over recent years that one prominent 
economics commentator claimed that it became ‘the unspoken third arm of official economic policy’ (Pascoe, 
2010). 
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after the demise of Hanson and particularly after the 2001 election, labour immigration policy 
received scant attention – negative or otherwise – either in Parliament or the broader forums 
of political debate, such as the media. The subsequent rising of intake levels to previously 
unreached heights makes this development rather remarkable. 
 
One notable exception to this was the growing opposition from the trade union movement to 
the regulation of temporary work visas. In 2005, the Howard government sought to remove 
any remaining protectionist elements of labour market regulation by abolishing compulsory 
arbitration, weakening employment protection mechanisms and significantly curtailing the 
ability of unions to represent workers. Despite the significant decline of its political influence, 
the union movement launched an orchestrated campaign against the new laws. As part of this 
campaign, unions drew attention to various cases of immigrant worker exploitation to attack 
the temporary work visa scheme. Unions claimed that weakened minimum standards for 
wages, employment conditions and job protection left visa holders more vulnerable (cf. The 
Advertiser, 2006; Canberra Times, 2006). The Labor opposition also grew increasingly 
critical of the scheme’s regulation. The campaign against the Howard government’s labour 
law reforms began to have an evident impact upon the Coalition’s standing in opinion polls. 
Civil penalties for companies and individual employers caught breaching their legal 
obligations were introduced, according to Kevin Andrews, largely in response to 
controversies surrounding the instances of worker exploitation. These cases were contributing 
to diminished public support for temporary work visas, which was particularly problematic 
given the persistence of labour shortages (interview, Immigration Minister AU34; cf. 
Immigration Minister, 2007b). 
 
There has been a reversion to a more restrictionist labour immigration policy since the 
Coalition’s defeat at the November 2007 election. Despite its involvement in the union 
campaign against temporary work visa regulations in 2005, the ascent of a Labor government 
did not herald a more restrictive labour immigration policy. Rather, it initially followed the 
example of its predecessor and further increased intake levels. The permanent immigration 
programme for 2008-09 was increased by 38,000 to 190,000 as the economy continued to 
expand. The rise of skilled categories by 31,000 represented both the largest ever single-year 
increase and overall intake.  
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The downturn in the Australian economy was comparatively mild following the onset of the 
global financial crisis in late 2008, but labour demand nonetheless contracted. So too did the 
permanent skilled immigration, which was cut by 24,400 places (or 19 per cent) in early 2009. 
(Markus et al., 2009: xii-xiii). The government’s ability to implement this reduction was 
thwarted by a large backlog of visa applications built up from before the crisis. Priority was 
given to processing ENS and State/Territory sponsored visas and Independent visa applicants 
with an occupation on the newly established ‘critical skills list’. Applicants with 
qualifications in ICT, medical, accounting and engineering – which remained in high demand 
– were consequently given priority and trades professions were sent to the bottom of the 
processing queue (Birrell and Perry, 2009: 64-70; Mares, 2009b).  
 
The financial crisis was not the sole motivation for these changes. The Labor government was 
also concerned that many international students transferring to permanent skilled visas were 
undertaking vocational training courses simply to meet the points test requirements for 
permanent residency, rather than utilising the qualifications nominated in their applications. 
The establishment of a strong student-work visa pathway had led to a large rise in foreign 
nationals undertaking tertiary education (see Chapter 4). The rapid growth in private 
vocational colleges offering courses for qualifications on the MODL directly contributed to 
this trend. Mares claims that most of these colleges were legitimate and provided quality 
education and training. But many of the colleges offering courses for occupations in persistent 
short supply, such as cooking and hairdressing, were ‘nothing more than visa factories’. This 
undermined the reputation of the Australian tertiary education industry, and contributed to the 
visa-processing backlog. In the hope of addressing these concerns, the government abolished 
the MODL in February 2010 and thereby weakened the student-work visa pathway (Mares, 
2010). 
 
Pockets of labour demand persisted across the economy despite the financial crisis. This 
allowed intake levels to remain steady for the demand-driven temporary work visa scheme 
(Markus et al., 2009: xiii). However, the number of entrants has dramatically declined after 
various restrictions were made to its regulation (The Age, 2010). In April 2009, the Labor 
government raised the standard of English proficiency required by applicants, increased the 
minimum salary level, and specified that employers had to demonstrate stronger commitments 
to training before utilising the scheme. These changes followed a review into the regulation of 
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the temporary work visa scheme, which was initiated after trade unions alleged that 
employers were using the visas to drive down labour costs (Mares, 2009a). 
 
The re-emergence of union antipathy towards labour immigration can be explained by the 
major reform of the Australian labour market over the previous two decades. Writing prior to 
the replacement of protectionist labour market regulation with a liberal model, Quinlan and 
Lever-Tracy prophetically warned that ‘a shift towards a more deregulated labour market 
which undermines union influence and the arbitration system, could foment divisions within 
the labour market and arouse strident union and working class hostility to further 
immigration’ (1990: 161). Changes to labour market regulation exposed the potential 
drawbacks of temporary work visas for both resident and migrant workers, even if they 
produced benefits for business and government. As Kinnaird notes, ‘the fundamental point 
about the … visa is that employers can sponsor skilled migrants without any reference to 
whether there is a skill shortage in the field or not’ (2006: 53). This was not particularly 
problematic in an economic environment of employment growth, and a regulatory 
environment that maintained a sufficient level of protection for worker rights and wage 
benchmarks, even in the context of an otherwise liberal regulatory framework.  
 
The recent decline in labour immigration intakes is thus partly the result of the – perhaps 
predictable – tensions created by the erosion of these protections by the labour law reforms of 
2005, and the removal of checks and balances on employers’ use of temporary work visas. 
These developments combined to offer possible incentives for employers to engage 
immigrant rather than resident workers. Having said that, contracting labour demand has also 
evidently impacted on falling labour immigration. This is consistent with the post-war pattern 
of intakes, which increased during periods of economic growth and declined during or in the 
aftermath of downturns.  
 
Aside from these regulatory changes, the Labor government that was first elected in 2007 
embraced the fundamental premise of the Howard government’s immigration policy: that it 
should be designed in accordance with national economic interest, as defined by optimal 
labour market outcomes for immigrants and employers alike. However, both Labor and the 
Coalition pledged to work towards a lower immigration intake during the 2010 election 
campaign, evidently in response to a rise in community support for slower population growth. 
Concerns relating to environmental sustainability, increasing congestion and a lack of 
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sufficient infrastructure in the major urban centres, and another rise in the arrivals of seaborne 
asylum seekers, seemingly contributed to these sentiments. There was also a visible backlash 
against the endorsement by Kevin Rudd (Prime Minster from November 2007 to June 2010) 
for a ‘big Australia’, and a 60 per cent increase in the national population by 2050. But the 
major increase in recent immigration – particularly temporary immigration in the form of 
international student and temporary work visas – also appeared to play a part (Sloan, 2010; 
Sydney Morning Herald, 2010).  
 
Conclusion 
By the time the Howard government was voted out of office in November 2007, the labour 
immigration intake was at its highest level in Australian history. A long period of economic 
growth combined with various structural weaknesses in the domestic labour market led to 
increased labour demand, which drove the relaxation of labour immigration controls. But 
other institutional factors were also at play. The incumbent Coalition parties initially saw an 
immigration selection system that favoured human capital over settlement criteria as a way of 
both gaining political leverage against the opposition Labor Party, and containing the appeal 
of Hanson’s anti-immigration populism. However, they gradually came to see a selective 
expansion of immigration as compatible with their broader economic agenda and pro-market 
inclinations.  
 
The Immigration Department’s institutional preference for a selection policy based on 
delivering measurably positive economic and labour market outcomes assisted the process of 
policy change. State/Territory governments and business groups shared these objectives and 
their persuasions influenced the Howard government’s growing inclination towards more 
liberal labour immigration controls. Political and ideological affinities resulted in greater 
access to policy-making for business groups, but previously influential organised interests 
were neutered. Nonetheless, the government faced minimal opposition in relaxing labour 
immigration control, including from the broader community. It is likely that the Howard 
government’s political manipulation of broader issues relating to immigration control 
increased popular acceptance of the case for labour immigration liberalisation, although this 
was undoubtedly helped by the buoyant economic climate.  
 
While some of the elements its reforms were radical, they were shaped by three longstanding 
features of Australian immigration policy discussed in Chapter 3: immigration continued to be 
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used as a policy instrument for nation-building; the state retained a strong role in controlling 
immigration flows; and the nation’s geography shaped policies pertaining to immigration 
selection and control. Each of these three features was adapted to shifting contexts and 
demands in shaping the development of immigration policy between 1996 and 2007.  
 
As was the case with the changes to immigration policy in the periods after federation and the 
Second World War, immigration policy was used to facilitate national economic prosperity 
between 1996 and 2007. The manner of its utilisation was adapted to shifts in Australia’s 
political economy and the regulation of its markets. The affirmation by the Howard 
government of labour market success among applicants, in the form of human capital 
attributes, as the principal basis of immigrant selection – rather than family connections or 
nationality – indirectly stemmed from the transition from protectionist defence to liberal 
engagement.  
 
Economic recession and political barriers impeded the moves by previous governments to 
make corresponding adjustments to immigration policy. Free of such constraints, the Howard 
government willingly adopted a model of selection based on the likelihood of labour market 
success, both among individual applicants and sponsoring employers. This helped to facilitate 
shifts in the Australian economy towards the internationally integrated knowledge industries 
upon which it had become increasingly dependent for wealth-creation.  
 
Tight labour immigration controls had once been justified on the basis of protecting the wages 
and employment conditions of the resident workforce. The efficacy of such restrictions were 
seen not only as redundant but also potentially harmful to business competitiveness in a more 
open economy. Moreover, the greater subjugation of economic policy to the whims of global 
markets prompted the Howard government to use immigration as a macroeconomic policy 
instrument.  
 
The shift to a political economic model of liberal engagement also had implications for the 
state’s role in controlling immigration. The Howard government gave business greater control 
over immigrant selection, since it used good business outcomes as a yardstick for gauging 
good immigration policy. But the government also intensified efforts to prevent the entry of 
those prejudged as unlikely either to succeed in the labour market, or to deliver a net dividend 
to the Australian economy. This was evident both in the diminished scope for family category 
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entrants, and the lengths to which the government went to prevent the arrival of a 
comparatively small number of seaborne asylum seekers. 
 
Despite Australia’s protectionist history and its longstanding maintenance of a racially 
discriminatory immigration policy, engagement with Asia and the increase of Asian 
immigration occurred with relatively minimal controversy (the brief popularity of Hanson 
being the one main exception). But it is quite likely that a lingering sense of vulnerability 
about Australia’s geopolitical position as a still predominantly Western-identifying nation 
surrounded by Asia underpinned the popularity of Howard government’s stance on asylum 
seekers, as a number of authors suggest (Freeman, 2004a: 174; Markus et al., 2009: 48-50). 
However, research by McAllister shows that the community’s broad acceptance of the 
government’s premise for its actions – that is, that it had a sovereign right to determine who 
should be permitted entry, and a duty to defend the inviolability of border controls – also 
fostered popular support (2003: 454-459).  
 
The preoccupation of Commonwealth governments and the Immigration Department with 
immigration control have undoubtedly been shaped by Australia’s geographical isolation. But 
an overt and perhaps exaggerated sense of vulnerability towards unwanted immigration has 
been matched by an equally overt insecurity over its ability to attract desired immigration. 
Technological advancements made Australia much easier to reach than in the past, but the 
increased competition for labour from other nation states had an evident impact on the 
Howard government’s labour immigration reforms. The ‘tyranny of distance’ factor thus 
continued to shape Australian immigration policy, but the proliferation of regional schemes 
shows that it took on a new dimension between 1996 and 2007. Not only did policies 
incorporate incentives to attract prospective labour immigrants to Australia, but also within 
Australia, through the various carrots offered for the settlement in regions with population and 
labour shortages. 
 
The Howard government’s relaxation of labour immigration controls can be seen as an 
adaptation of these three resilient features of Australian immigration policy to contemporary 
contexts. But what Hugo calls the ‘culture of migration’ characterising Australia’s 
immigration politics also explains policy developments between 1996 and 2007. The 
inclinations of government – be it Commonwealth or State, Coalition or Labour – and 
organised interests, such as business, to look to immigration policy to solve broader policy 
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dilemmas reflects a general level of consensus by the major parties, institutions and 
stakeholders, and across the broader community (at least to a greater degree than in other 
developed states) that, if properly regulated, immigration can be beneficial to the national 
interest.  
 
The prospects of a reversion to the incoherence that marked immigration selection policy 
between 1972 and 1996 are minimal. A bipartisan consensus seems to have been established 
around a human capital orthodoxy as the principal basis for selection. However, economic 
slowdown and rising concerns about environmental sustainability and urban congestion 
indicate that the immigration policy-making contexts have once again changed. Moreover, the 
combination of a more liberal labour market and the lax regulation of temporary work visas 
may have contributed to the recent rise in community antipathy towards expansionary 
immigration. While it is difficult to assess the significance of recent events, it could well be 
the case that Australian immigration politics has once again reached a crossroad. 
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CHAPTER 6  
THE POLITICS OF UK LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY PRIOR TO 1997 
 
Recent developments in UK labour immigration policy cannot be understood without 
reference to the historical and institutional contexts that shaped the contours of policy-
making. In the mid 1990s, the UK was widely characterised as having the most restrictive 
immigration selection criteria of any developed economy. According to various scholars, the 
policies of the Thatcher and Major governments had aimed to keep inflows to the ‘irreducible 
minimum’ (Salt, 2006: 252). It was claimed that in contrast to its European counterparts, the 
UK had ‘succeeded in restricting immigration where others had failed’ (Somerville, 2007: 4). 
These governments has supposedly demonstrated that it was indeed ‘possible to limit 
unwanted migration’ (Freeman, 1994: 297), through ‘horrendously tight’ immigration 
controls (Layton-Henry, 1994: 293), and an ‘exceptionally strong and unrelenting hand in 
bringing immigration down to the inescapable minimum’ (Joppke, 1999: 100). The UK was 
said to represent ‘Europe’s (and the Western world’s) closest approximation to a successful 
zero immigration country’ (Hansen, 2004: 338). According to Messina, this restrictionism 
was so entrenched by the time the Blair government came to office that UK policy-makers 
were ‘effectively prohibited from choosing the policy option of new labour migration’. He 
claims that they were ‘imprisoned’ by a path dependent legacy of ‘entrenched cultural and 
political hostility’ going back to the 1960s. An ‘illiberal and restrictive “ideological 
framework”’ was so ‘deeply embedded’ that expansionary labour immigration was effectively 
removed ‘from the menu of politically viable policy options’ (Messina, 2001: 267-268). This 
was apparently the case even when there were sound economic reasons for pursuing such 
policies (Freeman, 1994: 298). Writing three years before the 1997 election, Layton-Henry 
asserted: 
 
Immigration and related issues have been heavily politicised in the post-war period, 
to such an extent that it is now a powerful constraint on policy makers… The case in 
favour of immigration in terms of economic advantage, capital investment, 
expanding the labour force, international contacts and trade, and the acquiring of 
enterprise and entrepreneurial skills has little salience in public debates. The weight 
of public and media opinion tends to focus on the disadvantages of immigration and 
the need for tough immigration controls (Layton-Henry, 1994: 276). 
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Between 2000 and 2004, policymakers in the UK were able to defy this trend by relaxing 
labour immigration controls to an extent greater that anywhere else in Western Europe. The 
UK’s ‘exceptionalism’ was thus turned on its head. In understanding how and why the Blair 
government was able to embark on this shift, it is important to explain the reasons for the 
restrictionist legacy that it inherited.  
 
This chapter examines the politics underpinning the UK’s post-war labour immigration and 
related policy developments. The next section provides a brief outline of labour immigration 
policy developments prior to 1945, with a focus on the development of immigration control 
from the early 1900s. An overview is then given of the expansion of labour immigration in 
the period from 1946 to 1962. The policies introduced to limit labour and secondary 
immigration from the Commonwealth, and the reasons for these shifts, are then assessed. This 
is followed by a discussion of developments relating to European and skilled immigration 
after 1973. The relevant institutional contexts inherited by the Blair government are then 
examined. This sets the scene for Chapters 7 and 8, which explore the liberalisation of labour 
immigration controls between 2000 and 2004. 
 
Labour immigration policy prior to 1945: The advent of selection and control 
Despite the restrictionist characterisation of UK immigration policy in the mid 1990s, it was 
not always the case. Until the early twentieth century, foreign nationals were more or less free 
to enter the UK as they wished. As Ryan says: 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the principle of the free movement of people was 
accepted by the political elite in Britain… The understanding of the time was that 
labour migration was a necessary concomitant of a successful trading economy. The 
interests of the British state in maintaining a global empire discouraged the view that 
movement across national borders should be restricted (2005: 10). 
 
The passage of the 1905 Aliens Act heralded a significant shift in immigration control 
(Saggar, 1992: 27). Brought about in response to large waves of predominantly Jewish 
immigration from Eastern Europe, it represented the first attempt by UK legislators to impose 
restrictions on immigration (Spencer, I. 1997: 10). Under the 1905 Act, authorities were 
permitted to prevent entry to or deport those legally defined as ‘aliens’ (that is, those who 
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were not British ‘subjects’) who they adjudged to be incapable of supporting themselves 
(Money, 1997: 699; Winder, 2004: 259-260).  
 
The Aliens Restriction Acts of 1914 and 1919 introduced a series of more specific controls 
with direct implications for the rights of foreign nationals to work. The 1919 Act specified 
that ‘aliens’ wishing to engage in employment had to obtain a Work Permit from the 
Department of Employment, which required sponsorship for a particular job from an 
employer. To successfully apply for Work Permit, a sponsoring employer had to demonstrate 
that no suitable candidate could be found within the domestic labour force. The person 
sponsored was required to be sufficiently skilled and experienced, and their engagement could 
not undermine established norms regulating wages and conditions (Layton-Henry, 1985: 104-
105). These criteria remained largely unchanged for the next 80 years, and Work Permits 
provided the main avenue for foreign nationals to work legally until 1945 (Salt, 2006: 261-
262). 
 
Labour immigration policy from 1945 to 1962: A period of expansion 
The UK’s post-war labour immigration schemes started earlier than in other Western 
European states. After the 1945 general election, the incoming Attlee government set out to 
expand secondary industry and the public sector as part of its plans for economic 
reconstruction. It soon became apparent that a shortage of labour stood in the way of these 
ambitions, which was compounded by the emigration of some 750,000 Britons between 1946 
and 1950 (Layton-Henry, 1985: 89). Policymakers turned to foreign labour to meet this 
shortfall, which was delivered from three sources: continental Europe, Ireland and the British 
colonies.  
 
European labour immigration was facilitated by two policies. The Polish Resettlement Act 
1947 granted work and settlement rights to Polish soldiers that had fought under British 
military command. Through the establishment of the European Voluntary Workers 
programme in 1946, the government also recruited hundreds of thousands of displaced 
Central and Eastern Europeans, and prisoners of war from Germany, Italy and the Ukraine, to 
fill specific labour shortages. However, the scheme was abandoned four years later (Ryan, 
2005: 12). Labour requirements primarily drove these policy decisions, but neither business 
groups nor trade unions played any notable role in their development. At the direction of 
Cabinet, government ministries such as the Ministry of Labour, the Foreign Office, and the 
140 
Home Office instigated the European Volunteer Workers and Polish resettlement schemes, 
with no major support or dissent evident among the opposition parties, organised interests or 
the broader community. Moreover, it was these ministries, rather than business, that 
undertook recruitment for both schemes. Selection was based on general qualifications and 
candidates were assigned to specific employment upon arriving in the UK (Freeman, 1979: 
180-182; Paul, 1997: 67-78). 
 
The second source of post-war labour immigration came through the exceptional status 
granted to Irish nationals under the British Nationality Act 1948 (‘the 1948 Act’). This 
allowed them to work freely, resulting in over 50,000 Irish nationals entering the UK labour 
market on average each year until the end of the 1950s. The initiative was largely driven by 
the potential incongruity of categorising Irish nationals according to the terms of the 1948 
Act.38 Immigration controls would have been required if they were classified ‘aliens’, which 
would have been bureaucratically cumbersome and difficult in practice. Many had served in 
the British defence forces and remained in the UK after the war. ‘Subject’ was considered an 
unacceptable classification by the Irish government, as it had recently fought the UK for its 
independence. However, Paul claims that the Irish government – still yet to proclaim a 
republic – was keen to ‘reject the status of British subject’, but had no desire ‘to do away with 
the rights of British subjecthood’ (1997: 98, emphasis in original). The UK government’s 
solution was to categorise the Irish as neither subjects nor aliens, but they were effectively 
given all of the legal privileges of the former. The UK’s labour needs, and a stagnant 
economy and high unemployment levels in Ireland, enhanced the attractiveness of this 
solution. This specific factor helped to shape the outcome of the Attlee government’s decision 
on the legal classification of Irish nationals under the 1948 Act (Paul, 1997: 90-110). 
 
The 1948 Act also facilitated the third source of foreign labour by granting citizenship and the 
right to work freely to the nationals of all Commonwealth states and colonies. The 1948 Act 
resulted in some 500,000 people from the Commonwealth entering the UK between 1948 and 
1962. Arrivals from the so-called ‘New Commonwealth’ colonies in Africa, the Caribbean 
and South Asia vastly outnumbered those from ‘Old Commonwealth’ states such as Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and South Africa (Messina, 2001: 262; Money, 1999a: 67-68; Paul, 
                                                
38 Irish nationals were still at the time recognised as subjects under UK law, despite the establishment of the Irish 
Free State and the passage of the Irish Citizenship Act 1935 (Ryan, 2001: 859-860). 
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1997: 90). In legal terms, these people were not immigrants, but rather extra-territorial 
citizens exempt from immigration control and with an uncontested right to permanent 
settlement (Hansen, 1999b: 94). Labour shortages were not the government’s main motivation 
in facilitating Commonwealth immigration (Hatton and Wheatley Price, 2005: 123; Messina, 
2001: 263). Hansen argues that the Attlee government explicitly rejected using 
Commonwealth immigration to meet labour shortages (2000: 5). Much of the immigration 
from the New Commonwealth was relatively unorganised and voluntary. Many paid their 
own way, rather than having their passage subsidised through labour recruitment 
programmes, as was characteristic of the post-war immigration schemes of other states 
(Layton-Henry, 1992: 12).  
 
The facilitation of Commonwealth immigration was initially motivated by a desire to re-
establish uniformity in legal status among British subjects. This uniformity had been 
weakened through separate citizenship legislation in Canada and Ireland a few years earlier. 
The 1948 Act granted citizenship according to the Roman-derived notion of civis Britannicus 
sum to all British subjects, each of whom were considered to have an identical relationship 
with the Crown, irrespective of whether they were resident in the UK. According to Hansen, 
the Act equally bestowed the ‘full privileges in and the full protection of the United 
Kingdom’, including all rights of movement and employment (2000: 251). He claims that the 
creation of ‘a definition of citizenship including Britons and colonial subjects under the same 
nationality’ was done ‘before large-scale migration was considered possible’, and ‘for reasons 
that had nothing to do with migration’. The 1948 Act therefore did not intend to encourage 
colonial labour immigration, even if it had this effect (Hansen, 2000: 17).  
 
The Colonial Office and its respective ministers were at the forefront of these decisions 
concerning post-war Commonwealth labour immigration. While other ministries such as the 
Ministry of Labour favoured imposing controls, the Colonial Office advocated free 
movement. The latter was able to garner support for its position through the 1950s largely 
because of a bipartisan objective to preserve close relations with Old Commonwealth states. 
The Conservative Party, in government from 1951 to 1964, was particularly committed to this 
objective. Hansen says that the Old Commonwealth states were ‘central to the UK’s economic 
and foreign policy; they contributed to its international prestige and influence; and they 
ensured the flourishing of the English language and British culture in the international arena’ 
(2000: 19). 
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From the mid-1950s onwards, governments toyed with the possibility of restricting working 
rights for Commonwealth subjects. Despite its commitment to the Old Commonwealth, 
Hansen argues the Conservative government was: 
 
[Only] superficially and residually committed to the entry rights of New 
Commonwealth citizens… When New Commonwealth migration picked up in the 
1950s, politicians could not bring themselves to apply controls to Old 
Commonwealth citizens. At the same time, there was selective, but uncompromising, 
resistance to applying racially discriminatory restrictions (Hansen, 2000: 17-18). 
 
This was particularly the case in 1955, when the Colonial Secretary threatened to resign when 
the prospect was raised in Cabinet, saying that he would accept either blanket immigration 
controls over all Commonwealth subjects or none at all. Consequently, Cabinet chose to 
maintain unfettered New Commonwealth immigration over imposing restrictions on all 
colonial subjects (Hansen, 2000: 19). Joppke claims that New Commonwealth immigrants 
were therefore ‘never actively solicited but passively tolerated for the sake of a secondary 
goal – the maintenance of empire’ (1998: 271).  
 
The implementation and maintenance of unrestricted entry to Commonwealth subjects 
between 1948 and 1962 occurred in a low salience environment. The unrestricted inflow of 
colonial immigration provoked minimal concern in the broader community in the decade after 
the 1948 Act was passed. The issue was ‘low … on the list of government priorities’, 
according to Hansen (2000: 246-247). The existence of a liberal labour immigration policy 
was therefore made easier by the absence of major political sensitivity attached to the issue. 
However, the salience surrounding New Commonwealth immigration soon increased. During 
the latter half of the 1950s, annual labour immigration inflows from Europe and Ireland were 
comparable and often larger than from the New Commonwealth (Spencer, I. 1997: 91). But 
public opinion on colonial immigration turned decidedly negative after race riots erupted in 
London and Nottingham in 1958 (Hansen, 1999b: 95). The issue remained highly salient in 
the wake of the riots and the introduction of restrictions became increasingly likely. This 
resulted in a significant upsurge in colonial immigration before restrictions eventuated in 
1962 (Freeman, 1979: 24). Immigration flows from the New Commonwealth alone increased 
from less than 65,000 in 1959 to some 200,000 in 1961 (Money, 1997: 700).  
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The expansion of labour immigration from 1946 to 1962 was motivated by a variety of 
considerations, principally relating to macroeconomic, citizenship and foreign policies. The 
decisions that facilitated all three sources of labour immigration were driven from within the 
executive branch, rather than pressures outside of government. Labour and Conservative 
governments over this period were able to devise and implement a series of liberal 
immigration policies free of external pressure because it was ‘not an electoral issue’, 
according to Messina (2001: 268-269). However, this changed from the late 1950s, when 
events such as the 1958 riots generated greater interest among pressure groups and increased 
media scrutiny (Karapin, 1999: 429-432).  
 
Commonwealth immigration policy from 1962 to 1997: A period of restriction 
European, Irish and Commonwealth immigration between 1946 and 1962 helped provide the 
UK with workers to assist in the post-war reconstruction effort, whether or not this was the 
intended effect of policy change. Messina claims that the European and Irish labour 
immigrants ‘precipitated barely a political ripple’. By contrast, Commonwealth immigration 
‘left an enduring political legacy’ and definitively shaped immigration politics over the rest of 
the century (Messina, 2001: 264). Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, a series of laws 
wound back the provisions of the 1948 Act for Commonwealth citizens to enter and work 
freely in the UK. Family immigration, race relations and citizenship, as well as labour 
immigration, were at issue. 
 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 (‘the 1962 Act’) restricted colonial labour 
immigration. It specified that primary immigration was available only to British subjects in 
possession of a voucher issued by the Ministry of Labour under three quota-based categories. 
Category A was created for pre-arranged employment, Category B for specific skills in short 
supply, and Category C for lower-skilled labour shortage occupations, with preference given 
to those that had served in the British armed forces (Messina, 2007: 109-110; Money, 1999a: 
68-69). Category C was abolished in 1965 and the Wilson Labour government tightened the 
eligibility criteria of the other two categories on several occasions (Hatton and Wheatley 
Price, 2005: 124-125; Karapin, 1999: 429; Winder, 2004: 371-375). These changes resulted in 
a substantial decline in primary labour immigration, particularly among those from the New 
Commonwealth. The total number of Labour Vouchers issued to New Commonwealth 
nationals declined from 38,802 in 1963 to 2,865 in 1971 and for Old Commonwealth 
nationals from 2,299 to 897 over the same period (Hansen, 2000: 265). Most of the 
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immigrants from the Commonwealth prior to 1962 were workers without dependents and few 
intended to settle permanently (Messina, 2007: 108). Such expectations changed when the 
available routes of entry narrowed, with many instead deciding to stay and to send for their 
partners, children and other family members. Despite the large decline in labour immigration 
after 1962, there was a large subsequent increase in secondary immigration. Women and 
children made up a small fraction of the New Commonwealth nationals arriving in the UK 
before the passage of the 1962 Act, but within a decade they represented around 75 per cent 
of total inflows (Messina, 2001: 262-263; Winder, 2004: 374).  
 
Two subsequent laws heralded a further dwindling of both primary labour immigration and 
secondary immigration. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 (‘the 1968 Act’) 
introduced the concept of ‘patriality’, whereby ‘patrials’ (defined as anyone born or 
naturalised in the UK, or with a parent or grandparent with UK citizenship) were exempt from 
immigration control.39 Annual quotas were established through the voucher scheme for the 
primary immigration of ‘non-patrials’ (Money, 1999a: 69). The Immigration Act 1971 (‘the 
1971 Act’) ‘abolished the last vestiges of the old Empire-embracing concept of British subject 
or citizen’, according to Ian Spencer. It specified that, unless they were partials, those 
previously defined as subjects were bound by the same entry and working restrictions as other 
foreign nationals (Spencer, I. 1997: 144). The scope was thus further reduced for colonial 
labour immigration, as an individual’s rights to citizenship and immigration were now linked 
to their connections with the UK, rather than to the Commonwealth. The 1971 Act also 
jettisoned the labour voucher scheme. All non-patrials seeking employment in the UK now 
had to apply through the Work Permit scheme, which had previously existed only for the now 
defunct category of aliens. The 1962, 1968 and 1971 Acts collectively represented the 
endpoint of post-war labour immigration (Ryan, 2005: 15). The number of Commonwealth 
citizens accepted for settlement declined from 72,508 in 1972 to 33,070 in 1979 (Messina, 
2007: 35).  
 
Despite the decline in Commonwealth immigration, the issue remained politically salient. A 
National Opinion Poll of February 1978 found that over 85 per cent of respondents believed 
there were too many immigrants in the UK, and more than 80 per cent opposed the admission 
                                                
39 The main aim of the 1968 Act was to pre-emptively prevent entry to UK citizens of Asian descent that were in 
the process of being exiled from Kenya (cf. Hansen, 1999a: 810). 
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of immigrants’ siblings and parents (Layton-Henry, 1985: 122). The Thatcher government 
came to office in 1979 with a pledge to overhaul immigration and nationality laws in order to 
curtail the remaining inflows of New Commonwealth immigration. When she was Opposition 
Leader, Margaret Thatcher attempted to tap into this hostility by asserting that the scale of 
immigration was fundamentally changing the character of some local communities, which she 
claimed were feeling “swamped” (quoted in Thränhardt, 1997: 178). The Conservative 
Party’s election manifesto had made commitments to restrict Work Permits, introduce 
settlement quotas, restrict entry to non-dependent family members and redefine entitlements 
for attaining UK citizenship and residency. A number of these pledges were fulfilled through 
the passing of the British Nationality Act 1981, which Saggar argues ‘effectively closed the 
immigration door’ to the New Commonwealth and extinguished the political volatility of the 
issue (1992: 135; cf. Layton-Henry, 1994: 286-289; Messina, 2007: 173). According to 
Geddes: 
 
The election of the Thatcher government effectively shut down debate on 
immigration because there was nowhere else for ostensibly liberal politicians to go 
and little scope for the racist extreme right to make a breakthrough. The tough talk of 
the first Thatcher government actually helped put pay to the immigration issue 
(2003: 39). 
 
The political sensitivities of colonial immigration returned, however, over the issue of 
settlement rights for Hong Kong residents prior to the 1997 return of Hong Kong to China. In 
1981, the government decreed that settlement rights would be granted only to the 20,000 
people who could claim patriality. No such rights were given to the 3.5 million Hong Kong 
residents with the legal status of ‘citizens of the British Dependent Territories’ (a 
classification introduced in the 1981 Act that relevantly superseded the category of subject). 
In the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, UK settlement rights were extended to 
around 50,000 residents and their dependents in ‘essential’ or high-skilled occupations, 
including civil servants, police and defence personnel, and various professional categories 
(Layton-Henry, 2004: 298-299; Paul, 1997: 185-187; Winder, 2004: 425-427). However, 
many candidates for primary immigration instead decided to relocate to the US, Canada, 
Australia, and other states actively seeking to attract skilled and business immigrants from 
Hong Kong. Winder claims that ‘when the time came, those 50,000 passports would turn out 
to be more than enough: Britain was so successful in getting across its unwelcoming message 
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that even this small quota was not filled’ (2004: 426). According to Hansen, the episode 
represented the final abandonment of civis Britannicus sum: 
 
The year 1948 was the highpoint of this ideal: there was no question of ending the 
formal right of all British subjects to enter the UK… By 1962, the tradition was 
abandoned with agonising regret; by 1971, no one was prepared to defend such a 
position publicly; and by 1991, it is doubtful that few people could even conceive of 
such an argument ever being made (Hansen, 2000: 251). 
 
Hansen notes that from the end of the Second World War to 1962, the UK ‘operated one of 
the most liberal migration regimes in the world, granting citizenship to hundreds of millions 
of colonial subjects across the globe’ (2000: 16). Why and how did these arrangements 
change so resolutely? It is informative to return to the period when labour immigration 
restrictions were first introduced.  
 
Various arguments have been advanced to account for the initial shift in policy in 1962. 
Joppke claims that there was a ‘widely noted absence of economic considerations’ in the 
determination of immigration policy from the early 1960s. Unlike other Western European 
states, the UK’s post-war expansionary labour immigration phase ended for primarily political 
rather than economic reasons (Joppke, 1999: 102). Supporting this argument, Ian Spencer 
dismisses the possibility that the 1962 Act came about because of declining labour demand, 
claiming that restrictions were introduced ‘despite labour needs, not because of them’ 
(Spencer, I. 1997: 155). Others claim that policy-makers had racial motivations for restricting 
colonial labour immigration (cf. Paul, 1997: 132-133). Small and Solomos argue that both 
Conservative and Labour governments during the 1960s ‘were not merely responsive’ to 
public antagonism towards New Commonwealth immigration, but ‘actively regulated and 
racialised’ the issue (2006: 240). Layton-Henry asserts that governments went to considerable 
lengths to maintain open avenues for Irish immigration, while simultaneously tightening 
controls on Commonwealth immigration (1994: 274; cf. Paul, 1997: 91). Suggestions that 
racism inspired such double standards overlook the logistical challenge of implementing 
controls at the UK’s shared border with Ireland, particularly compared with enforcing 
restrictions at its ports (Ryan, 2001: 869-871). Hansen argues that while racial hostility may 
have mobilised populist pressure, there is no supporting evidence for the claim that policy-
makers explicitly rationalised restrictions on this basis (2000: 245-250). However, the labour 
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immigration policy changes of this era did have a greater impact on New Commonwealth 
nationals, who made much more extensive use of the voucher scheme than those from the Old 
Commonwealth (as indicated above).  
 
There is general agreement that the 1962 Act was introduced in the context of emerging 
populist pressures for immigration restriction. According to Messina, this heralded a shift in 
UK immigration politics away from ‘the elite policy making arena to a wider public, political 
forum’ (Messina, 2001: 266). Money argues that local electoral pressure in the wake of the 
1958 riots was the principal reason for policy change. In particular, she cites grassroots 
mobilisation within the Conservative Party, and pressure from local anti-immigration 
organisations, as key factors (Money, 1997: 699-707). Karapin disputes the extent to which 
these factors were important. He says that while the Conservatives were able to gain a small 
degree of electoral advantage on the issue, it was not one that mobilised significant voter 
support (Karapin, 1999: 432). Regardless of the extent to which policy-makers responded to 
grassroots pressure or tightened controls on their own initiative, Hansen claims that the 
strength of the executive branch allowed reform to be easily implemented: 
 
The door to the Commonwealth closed so quickly because policy-makers faced few 
constraints on pursuing the tight immigration policy demanded by the public. A 
strong executive, weak legislature, and tightly controlled judiciary allowed 
governments to respond to electoral demands with a single-minded success unknown 
in the rest of Europe or America (2000: 244). 
 
Ian Spencer says that ‘at the critical Cabinet meeting in 1961 the Treasury was very clear that 
Asian and black immigration was of continuing benefit to the British economy and that 
grounds of economic self-interest could not be used to justify the introduction of restrictions’ 
(Spencer, I. 1997: 155). Be that as it may, it appears that the Cabinet decision to restrict 
colonial labour immigration owed something to a calculation that the political costs of 
maintaining New Commonwealth immigration outweighed the benefits of maintaining ties 
with the Old Commonwealth. The Colonial Office and its ministers successfully tapped into 
colonial sympathies to gain support for liberal immigration controls in the 1950s. But the 
persuasiveness of these arguments had ebbed by the following decade. 
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European and other labour immigration policy from 1973 to 1997: Reflecting a shift in 
foreign policy priorities 
The case of post-war Commonwealth immigration highlights the links between post-war 
labour immigration policy and family immigration, race relations and foreign policy. With 
respect to the foreign policy, the weakening of colonial ties was one factor that enabled the 
tightening of entry to Commonwealth nationals. The UK’s burgeoning relationship with 
Europe explains a contrasting shift in labour immigration policy. On 1 January 1973, the UK 
became a member of the European Economic Community (EEC), which committed member 
states to the principle of free movement of labour (Spencer, I. 1997: 143-144). This 
development enabled both an increase in both migration inflows and outflows between the 
UK and other EEC states over the following years (see Figure 6.1). According to Ian Spencer, 
‘by 1983 citizens of the Commonwealth were in a position broadly equivalent to the one 
aliens had been in 1945. Europeans, who in 1945 had no rights to enter and settle in UK, by 
1981 were at liberty to do so’ (1997: 150). Changes in labour immigration policy thus 
corresponded to changing foreign policy priorities. 
 
From 1973, Work Permits provided the main labour immigration avenue for non-EEC 
nationals. The 1971 Act specified that Work Permits would only be granted for jobs requiring 
a specified minimum skill or qualification level. This resulted in a large decline in the number 
of permits issued from the early 1970s (see Figure 6.2). The Conservative Party’s pledge 
during the 1979 general election to “severely restrict the issue of Work Permits” came to 
nothing once it assumed office (quoted in Layton-Henry, 1994: 286). A series of reviews by 
the Thatcher government into the operation of the scheme found that it was functioning 
effectively. No significant changes were made to the regulation of Work Permits, and the 
number issued in fact increased from the mid 1980s (Salt, 2006: 252-253). In 1991, the Major 
government loosened the Work Permit criteria by creating a ‘two-tiered’ system, with an 
additional category introduced to provide streamlined sponsorship mechanisms for intra-
company transfers and occupations in shortage (Rollason, 2004: 136).  
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Figure 6.1 International migration flows between the UK and EU-15 member states 
(thousands), 1981 to 1997 
 
Source: Salt (2005): 11 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Long-term and Short-term Work Permits issued, 1973 to 1997 
 
Source: Dobson et al., (2001): 225 
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In 1994, the government established another avenue for European labour immigration by 
ratifying the European Agreement of 1991, which facilitated the entry of Central and Eastern 
Europeans. This allowed nationals from EU candidate states to establish their own businesses 
in the UK, resulting in increased inflows of self-employed and contract workers, especially 
from Poland (Drinkwater et al., 2009: 164). The arrival of greater numbers of Europeans and 
skilled workers would be key features of UK immigration policy and politics in the following 
decade. 
 
Labour immigration policy contexts inherited by the Blair government  
When the Blair government was first elected, the economic climate was becoming more 
conducive to a liberal shift in labour immigration policy. The performance of the UK 
economy was rather sluggish between the 1960s and the 1990s, and the resident workforce 
provided a largely adequate supply of labour, but this situation had begun to change by 1997. 
Labour shortages in the public sector were constraining the capacity of the government to 
deliver adequate services, particularly with respect to education and health care. There was 
growing concern about the implications of population ageing for future labour supply and the 
cost of pensions. According to Layton-Henry, these pressures allowed the relaxation of 
immigration controls to be defended as economically beneficial (2004: 299). Net migration in 
fact reached positive levels in the early 1980s and steadily increased thereafter (see Figure 
6.3). Particularly after the recession of the early 1990s, a more buoyant economy and a 
flexible labour market created a growing number of job opportunities. The English language 
emerged as the global lingua franca (Hansen, 2004: 340), and increasing numbers of 
Europeans utilised their rights to freely work in the UK (cf. Favell, 2008a: 35-36). But it still 
remained relatively difficult for non-EU nationals to work legally in the UK (Winder, 2004: 
408, 442). Moreover, there were various institutional and political barriers to a liberalisation 
of labour immigration policy. 
 
A ‘gatekeeper’ mentality within the Home Office (the government ministry responsible for 
immigration policy), and a bipartisan policy consensus to strict immigration controls appeared 
to institutionalise the restrictionist legacy inherited by the Blair government. Joppke claims 
that the Home Office exerted ‘absolutist’ control over immigration across Whitehall (1999: 
137). Prior to 1997, the main preoccupation of the Home Office centred on ‘keeping people 
out of the country and not letting them in’, according to one civil servant (interview, Home 
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Office official UK40).40 However, these arrangements were not wholly applicable to labour 
immigration, as the Work Permit scheme had always been administered by the Department of 
Employment (previously known as the Ministry of Labour). But various officials claim that 
the close connection with other dimensions of immigration policy invariably extended the 
gatekeeper mentality to labour immigration control (interviews, Home Office officials UK28, 
UK30, UK31; Home Office adviser UK29). 
 
Figure 6.3 Net migration flows to the UK by citizenship (thousands), 1981 to 1999 
 
Source: Layton-Henry (2004): Table 8.6 
 
A similar outlook appeared to be entrenched within the Conservative and Labour parties. The 
post-war experience had helped to forge an unspoken bipartisan commitment to maintaining 
tight controls. This was underpinned by an assumption that a more permissive immigration 
regime was socially undesirable and economically unnecessary. According to Hammar, a 
wide perception of ‘deep racial prejudices’ held among the general public underpinned the 
tenor of UK immigration politics (1985: 286-287; cf. Statham, 2003: 167). Sarah Spencer 
claims that this was fuelled by the failure of the Conservative and Labour parties ‘to reassure 
the public that immigration is under control’ (1998: 91). This created the situation where both 
                                                
40 The UK’s island status possibly exacerbated this mentality, as it may have served to focus attention more 
acutely on the arrival of outsiders, as compared with mainland states (Messina, 2001: 260-261) 
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parties became ‘locked into a public discourse on immigration-related issues in a fashion that 
effectively prohibit[ed] them from significantly altering the status quo’ (Messina, 2001: 273). 
 
The Conservatives were commonly portrayed as more resolute than Labour on 
immigration control (Law, 1995: 235; Messina, 2001: 260). Yet there were few concrete 
differences in the records of either party in government. According to Julie Smith, the 
Conservatives and Labour ‘espoused broadly similar policies in practice over the last 40 
years, even if their rhetoric has differed’ (2008: 415-416). Inter-party differences did exist 
with respect to settlement policy, with Labour tending to a more liberal approach than the 
Conservatives. But the existence of a restrictionist consensus on immigration control 
perhaps resulted in the major parties succumbing to populist pressures more than in other 
states. One effect of this was that far-right anti-immigration parties were prevented from 
gaining electoral traction, unlike in many other reluctant states. Conservative and Labour 
governments often explicitly justified strict immigration controls in the name of preserving 
harmonious race relations and marginalising the far right (Freeman, 1994: 299-300). 
 
While inter-party differences over immigration may have been infrequent, conflict was often 
apparent within both the Conservative and Labour parties (Money, 1999b: 30-38; Saggar, 
1992: 134-135). Labour’s sympathies were often divided between two of its main 
constituencies. The party generally had liberal positions on humanitarian immigration, owing 
to the consistent support it received from ethnic minority voters (Messina, 2001: 283). 
However, Labour also had to be mindful of the interests of its working class constituency, 
which often saw immigrants as competitors in the labour market and thus opposed liberal 
immigration policies (Freeman, 1978: 31-32). This was most apparent in the 1940s and 
1950s, when the Trades Union Congress (TUC) voiced occasional concern at unrestricted 
entry for Commonwealth immigrants (Winder, 2004: 349; Hansen, 2000: 6-7). In industries 
such as mining, unions insisted on certain conditions before employers could utilise the 
European Voluntary Workers scheme (Wrench, 2000: 133). Layton-Henry claims that despite 
the ‘suspicion’ and ‘hostility’ expressed towards immigration in the early post-war decades, 
union attitudes became increasingly liberal from the 1970s (1985: 98). 
 
In any case, unions generally had minimal influence on government immigration policy, 
regardless of which party was in office. The same can also be said about the role of organised 
business. In some sectors, such as hospitality, business recruited Commonwealth immigrants 
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through industry associations (alongside public employers, such as London Transport and the 
National Health Service, which also actively engaged foreign labour) (Money, 1999: 80; Paul, 
1997: 119; Small and Solomos, 2006: 242). That said, the role of business in both the 
expansionary and restrictionist phases of post-war immigration policy was marginal. The 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) (and its predecessor organisation, the Federation of 
British Industry) ‘apparently made no attempt to influence the outcome’ of the major 
government decisions of this era, such as the 1962 Act, according to Freeman. ‘Whether the 
organisation’s reticence [was] evidence of indifference, or simple unobtrusiveness, is difficult 
to say’ (Freeman, 1979: 184; cf. Messina, 2007: 112). 
 
The absent role of business groups during the major policy developments of the post-war era 
is not altogether surprising. Like other organised interests, business groups in the UK were 
characterised as politically weak (Grant, 1993). It was typically difficult to establish a 
commonality of interest across business in the UK due to industrial fragmentation, a pluralist 
mode of interest group interaction with government, and the relatively competitive nature of 
market relations. Moreover, the majoritarian nature of Westminster democracy and a model of 
policy-making dominated by a select number of key central ministries and senior ministers, 
typically resulted in UK governments with power akin to ‘elected dictatorships’ (Burch and 
Holliday, 2004: 2-3). This meant there was often little need to involve organised interests in 
the process of policy-making, according to Greenwood and Traxler (2007: 323-324). These 
factors help to explain the centrality of the executive branch of the state in driving the key 
liberal labour immigration reforms between 1946 and 1962.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the context of the Blair government’s relaxation of labour 
immigration controls. In 1997, these controls remained comparatively strict, to the extent that 
the UK was widely considered an ‘exceptional’ case. The salience of New Commonwealth 
immigration had largely dissipated when the Blair government came to office. However, 
acute sensitivities still surrounded immigration control, as seen in the Home Office’s 
gatekeeper mentality and the bipartisan consensus of restrictionism. 
 
A notable feature of post-war labour immigration policy was the tendency for it to be made 
‘by the way’ of broader policy reform (Dery, 1999: 165-166). That is, adjustments in labour 
immigration policy were often incidental to the making of other policies. The decisions that 
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allowed unfettered entry for Irish and Commonwealth workers were essentially subsidiary to 
broader foreign policy objectives. In particular, they eventuated because of policymakers’ 
desire to preserve relations with a newly independent Ireland and the states and colonies of 
the British Empire. Domestic political pressure was a dominant factor in the restrictions 
imposed on Commonwealth labour immigration after 1962. However, the UK’s shift from the 
Commonwealth to Europe as the main sphere of international engagement was another major 
consideration in these decisions. It was this factor that resulted in EEC (and later EU) 
nationals being permitted to work freely in the UK, thereby showing another instance of 
labour immigration policy being made incidentally to other policies. This feature partly 
explains why the impetus for the relaxation of labour immigration controls came largely from 
the executive branch of the state, rather than organised interests such as business.  
 
After 1997, labour immigration policy and the politics underpinning it would continue to be 
shaped by the traits of the post-war period. As the following two chapters show, an 
institutional environment characterised by ingrained restrictionist mentalities, a tendency for 
labour immigration change to eventuate as the by-product of reform in other policy areas, and 
a proactive executive branch, continued to be dominant themes under the Blair government. 
Various pressures had built up by 1997 that provided the potential for a break with the UK’s 
restrictionist legacy, but the ensuing relaxation of labour immigration controls could not 
necessarily have been anticipated.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THE LIBERALISATION OF UK LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY, 2000-2004 
 
Between 2000 and 2004, the Blair government presided over various changes in policy that 
made it easier for certain categories of foreign nationals to work in the UK. As a result, there 
were large increases of labour immigration across the main visa and entry categories (see 
Figure 7.1). These developments were somewhat unexpected, since no mention of labour 
immigration issues was contained in either the 1997 and 2001 Labour Party election 
manifestos. The Blair government’s reforms were not really labour immigration reforms as 
such. Rather, labour immigration was a relatively minor component of broader policy 
agendas, as with the period of liberal change between 1946 and 1962 discussed in Chapter 3. 
A lack of coordination in policy-making was a consequence of this, which had implications 
for the political impact of policy change. The Blair government’s adjustments of labour 
immigration policy can be categorised into three segments: 
 
(1) High-skilled and professional categories – where the employer-sponsored Work 
Permit scheme was expanded, and visas for innovators, high-skilled professional 
workers and graduating foreign students were introduced. 
 
(2) Lower skilled categories – through the enlargement of existing sector-specific 
schemes and the introduction of new ones, as well as the loosening of employment 
restrictions for working holidaymakers. 
 
(3) European labour mobility – through permitting nationals from new member states of 
the European Union to work freely in the UK. 
 
This chapter has two main sections. The first discusses the details of policy reform within 
each of these three segments in detail. The second section then evaluates the reasons 
motivating policy change in each segment, by drawing upon data gathered from interviews 
with government ministers, civil servants and the representatives of organised interests, and 
an analysis of primary documentation. As will be seen, objectives relating to microeconomic 
reform, border control and foreign policy principally motivated the relaxation of labour 
immigration controls in the high-skilled and professional, lower skilled, and European labour 
mobility categories respectively. The prominent role of central government ministries and 
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senior government ministers – rather than other institutions and stakeholders – in driving 
policy change was a common theme in all three segments of reform. 
 
Figure 7.1 Annual labour immigration intakes in the United Kingdom by main visa/entry 
categories, 1996 to 2006 
 
Source: Home Office (2008) Control of Immigration: Quarterly Statistical Summary, October-December, 30, 42 
(for highly skilled, low-skilled sector schemes 2000-2006, and A8 worker figures); Loizillon (2004): 129, 131 
(for low-skilled sector schemes and 1996-1999 and working holiday 1996-1998 figures; Salt, John (2007) 
International Migration and the UK, SOPEMI, 76, 87 (for work permits and working holiday 1999-2006 
figures). 
 
The main components of policy change 
High-skilled and professional categories 
As discussed in Chapter 6, certain categories of non-UK nationals were permitted to work in 
the UK without restriction at various stages in the post-war era. This was the case with respect 
to Commonwealth citizens from 1948 to 1962, Irish nationals after 1948 and nationals of EEC 
(and later EU) member states after 1973. For those not within these categories, the Work 
Permit scheme was the chief avenue for labour immigration. A steady rise in Work Permits 
from the mid 1990s accompanied a consistent increase in job vacancies. The scheme was 
demand-driven, in that employers could engage suitably qualified foreign nationals on Work 
Permits so long as certain obligations were met with respect to the domestic labour market. 
As such, the increase in Work Permits simply reflected an increase in labour demand, and 
occurred without any amendments to the regulation of the scheme. 
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The Work Permits scheme was made more responsive to labour demand following the 
introduction of a range of reforms in September 2000. The requisite level of skills and 
qualifications for applicants was watered down. Prospective Work Permit holders had 
previously required a university degree and two years work experience or five years senior 
company level experience, but now needed only the equivalent qualification of a UK degree 
or advanced level diploma, or three skills experience in a suitably skilled occupation. 
Moreover, the requirement for employers to locally advertise vacancies was relaxed for the 
new ‘shortage skills’ (mainly highly skilled professionals such as ICT specialists and 
engineers) and ‘key workers’ sub-categories (skilled occupations in short supply, such as 
electronic technicians and specialty chefs). The maximum tenure of Work Permits was 
increased from four to five years, and it was made easier for multinationals wishing to 
facilitate intra-company transfers and multiple-entry permits. Furthermore, instead of 
returning to their homeland, non-EU tertiary students could now apply for a Work Permit 
immediately upon graduation (Glover et al., 2000: 20-21; Rollason, 2004: 135; Somerville, 
2007: 30-31).  
 
The pathway between student and work visas was further strengthened with the establishment 
of the Science and Engineering Graduates Scheme, introduced as part of a package of reforms 
in the 2003 Budget. This change allowed students from outside the EU to obtain a 12-month 
work visa after graduating from a UK tertiary education institution in certain science, 
mathematics and engineering subjects, provided they attained a specific level of achievement. 
The scheme was later expanded to students graduating from Masters and PhD programmes in 
all other fields of study. The Scottish government and the Home Office jointly established a 
similar programme, which granted a work visa to foreign students at Scottish universities to 
continue staying in Scotland for two years upon graduating (Salt, 2006: 271; Somerville, 
2007: 37; HM Treasury, 2006b: 3.104). A large rise in foreign student numbers made the 
establishment of these student-work visa pathways particularly significant. This increase had 
eventuated from a Prime Minister’s Initiative in 1999 that aimed to double the total number of 
students from outside the EU by 2005. The target was achieved one year ahead of schedule, 
by which time the UK had attained almost a quarter of the global market for foreign students. 
A follow-up scheme based on similar principles was established in 2006 (O’Leary, 2007: 480; 
Spencer, S. 2007: 354). 
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The introduction of the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) in December 2001 
accompanied these reforms. Initially established as a 12-month pilot scheme, applicants were 
awarded points based on their qualifications, skills, work experience and earnings, with no 
limit to the number of visas allocated. Unlike the situation with Work Permits, HSMP visa 
holders were not bound to a single employer or job, making it the first policy to allow foreign 
nationals (at least those subject to labour immigration controls) the right to work in the UK 
without guaranteed employment. The visas were initially valid for one year, but could be 
extended upon showing evidence of employment. Visa holders were eligible for permanent 
settlement after four years (The Times, 2001a; The Times, 2001b; Daily Telegraph, 2001). 
Chancellor Brown announced an expansion of the HSMP in the April 2003 budget. 
Additional points were awarded for prior work experience, and the requisite minimum 
earnings thresholds were reduced for applicants from lower income nations (HM Treasury, 
2003c: 3.97-3.101; Rollason, 2004: 139-140). The points qualification mark was lowered later 
that year, and applicants were given additional points if they were younger than 28 years, or if 
their spouse had a tertiary degree. Further regulatory changes meant that applicants no longer 
had to have worked for four years in a graduate-level position, or earned the equivalent of 
£40,000, as was previously the case (Daily Mail, 2003b; Somerville, 2007: 33).  
 
A pilot ‘innovators visa’ for foreign nationals with intellectual property in specific areas 
(particularly ICT and e-commerce), and the means of financing its development, was 
introduced in September 2000 (Financial Times, 2000b). Scope already existed for foreign 
entrepreneurs and businesspeople to operate in the UK, but this was expanded under the new 
scheme (The Independent, 2000). While not a labour immigration programme as such, the 
innovators visa used human capital criteria as the basis for selection when it was later 
implemented as a permanent programme. Applications were approved via a points test based 
on their skills and entrepreneurial ability, in addition to the quality of their business plans 
(Salt, 2006: 270). Improving the overall supply of skills, which was a key component of the 
microeconomic reform agenda driven by the government ministries responsible for economic 
policy, underpinned all of the policy changes in the high-skilled and professional categories. 
 
Lower skilled categories 
Labour immigration controls were also relaxed selectively to permit increased labour supplies 
for various lower skilled areas of the labour market. The Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Scheme (SAWS) was established after the Second World War to allow labour providers in the 
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agricultural sector to engage young Europeans (originally displaced persons but later full-time 
students) on temporary work contracts during peak seasons (Martin, 2003a: 23). Over the 
following decades, it continued to function primarily as a programme promoting youth 
mobility and cultural exchange, providing a small yet steady supply of labour to agricultural 
employers (Loizillon, 2004: 114; Salt and Millar, 2006a: 351). SAWS operated according to 
an annual quota that remained stable at around 5,000 places per year. The quota was raised to 
10,000 in 1996, then to 15,200 in 2001, and again to 18,700 in 2002 (Loizillon, 2004: 129). In 
November 2002, Chancellor Gordon Brown further increased the quota to 25,000, and 
announced various regulatory reforms that significantly expanded the scope of the scheme. 
SAWS would now operate throughout the year, not just between May and November as was 
previously the case, and it was broadened to a range of agricultural sub-sectors. Furthermore, 
while the scheme remained available only to full-time students, the 25-year age limit for 
applicants was removed, the maximum visa period was extended from three to six months, 
and those eligible could now apply for multiple visas (Daily Telegraph, 2002; Loizillon, 
2004: 117; Martin, 2003: 23-24). 
 
A similar programme called the Sector Based Scheme (SBS) was established for the 
hospitality and food manufacturing sectors in May 2003. It was created as a 12-month 
programme for non-EU nationals aged between 18 and 30. An annual quota of 20,000 SBS 
visas was made available to employers that could prove they were unable to recruit UK 
residents for lower skilled vacancies (Daily Mail, 2003a; Home Office, 2003a). 
 
Reforms were also made to the Working Holidaymakers (WHM) scheme, a two-year youth 
mobility visa created in the 1970s for Old Commonwealth nationals. In order to be eligible for 
the scheme, candidates previously had to be younger than 28 years, and could only work up to 
50 per cent of the duration of their stay. There were restrictions of what types of work could 
be pursued. For instance, “engaging in business or providing services as a professional 
sportsman or entertainer or pursuing a career” was not permitted (Home Office quoted in 
Loizillon, 2004: 117-118). These restrictions were justified on the basis that the scheme was 
intended to help tourists finance their holidays through menial or low-skilled employment, 
such as bar work. Reforms to the WHM visa in 2003 transformed it from a scheme aimed 
primarily at cultural exchange to a labour immigration programme. The maximum age for 
visa holders was raised to 30, all employment restrictions were removed to allow work in any 
occupation for the entire two-year term of visa, and visa holders could apply for transfer to a 
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Work Permit after one year. The scope of the scheme was also extended to nationals from 
New Commonwealth states (Somerville, 2007: 143-145; Home Office, 2003b). All of the 
labour immigration policy changes within the lower skilled categories were components of 
the government’s border control reforms. 
 
European labour mobility 
While not strictly an immigration policy measure, the Blair government’s most significant 
initiative with respect to foreign workers (in terms of scale) related to its response to the 2004 
enlargement of the European Union. As mentioned in Chapter 6, free movement of labour 
with other member states had been in place in the UK since it joined the EEC in 1973. When 
eight Central and Eastern Europe states (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (the ‘A8’ states)) joined the EU in 2004, the 15 
existing Western European member states of the EU (‘the EU-15’) were permitted to restrict 
A8 nationals from freely working in their labour markets for up to seven years. The stated 
rationale behind these measures was to protect the EU-15 states against the prospect of 
increased unemployment and wage depression, in the event of large inflows of workers from 
less developed Central and Eastern European states (Dustmann et al., 2003: 11-12). 
Moreover, similar transitional measures had been imposed when Greece, Spain and Portugal 
joined the EEC in the 1980s (Jileva, 2002: 691).  
 
Existing member states all implemented similar labour market restrictions during earlier 
membership enlargements (Boeri and Brücker, 2005: 637). By contrast, the responses of EU-
15 states to the 2004 enlargement varied. Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, France, 
Luxembourg and Spain adopted restrictive policies that provided no or very limited scope for 
A8 nationals to work. Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal introduced 
quotas or work permit schemes for A8 nationals, in many cases allowing work only in 
specific or shortage sectors. And Ireland, Sweden and the UK allowed unrestricted access, 
although Ireland and the UK imposed restrictions on welfare provision (Boeri and Brücker, 
2005: 638; Gajewska, 2006: 380).41 In order to prevent the possibility of ‘benefit tourism’, the 
Blair government decreed that A8 nationals could not to claim any welfare benefits before 
accruing 12 months employment. Upon securing employment, workers from the accession 
                                                
41 The Treaty of Accession of 16 March 2003 established that the EU-15 states could review their stances on the 
second and fifth anniversaries of accession. A number of the states that had initially imposed restrictions used 
this provision to remove restrictions on free movement (either in part or entirety) on these anniversaries. 
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states also had to sign on to a Workers’ Registration Scheme (WRS), for which they were 
charged a fee (The Independent, 2004). The European labour mobility reforms were primarily 
driven by the government’s foreign policy objectives, as well as various other – somewhat 
disconnected – policy agendas. 
 
The reasons for policy change 
With the details of the Blair’s government liberal reforms of labour immigration control set 
out, this section discusses the reasons underpinning these policy changes. Distinct objectives 
in other policy realms largely account for change in each of the three segments. A 
microeconomic supply-side agenda led by the Treasury of increasing economic growth to 
improve productivity was the main impetus for the reforms in the high-skilled and 
professional categories. The efforts of the Home Office and the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO) in tackling the highly salient issue of border control was the principal motivation for 
the lower skilled categories. And the policy of facilitating greater European labour mobility 
to the UK was essentially a confluence of these two agendas, combined with foreign policy 
considerations. The pressure for labour immigration policy change came from within – rather 
than outside of – government in all cases. However, the diverse motivations for reform reflect 
the uncoordinated manner in which it occurred. 
 
High-skilled and professional categories 
The responsiveness of immigration to labour demand 
The significant increase in Work Permit approvals between 1996 and 2000 was not the 
product of proactive government decisions, but rather the responsiveness of existing 
regulations to labour market demand. Be that as it may, one senior civil servant claims that:  
 
Ministers could at any time intervene and have said, “no, this is not a skills shortage 
area”, or “we’re going to tighten up on the requirement for advertising to show that 
you can get a domestic worker to do this”, and they chose not to… There wasn’t one 
big policy decision, as opposed to a series of relatively low-level policy decisions 
that were responding to demand … created by a stable, successful economy, a 
flexible labour market, and substantial growth in a number of sectors … [where] 
there was substantial labour demand that could quite easily be accommodated from 
abroad, and was through the Work Permits system (interview, Cabinet 
Office/Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) official UK26).  
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The continued acceleration of Work Permit approvals after 2000 was also due to sustained 
employer demand for skilled foreign workers. But it was also the result of policy reforms to 
make the scheme more sensitive to labour market conditions. As with other policies in the 
high-skilled and professional categories, these changes were largely the inspiration of the 
ministries responsible for administering economic policy.  
 
Improving the supply of skills 
A major domestic policy objective of the Blair government was to overcome the ‘boom and 
bust’ cycles that had long characterised the UK economy. The Treasury under Gordon Brown 
saw microeconomic productivity improvement as the means for achieving long-term 
macroeconomic stability. As part of this broad objective, labour immigration was but one 
small component of a series of overarching policy goals. The UK was characterised as having 
low total factor productivity levels, particularly compared to its large industrialised 
competitors. The Treasury believed that improvements in labour productivity and supply-side 
areas of the UK economy noted for chronic weaknesses (such as a lack of investment in 
technology, infrastructure and human capital) could bridge this gap. To this end the Treasury, 
together with ministries such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
Department for Education and Employment, pursued a series of comprehensive policy 
reforms through its ‘productivity and growth agenda’. It aimed to enhance investment in 
research and development, promote more innovation and competition, increase market 
flexibility, utilise physical capital more efficiently, and improve skill levels (cf. HM Treasury, 
2000b).  
 
The relaxation of labour immigration policy controls in the high-skilled and professional 
categories related to the Treasury’s strategy for skills improvement in two key respects. 
Firstly, these reforms added to the UK’s stock of skilled human capital. The Treasury under 
Brown identified improving skills development as a central component of its supply-side 
agenda because of its potential contribution to productivity growth (HM Treasury, 2000c: 
3.16). In this context, Brown said in his 2003 Budget speech that ‘expanding the skills we 
need requires not only new investment in training but a modern approach to the economic and 
social benefits of legal immigration’ (HM Treasury, 2003a). Various civil servants said that 
the Treasury’s view that immigration could help improve the UK’s supply of high-skilled 
workers was the reason for the central role that it played in developing the HSMP (interviews, 
Treasury official UK23; Home Office officials UK28, UK32, UK42). 
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For similar reasons, the Treasury was also instrumental in introducing the 2000 and 2003 
policies that created a direct pathway to work visas for graduating foreign students 
(interviews, Treasury/Cabinet Office official UK22; Home Office official UK40). According 
to one senior Treasury official, the ministry saw this ‘as an addition to our skills base… We 
were trying to increase the number of graduates, and here they are… It seemed illogical to 
send them out and say, “go back to wherever and then apply from there”’ (interview, 
Treasury/Cabinet Office official UK22).  
 
Addressing market imperfections 
Addressing market imperfections to meet short-term labour shortages was the second way that 
labour immigration reform connected to the Treasury’s supply-side agenda. In this respect, 
the Treasury viewed labour immigration as a stop-gap measure until education, training and 
labour market participation reforms took effect. Brown’s Treasury believed markets to be the 
most effective way of ‘allocating an economy’s resources’. But it also believed that 
government intervention was required in areas where markets tended to operate imperfectly, 
for instance in investment in infrastructure and workforce training. Market imperfections or 
‘externalities’ existed in these areas because ‘there is an incentive for each firm in these cases 
to wait for someone else to invest, and then gain from their investment without committing 
any cost. Hence, if left entirely to the market, firms may tend to under-invest’ (HM Treasury, 
2000b: 4.19).  
 
Other government ministries had identified various structural shortcomings in the UK’s skills 
and training performance. The Department for Education and Employment commissioned a 
series of reports by the National Skills Task Force in 1999 and 2001, which found serious 
deficiencies in basic literacy and numeracy skills and intermediate, general transferable and 
ICT skills across the workforce (EIROnline, 2000; Hogarth et al., 2001: 8). The Treasury saw 
this as evidence of systematic market failure. The UK’s poor skills performance was the result 
of ‘voluntary training policies’, and employers being unable ‘to capture all the benefits of 
their investment … if trained employees leave’, or if such investment did not quickly pay off 
(HM Treasury, 2001: 3.90-3.99). Brown would later say that government intervention in 
training and skills policy was necessary given that ‘thousands of employers are unable to 
recruit the skilled staff they need because training is so poor’ (HM Treasury, 2002a). 
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Labour immigration was seen as a supplement to other human capital and skills policies to 
address these market imperfections, initially through the changes to the Work Permit 
regulations. The DTI had first explored the possibilities for loosening immigration restrictions 
for professionals and entrepreneurs in a 1998 white paper (Rollason, 2004: 133; Somerville, 
2007: 30-31). Following this, the Treasury outlined various measures in the Pre-Budget 
Report of November 1999 to ‘increase the quality of the UK’s human capital’, in order to 
‘help generate an enterprise economy’. It announced plans to increase the adaptability of 
skills by improving basic skills standards, vocational and managerial training, and strengthen 
the links between the education system and business requirements. Significantly, the report 
also announced a modification of Work Permit regulations to give preferential treatment to 
high-skilled professions in ICT and other sectors with persistent shortages. A loosening of the 
criteria under the Work Permit system was foreshadowed so that skilled immigrants could 
‘help the UK address skill gaps’ (HM Treasury, 1999: 3.80-3.99). The Treasury tacitly 
acknowledged that problems with skills development was the underlying motivation for these 
reforms:  
 
Failing to fill [job] vacancies with skilled workers will retard productivity and 
growth and mean fewer employment opportunities in the longer term. Developing 
people in the UK through education and training is key in achieving this, but access 
to skilled people from overseas is also part of the answer. Equally important is to 
enhance the UK’s image as an attractive location for talented overseas students and 
entrepreneurs (HM Treasury, 2000a: 3.76-3.77).  
 
In essence, the government saw improvement in domestic education and training as the most 
appropriate policy tools for improving the UK’s poor skills performance. However, market 
imperfections meant that ‘immigration of skilled labour may alleviate the problem in the short 
to medium term’ (HM Treasury, 2002b: 6.1-6.2). Labour immigration reform in the high-
skilled and professional categories was thus used in order to address structural and regulatory 
deficiencies in the labour market. 
 
165 
Lower-skilled categories 
Improving immigration control 
A rather different set of motivations underpinned the reforms to the lower-skilled categories. 
The Blair government’s desire to contain the salience of asylum and other ‘unwanted’ 
immigration, by incorporating labour immigration policy into a reform of immigration 
control, largely drove these changes. UK governments had found it difficult to grapple with 
the upsurge in human trafficking, visa overstaying and asylum claimants since the early 1990s 
(Hampshire, 2005: 2). These were not issues limited to the UK, which in relative terms 
received consistently smaller inflows of asylum seekers than many other Western European 
states (see Figure 7.2). Nonetheless, the UK had been previously insulated against inflows of 
this magnitude. Home Office statistics showed that while fewer than 4,000 asylum 
applications were received in 1988, this had steadily increased to over 80,000 by 2000 (Home 
Office, 2008a: 56; Watson and Danzelman, 1998: 16). 
 
Figure 7.2 Inflows of asylum seekers to selected Western European states (per 100,000 
population), 1995 to 2002 
  
Source: Messina (2007): 118 
 
Following the efforts of its Conservative predecessors, much of the Blair government’s 
energy on immigration issues during its first term was directed at minimising illegal 
immigration and asylum claims. According to one official, these issues proved to be the ‘total 
political occupation’ of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) (the agency within 
the Home Office responsible for immigration control) (interview, Home Office official 
UK28). In 1999, Home Secretary Jack Straw declared that the increase in asylum applications 
was fuelled by ‘large numbers of economic migrants abusing the system’, and an inefficient 
appeals process that allowed failed applicants to remain in the UK ‘for years’ (Home Office, 
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1999: preface, 8.9). During its first term, the government curbed access to welfare and legal 
rights as a way of deterring asylum seekers. These measures proved ineffective, as 
applications subsequently increased. 
 
In 2000, the Home Office Minister for Immigration Barbara Roche foreshadowed a change in 
strategy through a series of speeches in which she called for “imaginative rethink” on 
immigration policy. Roche aimed to shift the tone of public discourse to emphasise that 
“immigrants have had a very positive impact on the societies they join”. She called upon 
policy-makers to address simultaneously the issues of asylum and labour requirements, by 
finding “ways to meet legitimate desires to migrate and be ready to think imaginatively about 
how migration can meet economic and social needs” (quoted in BBC Online, 2000). Roche 
says that her speeches were aimed at setting out a different policy direction for managing 
immigration:  
 
What you had at that period were unfounded claims for asylum, which were basically 
about economic migration. I tried to take on the political arguments and say that 
there’s nothing wrong with economic migration, providing it’s legal. But you can’t 
use it as a way of making asylum claims because asylum is such a precious concept 
that if you undermined it, we will lose it (interview, Home Office minister UK33). 
 
According to Sarah Spencer, the approach that Roche advocated represented ‘the replacement 
of the language of immigration “control” with that of immigration “management” and opened 
up the possibility of the UK developing a more consistent, positive and holistic approach to 
migration policy’ (2002: 1). A joint report by the Cabinet Office’s Performance and 
Innovation Unit (PIU) and the Home Office that had been drafted in the year preceding her 
speeches (although not published until 2001) made similar prescriptions. The report argued 
that: 
 
There is little evidence that native workers are harmed by migration. There is 
considerable support for the view that migrants create new businesses and jobs and 
fill labour market gaps, improving productivity and reducing inflationary pressures. 
Continued skill shortages in some areas and sectors suggests that legal migration is, 
at present, insufficient to meet demand across a range of skill levels (Glover et al., 
2001: viii).  
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Furthermore, the report put forward a qualified fiscal case for relaxing labour immigration 
controls. It cautiously suggested that immigration could contribute to increased per capita 
growth, and implied that increased labour demand rendered attempts to prevent the entry of 
‘economic migrants’ futile. ‘People move in response to economic and other incentives, and 
they will switch between different migration categories in response to those same incentives’. 
Moreover, growing labour demand made it ‘very difficult for the government to constrain 
entirely the growth in migration’ (Glover et al., 2001: 2.14, 3.13). Sarah Spencer (2007: 350) 
says the report was received ‘with some enthusiasm at the Treasury, if less so within IND 
itself’. By this stage, a number of reforms in the high-skilled and professional categories had 
already been implemented or developed, but only through the Treasury’s microeconomic 
agenda, rather than immigration control policy. According to one of its co-authors, the PIU 
report sought to place ‘a proper analytic and policy framework around a phenomenon which 
was happening because of wider economic and social forces that hadn’t really … been 
analysed or explained’ (interview, Cabinet Office/DWP official UK26). The report therefore 
aimed to construct a broader narrative for impending reform.  
 
There was much caution about the adoption of a liberal strategy for asylum minimisation. One 
senior official says he recalls ‘being struck by the extent to which Jack Straw wanted to keep 
his head below the parapet’ (interview, Home Office official UK28). Prior to one of Roche’s 
speeches, The Guardian (2000a) reported that Straw was ‘acutely aware of the rightwing 
backlash over asylum seekers and is seen in Whitehall as ultra cautious in introducing major 
changes in such a sensitive area. But he is also keen on opening up debate, and will watch 
public reaction to the speech with close interest’. This caution extended beyond the Home 
Office right across Whitehall. Another senior civil servant says that ‘[Straw knew] what she 
was saying, the Treasury almost certainly, and [the Department of] Employment would have 
consulted her over the line that she was taking’ (interview, Home Office official UK35). 
Indeed, Roche herself says that the Department of Employment was ‘very nervous’ about the 
tenor of her speeches (interview, Home Office minister UK33). According to another report in 
The Guardian (2000b), she had ‘Tony Blair’s blessing … [although] Downing Street, which 
has shown a close interest in Mrs Roche’s text, knows it is walking a tightrope’. 
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‘Managing’ immigration 
David Blunkett attempted to extend the narrative and take up Roche’s call for strategic reform 
when he became Home Secretary after the May 2001 general election. The parameters of 
Blunkett’s ‘managed migration’ agenda included relaxing labour immigration controls for 
lower skilled jobs in shortage areas, as well as professional and high skill occupations, in the 
hope of drawing people away from illegal routes of entry and asylum. He claimed this would 
also increase the productive capacity of the economy by helping to fill labour shortages 
(Blunkett, 2001). The first step in this process was to transfer responsibility for labour 
immigration policy from the Department of Employment to the Home Office. According to a 
ministerial adviser, this reflected Blunkett’s belief that incorporating all immigration matters 
within a single department would allow the managed migration strategy to be executed more 
effectively (interview, Home Office adviser UK29). But in the immediate term at least, this 
transfer resulted in weakened bureaucratic coordination of labour immigration. There was a 
distinct lack of expertise within the Home Office on the economic and labour market 
dimensions of immigration. While it administered small schemes such as SAWS and the 
WHM visa, the Home Office’s primary domain was border control. According to one senior 
official: 
 
There never had been any economic input into Home Office thinking on migration… 
There were never macro discussions on the link between any form of immigration – 
whether it was controlled or uncontrolled – and anything to do with economic 
policy… It didn’t feature in our thinking at all, it didn’t feature in the Home 
Secretary’s thinking, and it wasn’t relevant to the issues to do with immigration of the 
day (interview, Home Office official UK28). 
 
In 2002, Blunkett and his special advisers wrote a white paper on the managed migration 
strategy. It took up Roche’s call by attempting to integrate labour immigration, asylum, 
citizenship and border control policies. The white paper also extended the narrative set out by 
the PIU report by fusing the expansion of controlled labour immigration with the 
minimisation of uncontrolled illegal immigration:  
 
It has to be clear to those who seek work here that we are tackling this issue and that 
there are alternative legitimate routes. Managed migration schemes and our wider 
employment policies will help to ensure that labour market demands can be met 
169 
through legal sources and that those wishing to work in the UK have legal routes 
available to them (Home Office, 2002: 77-78). 
 
According to one senior official, it was a strategy aimed at ‘validating forces that we couldn’t 
control… The idea was that you could be tougher on the asylum seekers if they had a 
legitimate route’ (interview, Treasury/Cabinet Office official UK22). In the words of another 
official, managed migration was one borne out of a realisation that: 
 
The two groups of potential migrants didn’t live in completely separate worlds. 
Those who were intent on circumventing the system were as likely to try to use 
legitimate routes. Equally those who had entered the country under some legitimate 
permission, if they ever got refused, were quite likely to apply through the asylum 
route (interview, Home Office official UK31). 
 
The strategy carried high political risks and rewards. It assumed that the broader community 
would be able to distinguish between ‘wanted’ types of immigration on one hand, that the 
government supposed would deliver economic benefits, and ‘unwanted’ types on the other 
hand, that it claimed to be undermining the integrity of border controls (Spencer, S. 2007: 
348-349). Public opinion polls from this period showed widely negative views held toward 
the latter. However, skilled and legal labour immigration was indeed much less salient and did 
not elicit significant consternation (Boswell et al., 2005: 24-25).  
  
The political volatility of immigration control attracted interest from the very top. The asylum 
issue was high on Prime Minister Blair’s domestic agenda when the managed migration 
strategy was being set out in mid 2001. He said that it was “the toughest immediate issue”, 
with “the capacity to explode at any moment” (quoted in Seldon, 2005: 635). Blair believed 
that reducing the number of asylum applications was central to restoring public confidence in 
the government’s capacity to control immigration (Seldon, 2007: 75-76; Spencer, S. 2007: 
359-360). While the managed migration strategy involved a more ‘positive’ approach for 
minimising asylum applications, it also entailed bolstering the government’s earlier efforts to 
reduce the UK’s ‘appeal’ as a destination. The rights of asylum seekers and their access to 
benefits were reduced, and border security measures were strengthened, in order to prevent 
people from entering in the first place (Spencer, S. 2007: 343-344). The government aimed to 
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promote its efforts through various headline-grabbing initiatives, such as Blair’s February 
2003 pledge to halve asylum applications by the end of the year (Financial Times, 2003). 
 
Despite sharing Blair’s desire to neutralise the political volatility of immigration, those close 
to Blunkett say that he remained ‘convinced [that] the tough policy on asylum had to be 
balanced by encouraging policy on skilled legal migration’ (interview, Home Office official 
UK31). He told his biographer that a “talk tough and act tough and liberal” approach, centred 
on “security, stability and order” for unwanted migration, which he believed would engender 
greater public support for relaxing labour immigration controls (quoted in Pollard, 2005: 275, 
278, emphasis in original). Blunkett shunned the exclusively restrictive approach favoured by 
his predecessors, because he believed that such an approach was ineffective in a climate of 
high labour demand (interview, Home Office adviser UK29). As claimed in the 2002 white 
paper, the large number of job vacancies was ‘a magnet for those seeking better jobs and lives 
for themselves and their families’ (Home Office, 2002: 24). According to Sarah Spencer, 
Blunkett believed that ‘the lack of legal channels for migrants to take those jobs [was] both 
encouraging illegal immigration and lengthening the asylum queues. Conversely, clamping 
down on illegal migration and asylum would mean closing off some sources of much needed 
labour’ (2007: 350). Blunkett and his office thought that the best solution to this quandary 
was ‘to develop proper systems of labour migration that people could legally and legitimately 
use’ (interview, Home Office adviser UK29). The changes to the lower-skilled categories 
aimed to neutralise the magnet of job vacancies through demand-driven and targeted labour 
immigration schemes, such as SBS and SAWS.  
 
The Treasury fully endorsed these reforms, says an adviser closely involved in their 
implementation (interview, Home Office adviser UK29). The high profile and punitive 
deterrence of ‘unwanted’ immigration made the Treasury “very jumpy”, according to 
Blunkett, because of a view that “if you didn’t have very substantial legal routes for working 
in this country our economy would be closed down” (quoted in Spencer, S. 2007: 350). 
Indeed, the changes to the WHM scheme came about partly from the Treasury’s desire to 
make it ‘more flexible and responsive to labour market needs’ (HM Treasury, 2003b: 3.101). 
Removing tacit discrimination against New Commonwealth nationals within the eligibility 
requirements also motivated these changes, according to various officials (interview, Home 
Office officials UK40, UK42). So too was an apparent desire to reduce regulations that 
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restricted the working rights of WHM visa holders, which were complex and difficult to 
police (Loizillon, 2004: 118-119; Rollason, 2004: 141-142; Somerville, 2007: 143).  
 
Pressure from employers in lower skilled industries 
Employer lobbying seems to have played a role in the expansion of SAWS and the creation of 
the SBS. The National Farmers’ Union (NFU) had consistently lobbied the government to 
relax immigration controls in the period prior to the change in policy (interview, NFU official 
UK07; Financial Times, 2000a). During a government review of SAWS in August 2002, the 
NFU and other industry associations called for its scope to be expanded, eligibility restrictions 
to be removed, and the annual quota increased. The government incorporated all of these 
proposals into its reforms. Furthermore, a British Hospitality Association (BHA) 
representative says that the group ‘specifically asked for’ the introduction of the SBS to help 
meet labour shortages (interview, BHA official UK20). According to other reports, the Home 
Office cited employer lobbying as a reason for the scheme’s introduction (Loizillon, 2004: 
115-117, 123).   
 
The employer response to reforms in the lower-skilled categories was otherwise ambivalent. 
Despite the promised economic benefits of managed migration, segments of the business 
community argued that the strategy provided only a ‘partial remedy’. These groups said that 
more attention needed to be paid to ‘domestic shortcomings’ in education and training in 
order to overcome the ‘chronic deficit’ in skills (Financial Times, 2002a). Moreover, a senior 
civil servant says that the government’s concerns about immigration control was the principal 
motivation:  
 
It was a case of the government saying that our capacity to exert control over this is 
actually quite limited, because there are strong forces at work here … and therefore 
we’ve got to try to bring some order to something that’s largely happening anyway 
… rather than the government being lobbied, because I don’t think the employers 
ever needed to lobby (interview, Treasury/Cabinet Office official UK22). 
 
While business was an obvious beneficiary of the lower skilled category reforms, the 
initiative for policy change therefore came primarily from within government. 
 
172 
European labour mobility reforms 
A decision marked by indecision 
Considerations relating to foreign policy, as well as a desire to improve labour supply and 
immigration control, were all factors that motivated the European labour mobility policy. The 
Blair government’s decision to allow A8 nationals to work freely occurred in the face of some 
equivocation within the government. A number of EU-15 states that had initially made a 
commitment to allow free movement, such as Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands, 
subsequently reneged. Nonetheless, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s assurance in December 
2002 that restrictions would not be imposed on A8 workers was given in the knowledge that 
the UK would be the only large EU-15 state to pursue this course. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the DWP (which had replaced the Department of 
Employment) then expressed scepticism over the veracity of research estimating the likely 
size of inflows from the new member states to be modest,42 but the decision to restrict welfare 
access for A8 nationals appeared to allay these concerns. One official says that the decisions 
of the other large EU-15 state to impose restrictions ‘certainly made some people nervous, 
and we knew as a consequence that we would get more than we otherwise expected, but we 
still thought that it would be a good thing’ (interview, Cabinet Office/DWP official UK26). 
This is confirmed by another senior official, who says, ‘we could have changed our mind if 
we wanted to … [but] we did it because we thought it was the thing we wanted to do’ 
(interview, Treasury/Cabinet Office official UK22). According to his biographer, it was Blair 
who ultimately sanctioned the government’s confirmation to permit free movement (Seldon, 
2007: 457). But it was a decision underpinned by a diversity of motivations. 
 
Foreign policy considerations 
Factors relating to foreign policy were especially important in the decision to allow free 
movement. In particular, the government believed that the move would fortify positive 
relations between the UK and the A8 states, according to a senior civil servant (interview, 
Home Office official UK42). A ministerial adviser confirms that despite its indecision, the 
FCO ‘wanted to cement good relationships with the new Eastern European countries’ 
                                                
42 A number of earlier studies had predicted that the vast majority of A8 nationals would go to Germany and 
Austria (Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; Boeri/Brücker, et al., 2001; Fertig, 2001). A June 2003 report commissioned 
by the Home Office followed on from these studies and cautiously predicted that the average annual net inflows 
to the UK would range from 5,000 to 13,000 persons (Dustmann et al., 2003: 58). Despite various caveats 
attached to this figure, the report was ridiculed in sections of the UK press, particularly after the policy reversals 
of other states. 
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(interview, Home Office adviser UK29). UK governments had long been staunch advocates 
of incorporating the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. In 
building upon the efforts of the Thatcher and Major governments, the Blair government 
forcefully pushed for membership of all the new Central and Eastern European states in the 
face of strong opposition from France and other EU-15 states. This was especially evident 
when the UK held the rotating presidency of the EU in 1998, and again when the enlargement 
was finalised at the Copenhagen Council in December 2002 (Seldon, 2007: 127, 407-408). As 
Bache and Nugent claim, ‘as a leading advocate of enlargement’, the UK ‘would not have 
been well placed to be seen to be acting in a restrictive manner’ (2007: 536). Moreover, 
according to one Cabinet minister, free movement of labour represented to many of the A8 
states: 
 
An important testament of the seriousness of which they were really new EU 
members, and we thought it was important to encourage them and to strengthen the 
enlargement decision… And an important symbol to that commitment was people 
being able to work here (interview, Education/Home Office minister UK38). 
 
It was believed that not affording workers from these states the same rights as workers of 
other EU states would in fact undermine the UK’s diplomatic efforts. Another minister 
involved in the deliberations confirms the impact of this view: 
 
All the way up to 2004, Britain played a far more well-disposed role towards the A8 
countries than most others did. There was huge investment by every department in 
working with their counterparts… The broad attitude was that unless there were 
absolutely compelling reasons not to, we had to bring the borders down entirely… 
The very positive political relationships [with the A8 states meant] by that stage it 
would have made it very difficult for us as a government to say “no” … and throw 
away all of that good work (interview, Home Office minister UK41). 
 
Immigration control 
As with the changes to the lower-skilled categories, considerations relating to immigration 
control were also relevant with respect to the European labour mobility reforms. Any 
restrictions imposed would have to be lifted in entirety no later than May 2011, thereby 
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merely delaying the inevitable (interview, Treasury/Cabinet Office official UK22). According 
to one Cabinet minister: 
 
We took the view that there was no point in putting off the evil day. This was 
something that we’d signed up to, we welcomed and we wanted for a variety of 
different reasons. We therefore had to face up to it right now and we thought there 
were significant benefits (interview, Education/Home Office minister UK38). 
 
Moreover, regardless of its decision on free movement of labour, the government had no legal 
capacity to prevent A8 nationals entering the UK. Blunkett forcefully put the view that in the 
context of a buoyant labour market, restricting their right to work would be an invitation for 
A8 nationals to work illegally, and thus undermine the managed migration strategy 
(interviews, Home Office officials UK31, UK42; Blunkett, 2006: 593-594; Spencer, S. 2007: 
352). 
 
Labour market considerations 
Aside from considerations relating to foreign policy and immigration control, the anticipated 
impact on the labour market was another factor feeding the decision to allow free movement. 
The push by UK governments to ‘widen’ the EU had been a way of circumventing the desire 
of other large EU-15 states, such as France and Germany, to ‘deepen’ the EU’s institutional 
reach through greater integration (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 53). But the strong support for 
enlargement by Blair and his predecessors was also due to ‘the economic benefits likely to 
accrue to the UK, as a major trading country, from a European market that is as wide as 
possible’, according to Bache and Nugent (2007: 535; cf. Rachman, 2006; Schmidt, 2006: 
28).  
 
Facilitating European labour mobility furthered the quest for greater labour market flexibility, 
which was another component of the government’s ambitions to improve labour market 
supply in promoting its microeconomic agenda. According to one senior official, the 
government believed there were strong ‘labour market reasons for taking a liberal approach’ 
on A8 workers (interview, Home Office official UK31). When confirming the government’s 
decision to allow free movement, Blunkett lauded ‘the new opportunities for trade and labour 
market flexibility’ that would be supposedly delivered (Hansard, 2004: Columns 23-24). 
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Interviews suggest that the Treasury was again particularly influential in promoting this view 
within the government (interviews, CBI official UK02; Home Office minister UK41).  
 
By this time, the Treasury had begun to argue that greater labour market flexibility would 
help to complement its productivity and growth agenda. In its earlier deliberations over 
joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) (which would have meant yielding domestic 
control over monetary policy), the Treasury concluded that greater labour market flexibility – 
particularly increased geographical mobility of labour – would act as an effective adjustment 
mechanism to buffer against destabilising economic shocks (cf. HM Treasury, 2003c: 1). The 
logic behind this argument was that greater labour mobility would increase the potential 
supply of labour, thus helping to rectify imbalances between supply and demand that might 
otherwise push up the price of labour, and generate inflationary pressure (HM Treasury, 
2003b: Box 1.1). While the UK ultimately did not join the EMU, Brown and the Treasury 
appeared to conclude that facilitating labour mobility in order to increase labour supply – such 
as by relaxing immigration controls – would nonetheless allow the UK’s monetary policy to 
operate more effectively (Brown, 2003; HM Treasury, 2003b: 4.23). Indeed, a 2004 Treasury 
report argued that ‘easing inflationary pressures’ was one of the economic advantages 
delivered by the government’s labour immigration policies (HM Treasury, 2004: 4.60-4.62). 
The Treasury used this reasoning to argue that a policy of free movement would make the 
labour market more flexible, and thereby help the economy to grow further at a sustainable 
pace. One senior civil servant says: 
 
There was a view that the British economy would grow faster with less inflation with 
this group [of A8 workers]… We had a lot of success with open markets and supply-
side policies and basically we thought that supply creates its own demand… And if 
you have faster growth than labour supply, you can run the economy at a higher rate 
of output before you have to put the brakes on. So it we thought that if it added to the 
underlying growth rate, we could then – through the Bank of England’s monetary 
policy – ensure that demand then matched that growth. And that would then result in 
a bigger, faster growing economy (interview, Treasury/Cabinet Office official 
UK22). 
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A senior business lobbyist confirmed the influence of this rationale on the government’s 
decision: 
 
The Treasury was picking up in discussions with the Bank of England and a range of 
employer inputs … that the labour market was tightening, that companies were 
beginning to struggle to get the labour they needed, and that to continue the flexible 
labour markets which were pivotal to British economic success … that a new 
intervention was needed, that we would need labour from Eastern Europe (interview, 
CBI official UK02). 
 
The Governor of the Bank of England later endorsed these arguments, claiming that the 
increase in labour immigration – particularly of A8 workers – had: 
 
Helped the economy to continue growing without upward pressure on wages, which 
would otherwise have forced us to raise interest rates further than they actually 
went… If we had no flows of migrant labour from the accession countries, then it 
would certainly affect the way the labour market operated and in the recent past it 
would probably have led to faster growth of average earnings and hence probably 
higher interest rates than we otherwise had… Employers have been able to use 
migrant labour to fill gaps in skill shortages, thus enabling them to continue growing 
output in a way that they wanted to and to ensure faster growth in the economy. That 
is a fact… The growth rate of the labour force had effectively doubled in the last 
couple of years as a result of the extra flows of migrant workers (King, M. 2005). 
 
This is not to necessarily suggest that the government considered the link between inflation 
and immigrant labour in such a clear-cut and rational manner. In the words of one minister, 
‘were we so ready to embrace flows from A8 right from the beginning with no controls as a 
matter of public policy to keep wages lower and therefore inflationary pressures down? The 
answer is no’ (interview, Home Office minister UK41). Nonetheless, considerations relating 
to labour market supply were an important part of the European labour mobility reform, as 
with the policy changes in other segments. But the vacillation that characterised the 2004 
European labour mobility decision, and the diverse motivations for allowing A8 nationals to 
work in the UK without restriction, reflected the disorderly manner of labour immigration 
policy-making under the Blair government.
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Conclusion 
In the mid-1990s, the UK was characterised as having among the most restrictive labour 
immigration controls of any developed economy. But in the space of a less than five years, it 
went from being exceptional for its restrictiveness to being exceptional for its liberalism. By 
end of Tony Blair’s premiership in 2007, the UK had perhaps the most liberal policy regime 
in Western Europe. According to Sarah Spencer, it was now ‘firmly open to labour migration 
in a way that seemed inconceivable only a decade ago’ (Spencer, S. 2007: 358).  
 
Layton-Henry claims that the assumptions upon which the Blair government based its 
immigration control policies were broadly consistent with those of previous governments 
(2004: 315-317). This assessment is largely correct, but there are a number of key differences. 
Like its predecessors, the Blair government resolutely sought to demonstrate its authority over 
immigration controls. However, it carved a new path in asserting that unwanted immigration 
was most effectively minimised through a variety of means that went beyond the traditional 
punitive approach. The Blair government claimed that relaxing labour immigration selection 
mechanisms would augment the state’s capacity to control immigration. This would help to 
manage more effectively the irregular migration flows that were being drawn towards a 
buoyant jobs market. Furthermore, Layton-Henry correctly claims that the Blair government 
maintained that it had an ‘absolute right to determine which non-citizens should be allowed to 
enter and remain’, in accordance with ‘the national interest’ (Layton-Henry, 2004: 315). But 
for the first time in many decades, a policy of selectively encouraging immigration fell within 
the government’s understanding of the national interest. Relaxing labour immigration controls 
was seen as complementary to immigration control, foreign policy and microeconomic policy 
objectives. In fact, the Blair government’s initiatives in each of the three segments of reform 
were, in essence, by-products of these broader policy agendas.  
 
Freeman claims that since employers were supposedly the principal beneficiaries of the Blair 
government’s liberal labour immigration policies, that his model of ‘client politics’ can 
explain the reasons for change (2004b: 334-336). Menz also argues that policy change 
occurred because of ‘employer concerns and interests’, as well as ‘activism on the part of the 
Home Office’ (2009: 162-164). According to Ruhs, the increased availability of migrant 
labour meant that employers indeed benefitted more from changes in UK labour immigration 
policy than any other group (2006: 17-18). But this does not necessarily mean that employer 
groups led the push for policy change. This chapter has argued that as with the period of 
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liberal reform implemented between 1946 and 1962, the executive branch of the state – rather 
than business groups or other organised interests – was the main institutional driver of policy 
change between 2000 and 2004. Moreover, the relaxation of labour immigration controls was 
largely an incidental consequence of other policy agendas that were driven by a diverse range 
of state actors and institutions. The ministries responsible for administering labour 
immigration policy (the Department for Employment prior to 2001, and the Home Office 
thereafter) played largely peripheral roles, and reform was thus implemented without much 
coordination or consideration of the potential longer term impact. The structural and 
institutional dynamics behind the Blair government’s labour immigration reforms are 
explored in greater depth in Chapter 8, which analyses precisely why the factors indentified as 
driving policy change were influential. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF UK POLICY CHANGE 
 
A common ingredient of the three segments of the Blair government’s labour immigration 
policy reforms discussed in Chapter 7 is that they all served an economic purpose. Were it not 
for a buoyant economy with relatively low unemployment and a high demand for labour, 
there would have been no economic case for relaxing immigration controls, and the reforms 
may not have occurred. Despite the importance of economic considerations to all three reform 
segments, the executive branch of the state – or more precisely, certain senior government 
ministers and ministries – rather than business, provided the main impetus for policy change. 
Business groups played a role in the reforms to the lower skilled categories and voiced 
support for other components of the liberalisation agenda (Geddes, 2005b: 6). However, while 
business stood to gain directly, the reforms were largely a case of the ‘government predicting 
a problem’ rather than ‘capitulating to lobbying’, in the words of one business group 
representative (interview, CBI official UK02). The executive branch played the central role in 
defining the parameters of public discourse and driving a series of expansionary policies.43 
But there was also a lack of coordination in the making of policy across the high-skilled and 
professional, lower skilled and European labour mobility reforms. 
 
This chapter analyses the structural and institutional underpinnings of the Blair government’s 
changes to labour immigration policy, in order to explain the significance of the factors 
identified in Chapter 7 as driving reform. The first section examines the relevant structural 
factors that made labour immigration liberalisation an attractive policy course, looking 
particularly at the regulation of the UK labour market. Factors that defined the salience of 
immigration – including party politics, media coverage and public opinion – are then 
discussed. Attention then turns to the institutional factors that drove policy change, in order to 
explain why the impetus principally came from the executive branch, and not from organised 
interests. It analyses the involvement of business groups and trade unions in the policy 
process and their influence on labour immigration reform. The roles of the main state 
institutions and actors involved in policy change are then examined. An overview is then 
provided of policy developments in the period since 2004, during which there has been a 
                                                
43 Statham similarly argues that the executive branch under the Blair government played a dominant role in 
framing public debate around asylum seekers (2003: 170). 
180 
tightening of labour immigration controls and the creation of more formalised policy-making 
mechanisms. Finally, some conclusions are made about the processes and dynamics behind 
UK labour immigration policy-making.  
 
The UK economy and its institutional structures 
The continuous growth of the UK economy is fundamental in understanding why the Blair 
government adjusted immigration controls to make it easier for foreigners to work. Declining 
unemployment and the emergence of labour shortages meant that the labour required to 
sustain this growth was less readily available from within the domestic labour market. 
Between 1997 and 2005, there was a steady decline in the unemployment rate, and relative 
stability in the number of job vacancies. The concurrent increase in labour immigration flows 
over this period may have helped to meet labour shortages (see Figure 8.1). 
 
Figure 8.1 Total labour immigration intakes (main visa categories), job vacancies and 
unemployment in the United Kingdom, 1997 to 2006 
 
Note: Job vacancy figures calculated on the basis of the April-June three-month rolling averages for each year. 
No figures available for 1997-2001. 
Source: OECD Statistical Extracts, Labour Force Statistics, Standardised Unemployment Rates, available at: 
webnet.oecd.org/wbos/index.aspx (for unemployment figures); National Statistics Office (2009) Labour Force 
Survey, available at: www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=9390 (for job vacancy figures); Figure 7.1 (for 
labour immigration intake figures) 
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Job vacancies and labour shortages 
The Blair government justified many of its adjustments to labour immigration policy between 
2000 and 2004 on the basis of addressing labour shortages. In 2000, the Treasury said that the 
existence of skills shortage necessitated the expansion of the Work Permit system (HM 
Treasury, 2000a: 3.77-3.78). Barbara Roche cited emerging skills shortages and helping to 
“ease the upward pressure on pay” in the private sector in foreshadowing the later shifts in 
labour immigration policy (quoted in Financial Times, 2000c). And the 2001 PIU report 
recommended that immigration be used to complement other instruments in addressing the 
‘clearly unsatisfied demand at all skill levels in the labour market’ (Glover et al., 2001: 50). 
Furthermore, Prime Minister Blair justified the decision to open the UK labour market to A8 
nationals in 2004 in the following terms: 
 
There are half a million vacancies in our job market and our strong and growing 
economy needs migration to fill these vacancies. Some of these jobs are highly 
skilled, some are unskilled jobs which people living here are not prepared to do… 
Given the facts we faced a clear choice: use the opportunities of accession to help fill 
those gaps with legal migrants able to pay taxes and pay their way, or deny ourselves 
that chance, hold our economy back and in all likelihood see a significant increase in 
illegal working (Blair, 2004).  
 
According to one senior adviser, the issue of labour and skills shortages was the ‘main reason’ 
for the loosening of labour immigration controls (interview, Home Office adviser UK29). 
 
Foreign policy and comparative economic advantages 
The institutional structure of the UK economy was another factor contributing to labour 
immigration reform. The promotion by the Blair government and its predecessors of labour 
market flexibility as a key component of the UK’s comparative economic advantage 
complemented a liberal labour immigration policy (cf. Fioretos, 1996: 22; Hall, 2007: 66-67; 
Ruhs, 2007: 9). As discussed in Chapter 6, foreign policy considerations can largely explain 
the shift from the Commonwealth to Europe as the main source of labour immigration. The 
Blair government further consolidated this shift with its policies on European labour mobility. 
UK governments have been much more selective than their European counterparts in signing 
onto EU policy measures, and this has been exemplified in their positions on border and 
asylum policy. As with the Thatcher and Major governments before it, the Blair government 
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consistently said that the UK’s island status meant that it had different imperatives in 
regulating the entry of foreigners. As a 1999 Home Office white paper on immigration and 
asylum claimed: 
 
The main focus of UK immigration control has traditionally been at the point of 
entry. For the UK, frontier controls are an effective means of controlling 
immigration, and of combatting terrorism and other crime. These controls match 
both the geography and traditions of the country and have ensured a high degree of 
personal freedom within the UK. This approach is different from the practice in 
mainland Europe where, because of the difficulty of policing long land frontiers, 
there is much greater dependence on internal controls such as identity checks (Home 
Office, 1999: 2.09). 
 
This argument was invoked to justify the UK’s decision not to join the common EU border 
zone established by the 1990 Schengen Convention, and in negotiating the right to ‘opt out’ 
of EU asylum and immigration policies. These arrangements enabled the UK to participate 
only in the measures it viewed as consistent with its supposedly unique immigration control 
requirements. According to Geddes, the EU has been used as ‘an alternative institutional 
venue for the pursuit of British migration policy objectives that are not necessarily attainable 
by domestic means alone’ (2005a: 725). The Blair government took full advantage of the 
EU’s potential in this respect, by opting out of common policies extending various rights to 
immigrants, and opting in to those that enhanced its control over irregular immigration 
(Geddes, 2005a: 732-738). While utilising EU policy to restrict entry and settlement of ‘third 
country nationals’ (i.e. those from outside the EU) that it deemed as unwanted, the Blair 
government also used it to entice nationals from within the EU that it considered to be 
desirable. This was most evident in the 2004 European labour mobility decision, which the 
government justified in part because of its compatibility with the regulation of the UK labour 
market. 
 
Whereas most EU-15 states saw free movement as having a potentially adverse economic 
impact, the Blair government believed it could gain a competitive advantage from opening its 
labour market. When first announcing the government’s intention to allow A8 nationals to 
work freely, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said such a move was “in the UK’s interest” 
because it would “attract workers we need in key sectors” (quoted in The Independent, 2002). 
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By contrast, the language used by leaders of the EU-15 states that imposed restrictions was 
often couched in terms of the potential risks that would be otherwise posed to their more 
protectively regulated labour markets. For instance, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder said that 
local labour markets in Germany, particularly those bordering the accession states, could not 
accommodate a large inflow of workers (Jileva, 2002: 694). 
 
Although it is not a perfect indicator of vacancies, unemployment in the years immediately 
prior to the 2004 EU enlargement was lower in a number of states – such as Austria, 
Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – that adopted more restrictive policies on A8 
workers (and maintained tighter labour immigration controls more generally) than in the UK 
(cf. OECD, 2009: 250). Sweden adopted an open labour market policy for A8 workers and, 
unlike the UK, did not restrict access to welfare. Despite having similarly low levels of 
unemployment, around 5,000 A8 workers went to Sweden each year after enlargement, 
compared with over 200,000 to the UK (Drew and Sriskandarajah, 2007). Stronger demand 
for labour in the UK was one reason for this disparity (Krings, 2009: 54). Another possible 
factor is that the more liberal regulation of the UK labour market may have allowed 
businesses to employ migrant workers on relatively lower wages and conditions than in 
Sweden, which had more protective regulation (Ruhs, 2007: 24). Moreover, the more flexible 
nature of its labour market might have placed the UK economy in a better position than other 
EU-15 states to absorb more workers without an accompanying increase in unemployment 
(Somerville and Sumption, 2009a: 13).44 This suggests that the extent of labour demand in the 
UK, which underpinned the Blair government’s relaxation of labour immigration controls, 
may have been shaped by the regulation of its labour market. 
 
The effects of liberal labour market regulation 
Liberal labour market regulation perhaps allowed the UK to accommodate a larger inflow of 
workers than if it had more protective regulation, but it may have also compounded the 
magnitude of labour shortages. A report for the government’s Migration Advisory Committee 
on why systemic shortages existed in parts of the UK labour market cited the following 
reasons: 
 
                                                
44 When compared against other EU-15 states, the regulation of the UK labour market is considered to be more 
liberal or flexible than other EU-15 states, because of its relatively low wage benchmarks, and the greater ease 
with which employers can fire workers and use part-time and temporary work contracts (Ruhs, 2007: 9). 
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Low wages, poor employment conditions, high rates of labour turnover (low rates of 
retention), a lack of training of local workers, reluctance to invest in labour saving 
technology and/or change to more capital intensive production processes as well as 
various inflexibilities in local labour supply including reluctance to engage in certain 
types of work because of the lack of flexibility of the benefits system (Anderson and 
Ruhs, 2008: 6-7). 
 
In a widely publicised report on the economic impact of immigration, the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Economic Affairs contended that addressing these deficiencies, 
particularly labour market inactivity among UK residents and training investment, were 
preferable options to a liberal labour immigration policy (2008: 31, 37-38).45 However, 
Taylor says that the UK’s ‘historical failure in training and skills’ meant that implementing an 
effective training policy would have been rather difficult. He claims that the UK suffers ‘from 
a particularly chronic lack of workers equipped with recognisable and adaptable skills’, 
particularly compared to other EU-15 states (Taylor, 2007: 222, 234). Finegold and Soskice 
argue that a range of reinforcing structural attributes seriously impeded the creation of an 
effective training policy. Industry-based training initiatives proved difficult to establish or 
coordinate because of decentralised labour market regulation. The reluctance of both Labour 
and Conservative governments to sanction compulsory training, owing to a view that 
companies should be left to determine their own arrangements, reinforced these difficulties 
(Finegold and Soskice, 1988: 21-22). This ‘orthodoxy of voluntarism’ placed the onus of skill 
development on individual employers (King and Wickham-Jones, 1998: 442). But employers 
were often disinclined to invest too heavily in training their employees, lest other companies 
poach them (Anderson and Ruhs, 2008: 38-42).  
 
If liberal labour market regulation made it difficult for the UK to meet labour shortages 
through conventional responses such as training, why did this only become pronounced in the 
early 2000s? The structural problems in the UK labour market had been longstanding, 
particularly with respect to skills and training (King, D. 1997: 385-388; Stevens, 1999: 16-
                                                
45 The relatively low unemployment rate presided over by the Blair government disguised some important 
realities. While overall labour market inactivity rates remained stable from 1975 to 2000, there was a five-fold 
increase in labour market inactivity among working age males over this period. By 2000, some 30 per cent of 
unskilled males aged 25 to 54 were inactive (Nickell, 2001: 727-735). The invoking of low unemployment and 
high job vacancy levels to justify a relaxation of labour immigration controls was therefore somewhat 
disingenuous. 
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17). However, government policies from the 1980s onwards aggravated these problems. 
Initiatives aimed at injecting market principles into and reducing trade union influence over 
training policy further weakened the capacity of the domestic labour market to respond to 
labour shortages. In 1988, the Thatcher government replaced the national tripartite body 
responsible for training policy with regional Training and Enterprise Councils, which did not 
provide for union representation (Wood, 2001: 261-262). As a consequence, employer 
preferences for voluntarist training arrangements and their antipathy towards formalised 
mechanisms, such as apprenticeships, came to dominate the tenor of training policy, and 
governments became more ‘hands-off’ in their approach. This led to greater employer 
autonomy and flexibility in determining their own training arrangements, but also weaker 
coordination of training outcomes (King, D. 1993: 215; King, D. 1997: 397). As Desmond 
King claims, Conservative governments of this era believed that ‘questions of training and 
skill acquisition were fundamentally individual ones best sorted out by the market… National 
training policy [was] ignored, an orientation further distancing firm-based arrangements from 
the concerns of public policy’ (1997: 404-405). 
 
Changes made to the regulation of the UK labour market from the early 1980s further 
strengthened voluntarist training arrangements. As rapidly declining union membership 
contributed to a weakening of trade union power, it became easier for business to hire and fire 
workers. Job security weakened and temporary and fixed-term employment contracts 
increased as a result of this (Brown and Edwards, 2009: 17-18; Nickell, 2001: 720-722; 
Schmidt, 2002: 162-164). Temporary employment diminished the commitment of UK 
employers to training, according to Arulampalam and Booth. They claim that this was 
because workers employed under such arrangements, or those not covered by union-
negotiated collective agreements, were ‘significantly less likely’ than those on permanent 
contracts and union negotiated agreements ‘to be involved in any work-related training to 
improve or increase their skills’ (1998: 521). Problems also existed in the design of the 
national framework for the recognition of vocational qualifications. Again, this system came 
to be dominated by employer policy preferences, and was essentially predicated on 
perpetuating the status quo rather than improving skills standards. Inherent deficiencies in 
training policy and skills development were thus not addressed. Skills standards declined in a 
number of industries and occupations after the introduction of this framework in the late 
1980s, notably in areas where shortages would later develop, such as in engineering, 
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management and retail (Grugulis, 2003: 457-461). Immigrant labour would later be 
increasingly relied upon to help address these skills shortages. 
 
The restructuring of UK industry during the 1980s also exacerbated labour and skills 
shortages. This became particularly apparent as the demand for labour increased with 
sustained economic growth from the mid 1990s. A shift away from manufacturing towards 
services, as well as technological change, had a large impact on the skill profile of the UK 
workforce. These developments contributed to fluctuations in demand and supply, which 
further exacerbated labour shortages. The ‘hollowing out’ of the labour market was one 
consequence of these changes. The demise of manufacturing led, on one hand, to a fall in 
intermediate manual skilled jobs and, on the other hand, to growth in work in the service 
sector. This in turn resulted in a rise in both lower and high-skilled employment (Greenhalgh 
and Gregory, 2001: 639-642). These shifts in industrial composition led to both increased 
demand for labour (manifested through higher vacancy rates) in some localities and 
industries, and excess supply (as seen in the emergence of pockets of unemployment or 
inactivity) in others. Such conflicting trends were highlighted by a 2006 Treasury report on 
the London economy, which found that localised industrial change had created dynamism at 
the higher skilled end of the labour market, such as in finance and the creative industries, and 
generated growth in lower-skilled service sector jobs. However, it also showed many long-
term residents had been squeezed by economic change:  
 
London greatly benefits as an international business centre, with a highly skilled and 
flexible international workforce able to benefit from these processes of change… 
This dynamic model of growth benefits those with the skills and ability to adapt to 
work in new and emerging businesses… But while dynamic growth benefits many, it 
can cause problems for others. Workers who are displaced or who do not have the 
appropriate skills may face prolonged periods of worklessness. For example, 
information technology has removed much of the processing work that was 
previously carried out by staff highly trained in shorthand or audio typing skills. 
Those who consider themselves unable to retrain or who lack the confidence or 
support to gain the necessary skills may find these negative consequences of vibrant 
city growth a reality (HM Treasury, 2006a: 40).  
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The report claimed that labour immigration helped the London economy structurally adjust by 
meeting fluctuating labour demand (HM Treasury, 2006a: 42). Indeed, Favell argues that 
young, motivated and often highly skilled Europeans were particularly drawn to the growth of 
menial service sector jobs in London (2008a: 9, 35-36). But in the context of industrial 
restructuring and the flexibility of the UK labour market, labour immigration arguably 
contributed to labour market segmentation.  
 
Employers in some areas of the economy became structurally dependent in their demand for 
migrant workers, particularly at the lower skilled end of the labour market (Anderson and 
Ruhs, 2008: 42; Ruhs, 2007: 26). Anderson and Ruhs claim that liberal labour market 
regulation, the consequences of industrial restructuring, and other factors such as 
inefficiencies in the welfare system, created ‘system effects’ that shaped and constrained ‘the 
incentives underlying employers’ choices about how to respond to perceived staff shortages’ 
(2008: 8). As discussed in Chapter 7, the Treasury acknowledged that various market 
imperfections made it difficult to respond to labour shortages through strategies such as 
training resident workers, increasing wages, or investing in labour-saving technology. 
Consequently, the attractiveness of relaxing labour immigration controls as a solution to 
labour and skills shortages was enhanced. As one civil servant says, compared to the 
alternative options, ‘migration is very flexible … you’re better off with a few Bulgarians’ 
(interview, Home Office official UK40). This point is revisited below. 
 
Public opinion, the media and party politics 
The lack of dissent from the potential sources of opposition in Parliament, the press and the 
broader public further increased the utility of labour immigration to plug labour shortages in 
all three segments. Some differences emerged in the positions of the Labour and Conservative 
parties over immigration issues between 1997 and 2004, mostly in relation to asylum seekers 
and illegal immigration. During the 2001 general election campaign, Conservative leader 
William Hague accused the government of being too lax in its border controls and said 
Labour would turn the UK into a “foreign land” if re-elected (quoted in The Observer, 2001). 
But until 2004, there was general agreement from the Conservative Party about the 
government’s labour immigration policies (Boswell et al., 2005: 20-21). 
 
The relaxation of labour immigration controls also received broad support from the editorial 
pages of the press. This was the case among socially liberal publications such as The 
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Guardian and The Independent, the economically liberal Financial Times, and even the more 
right-leaning mastheads. For instance, the Daily Mail gave ‘in principle’ support to the 
September 2000 speech by Barbara Roche that heralded a broad shift in immigration policy. It 
claimed that ‘a well-regulated programme of “managed migration”, with incomers getting 
work permits for specific, high-tech jobs would certainly have advantages’ (Daily Mail, 
2000). The Times said that the 2002 white paper that set out the government’s managed 
migration agenda was ‘balanced and reasonable’. The Times argued that ‘opening this 
country’s borders to skilled workers currently unable to come here is not only economically 
sound, it also allows the rest of David Blunkett’s proposals for tackling problems with 
immigration to be seen as fair and reasonable rather than mean-spirited and isolationist’ (The 
Times, 2002a). Coverage of the government’s European labour mobility decision in 2004 was 
not quite as complimentary. Tabloids such as the Daily Mail and The Sun contended that such 
a move could lead to a surge in ‘benefit tourism’ (Boswell et al., 2005: 23). Nevertheless, 
while press coverage of immigration issues intensified between 2000 and 2004, it appears that 
labour immigration issues were not the main reason for this increase in salience (see Figure 
8.2). 
 
Figure 8.2 Number of articles containing the term ‘immigration’ in the domestic political 
news sections of selected daily newspapers, January 1997 to December 2004 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data generated from Factiva.com  
Note: Periodicals selected on the basis of a variety of ownership, format, and availability of data.  
189 
Measures of public opinion reflected the general extent of support for (or at least a lack of 
dissent against) the government’s relaxation of labour immigration controls from the main 
opposition party and the press. There was, however, a mood of increased concern from the 
general public on immigration-related issues from the time of the election of the Blair 
government until 2004 (see Figure 8.3). But as with the level of salience as measured by press 
coverage, it appears that other immigration matters, rather than labour immigration, drove the 
rise in public interest.46 Opinion polls often showed that the UK was seen a ‘soft touch’ on 
immigration and there were high levels of opposition to the acceptance of more asylum 
seekers (Boswell et al. 2005: 24). However, an ICM poll published in May 2001 found that 
70 per cent of respondents supported entry for foreign nationals with skills in short supply 
(The Guardian, 2001). Another poll conducted by the European Commission ahead of EU 
enlargement found that public opinion in the UK towards labour immigration was in line with 
the EU-15 average (though much less supportive than in a number of states that had imposed 
restrictions on A8 workers) (see Figure 8.4). The relatively low levels of salience around 
labour immigration, if not other immigration issues, may have made it easier for the Blair 
government to implement its reforms than if salience levels were high. 
 
Figure 8.3 Respondents citing race relations/immigration/immigrants as one of the three 
most important issues facing Britain today (%), January 1997 to December 2004 
 
Source: Ipsos MORI Issues Index (2009) ‘Trends since 1997’, www.ipsos-mori.com, 24 August 
                                                
46 A strengthening of the ‘migration-security’ nexus may well have contributed to this increase, particularly in 
the wake of the September 11 attacks. 
190 
Figure 8.4 Responses among EU-15 member states to the statement: ‘we need immigrants 
to work in some sectors of our economy’ (%), December 2003 
 
Source: European Commission (2004) Justice and Home Affairs: Flash Eurobarometer 155, available at: 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl155_report_en.pdf, 15 
 
Organised interests 
The Blair government was perhaps further encouraged to relax immigration controls by the 
support it received from organised interests, such as trade unions and business groups. Unions 
consistently supported labour immigration policy initiatives such as the 2004 decision on 
European mobility (The Times, 2002). Various union officials claim that steady employment 
growth, and an acceptance that liberal markets were the key to national comparative 
advantage, were among the reasons for union support. Socially liberal views on immigration 
among union leaders, and a desire to mitigate racist attitudes in membership ranks, were also 
important. The introduction of a national minimum wage in 1999, which helped to cushion 
the economic impact of low-wage immigration, was another key reason for union support 
(interviews, TUC official UK13; Unite official UK 25). However, unions did express some 
concerns about the reforms to the lower skilled categories (The Times, 2003). Despite the 
strong historical links between the Labour Party and the trade union movement, the weakened 
political position of unions meant that it is doubtful whether their policy preferences on labour 
immigration actually had a tangible influence over the Blair government’s decision (as was 
the case in other policy areas during this period (cf. Taylor, 2001: 245-250)). 
 
Business in the UK has a legacy of political weakness and fragmentation, as discussed in 
Chapter 6. The CBI has historically been the largest and most influential of the UK business 
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associations, but was somewhat marginalised by the Thatcher and Major governments. 
Nevertheless, Grant claims that the Blair government was ‘well disposed to big business’, and 
gave the CBI ‘direct access’ to policy-making. He says that the CBI and other business groups 
had a more favourable relationship with the Blair government than any other organised 
interest, including unions (Grant, 2005: 411-418). This relationship was particularly strong 
between 1997 and 2001, and weakened somewhat thereafter, but remained rather constructive 
until Blair stood down as prime minister in June 2007 (Grant, 2009: 83-85). The strengthened 
role of business groups under the Blair government raises the possibility that business may 
have influenced the direction of labour immigration policy. Peak associations such as the CBI 
and the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) often voiced support for government policies, 
such as the reforms to the lower-skilled categories and European labour mobility (Financial 
Times, 2002b; The Times, 2002b). However, business played a rather peripheral role during 
the key instances of reform. Various government officials suggest the ‘perfectly calibrated 
and entirely demand-led’ regulation of the Work Permit scheme may have accommodated 
business interests (interview, Home Office official UK40; cf. Cabinet Office/DWP official 
UK26). Much of the growth in Work Permits indeed occurred prior to the policy changes of 
2000. 
 
But while market considerations had a discernible bearing on all three segments of labour 
immigration policy change, the preferences of peak-level business groups did not. A major 
factor for their marginal role in the reform process was simply a lack of interest. On numerous 
occasions, any support that peak business associations lent to immigration policy initiatives 
was accompanied by the caveat that investment in education and training were preferable 
policy alternatives (cf. Daily Telegraph, 2003; Financial Times, 2002a). Additionally, such 
support generally came only as labour shortages became more pronounced, and business 
groups such as the BCC strictly viewed relaxing labour immigration controls as a short-term 
and temporary measure (interviews, BCC officials UK04, UK11). Groups such as the CBI 
had ‘philosophical’ commitments to ‘flexible labour markets, open trading markets, free 
competition’, but no similar attachments to liberal labour immigration. This was because ‘we 
don’t have a long-term legacy of policy in this area’, in the words of one official. The 
regulatory obligations of employers engaging immigrant workers were the main issue on 
which it would actively lobby for policy change. Otherwise, labour immigration was seen as a 
‘political’ issue that the CBI would avoid engaging with where possible (interview, CBI 
official UK02). 
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Industry-level business groups played a somewhat more proactive role in the reform process 
than the peak-level bodies. Variations in the magnitude of labour shortages suggest that some 
industries stood to benefit more from the relaxation of immigration controls than others. In 
relative terms, vacancy rates were above the all-industry average in the hospitality, finance, 
health, and retail (and related) industries during the liberal reform period (see Figure 8.5). 
Medical, finance, ICT and managerial professions accounted for a large proportion of the 
visas approved under the HSMP and Work Permit scheme in 2005 (see Figures 8.6 and 8.7). 
The growth of the Work Permit intake coincided with increased concentrations of sponsorship 
among the health, ICT and hospitality sectors (see Figure 8.8). The labour market distribution 
of A8 workers was rather diffuse, with the majority employed in lower-skilled jobs, and a 
relatively large number in ‘administration, business and management’ industries across the 
UK, as well as in the London hospitality industry (see Figure 8.9). These trends suggest that 
the financial and business services, health and hospitality industries were the greatest 
beneficiaries of the government’s labour immigration reforms between 2000 and 2004. This 
helps to explain why the BHA was among the more engaged industry associations in lobbying 
the government for policy change. But these other industries were not so active. Layton-
Henry claims that shortages in the health industry provided a further motivation for the 
relaxation of labour immigration controls (since the government itself is a large employer in 
this industry) (2004: 298), but the research conducted for this study did not show this to be a 
major factor behind policy change. Curiously, the financial and business services industries 
(principally represented by the CBI) appeared not to have made any major agitation for 
reform. Nor did retail industry associations, despite retail employers experiencing significant 
shortages (interview, British Retail Consortium official UK19). The lack of interest taken by 
organised business in labour immigration, as evident by their general disinclination to push 
for changes in selection and control policy, is indicative of a restrictionist outlook, which is 
further illustrated below. 
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Figure 8.5 Vacancies per 100 employee jobs by industry in selected industries (3-month 
rolling average, month ending), July 2001 to January 2006 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics (2008) Labour Market Statistics, 17 December, available at: 
www.statistics.gov.uk  
 
 
Figure 8.6 Highly Skilled Migrant Programme applications approved by occupational 
group, 2005 
 
Source: Salt and Millar (2006a): 349 
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Figure 8.7 Work permits granted by main occupational group, 2005 
 
Source: Salt and Millar (2006a): 346 
 
 
Figure 8.8 Work permits approved by industry (% of total approved), 1995, 2000 and 
2005 
 
Source: Salt, John (2007) International Migration and the UK, SOPEMI, 77 
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Figure 8.9 Geographical distribution of largest industry classification sponsors of A8 
workers, May 2004 to December 2006 
 
Source: UK Border Agency (2007) Accession Monitoring Report: May 2004-December 2006, 21 
 
The executive branch of the state 
The main force for relaxing labour immigration controls came not from business, but rather 
from within the government itself. As discussed in Chapter 6, the executive branch in the UK 
is institutionally strong. Large parliamentary majorities enabled the ‘core executive’47 of the 
Blair government – dominated by the PMO and the Treasury – to wield significant influence 
over a range of policy areas (Burch and Holliday, 2004). This dominance was pronounced in 
the realm of labour immigration policy during the period of liberal reform, as core executive 
institutions and actors set down the policy agenda with minimal input from other government 
ministries or organised interests. In particular, the PMO (through its broader agenda on 
immigration control), the Treasury (on microeconomic reform), the FCO (on foreign policy), 
and a reformist Home Secretary in David Blunkett, were notably assertive agents of policy 
change.
                                                
47 Following Burch and Holliday’s definition, the core executive is taken here to mean ‘the small number of 
agencies at the very centre of the executive branch of government that fulfil essential policy setting and general 
business coordination and oversight functions above the level of departments’. In the UK, these agencies can be 
taken to include the PMO, the Treasury, the Cabinet Office and the FCO (Burch and Holliday, 2004: 2-3). The 
‘core’ of the executive branch is not always strong. For instance, Heffernan highlights its weakness under the 
Major government (2003: 352-353) 
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The Home Office 
The Home Office played only a marginal role compared to that of these core executive actors 
and institutions during the main instances of policy change. The Home Office and IND had 
long held responsibility for immigration and border control, but their jurisdiction did not 
extend to labour immigration until Blunkett brought this policy domain over to the Home 
Office in 2001 from his previous ministerial posting at the Department of Employment. 
Blunkett came to the Home Office with ‘strong ideas and strong views’ about what needed to 
be achieved, in the words of a senior official (interview, Home Office official UK31). He was 
frustrated by its gatekeeper mentality that had been ingrained by the legacy of restrictionism, 
as Chapter 6 showed (interview, Home Office officials UK28, UK40). Blunkett and his 
advisers – rather than the IND and the Home Office – largely crafted the framework for the 
managed migration agenda. According to Sarah Spencer, the notion of relaxing labour 
immigration controls as a device for stemming irregular immigration flows was met by 
‘incomprehension’ from the IND (2007: 351; cf. Blunkett, 2006: 316-317, 339).48 The Home 
Office and the IND lacked strong coordinating roles even after taking formal responsibility 
for all policy matters relating to immigration in 2001. The impetus for policy change instead 
came from elsewhere. While their involvement in labour immigration policy was generally 
done in collaboration with the Home Office, the PMO and the Treasury were more 
instrumental in driving policy change. Moreover, it was clear from interviews with business 
and government representatives that business groups would regularly liaise with the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) (formerly the DTI) on matters relating to 
employers’ regulatory obligations with respect to foreign workers, rather than the Home 
Office. This was in part due to BIS’s status as the main ministry for business liaison, but it 
was also due to a widespread perception that whereas BIS did its utmost to remove regulatory 
burdens on business, the Home Office largely strove to enforce such regulations (interviews, 
CBI official UK02, BCC official UK04, BHA official UK20; BIS official UK34; Home 
Office minister UK41). The Home Office’s gatekeeper mentality was thus retained 
throughout the period of liberal labour immigration reform. 
 
                                                
48 Blunkett’s recounts his frustration with the Home Office and the IND to his biographer: “The people inside the 
Home Office didn’t believe that we would do what we said. And they had a policy of their own. I’ve never 
experienced anything quite like the first few months here. We were running parallel policies. There were my 
policies and there was officials called ‘Home Office policy’, and that was what they worked to. I had to say to 
them over and over again, “There is only one policy and it’s what we say it is”’ (quoted in Pollard, 2005: 273-
274). Interviews with various officials indicate that relations between Blunkett’s office and the Home Office 
were indeed of this ilk (interviews, Home Office officials UK28, UK31, UK35; Home Office adviser UK29). 
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The Prime Minister’s Office 
The status of PMO as ‘the core of the core, the centre of the centre’ of the executive branch 
increased under Blair, according to Heffernan (2005: 612). The Treasury during the Blair 
years took a keen interest in all areas of policy relating to the economy. By contrast, 
minimising political damage and exercising control over high salient issues was the principal 
domestic affairs preoccupation of the PMO (Bennister, 2007: 337-338). Indeed, Sarah 
Spencer says that Blair gave the issue of immigration control, and particularly asylum, ‘an 
extraordinary amount of his personal attention’, as seen in Chapter 7 (Spencer, S. 2007: 359-
360). One senior Home Office official says ‘we had very, very frequent dealings with Tony 
Blair and with Number 10 and the PM Delivery Unit. He would be taking a very detailed 
personal interest in what was happening’. According to another, ‘we used to go to meetings in 
Number 10 every week and sometimes several and [Blair] was very engaged’ (interviews, 
Home Office officials UK40, UK42). But as discussed below, it is likely that that the 
involvement of Blair and the PMO in immigration control policy inadvertently undermined 
the government’s liberal labour immigration reforms.  
 
The Treasury 
As with the PMO’s involvement in the lower skilled category reforms, the changes to the 
high-skilled and professional categories were one, largely peripheral, part of a broader policy 
agenda driven within the core executive. Nevertheless, the Treasury’s interest in labour 
immigration policy was partly the result of what it viewed to have been past opportunities 
missed. The Thatcher government’s miserly extension of UK settlement rights to a small 
minority of Hong Kong nationals (see Chapter 6) had struck a particular chord. According to 
one senior official, the episode was seen within Treasury as ‘a chance to bring in a really 
dynamic, highly educated, highly entrepreneurial group of people, and we didn’t take it’ 
(interview, Treasury/Cabinet Office official UK22). The official says that the Treasury saw 
the expansion of labour immigration ‘as a good piece of supply-side economics’, in extending 
its skills and labour market policies (interview, Treasury/Cabinet Office official UK22; cf. 
interview, Treasury official UK23).  
 
The Treasury was able to involve itself in labour immigration policy by virtue of its status as 
a “permanent member of the core executive” (Moran quoted in Smith, M. 1999: 6). During 
Brown’s tenure, its authority in this respect was extended well beyond its usual remit, largely 
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due to Brown’s dominance as chancellor.49 According to a former permanent deputy secretary 
of the Treasury:  
 
The Treasury has three functions. It’s a ministry of finance. It’s a budget and tax 
ministry, and it has sometimes been an economic ministry – that is, a ministry that 
wants to get the best use of the country’s resources. At different times in the 
Treasury’s history, each of these three functions has come to the fore. It is right to 
say that in the last few years the economics ministry side of the Treasury has perhaps 
come to the fore as never before’ (quoted in Coates, 2005a: 60). 
 
Or – in the words of Brown – the Treasury under his command acted “not just a Ministry of 
Finance, but also a Ministry working with other departments to deliver long-term economic 
and social renewal” (quoted in Lee, 2008: 19). This allowed the Treasury to greatly extend its 
institutional reach and intervene in areas of domestic economic and social policy to an extent 
unprecedented during peacetime (Deakin and Parry, 2000: 216-218; Lee, 2007: 72-73; 2008: 
18-19), including into labour immigration. 
 
Like the Thatcher government (Grant, 1993: 18-19), Blair and Brown believed their 
government was more attuned to the needs of business than business itself. Gamble says that 
while Thatcher government was strongly guided by laissez-faire principles, it gave the state a 
more interventionist role so as ‘to police the market order and provide those goods … that the 
market cannot provide for itself’ (1994: 5-6). Brown believed markets to be the most efficient 
mechanism for allocating economic resources. But he also saw an activist state as a necessary 
“lubricant in the engine of the … economy”; it needed to help coordinate areas where the 
market allocation did not function effectively, particularly with respect to supply-side 
investment in areas such as skills (quoted in Coates, 2005b: 7; cf. Krieger, 2007: 424-426). 
The Treasury under Brown identified the lack of private investment in skills as a market 
imperfection, as Chapter 7 discussed. It decried the shortcomings of the ‘voluntarist’ 
orthodoxy, but was ultimately unable to address these problems. While the Treasury provided 
carrots for employers to increase investment in workforce skills, it was not prepared to wield 
sticks to compel them to do so. This was essentially due to the fear that such compulsion 
                                                
49 This outcome was partly the consequence of Brown’s negotiation of control over domestic policy in exchange 
for agreeing not to challenge Blair for the Labour party leadership in 1994 (Burch and Holliday, 2004: 18). 
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could stifle the dynamism of the UK’s liberal markets, which after all were a cornerstone of 
its comparative advantage (Coates, 2005a: 182-184; Coates and Hay, 2001: 462-466). Hay 
claims that Treasury’s efforts to promote labour market flexibility offered ‘yet further 
incentives for the market to fail to provide [skills] investment’ (2004: 53). This essentially 
compounded the ‘anaemic’ nature of the skills base (Lee, 2008: 30). However, immigration 
offered a resolution to this dilemma (Taylor, 2005: 197-202; Taylor, 2007: 234-237). By 
relaxing labour immigration controls, the government could both increase supply to make the 
labour market more flexible on one hand, and provide a ‘blood transfusion’ of skilled workers 
to enhance productivity on the other.  
 
Despite its interest in labour immigration, the Treasury played a cautious role in the policy 
process. Its interventions in labour immigration were made from a distance, and always only 
as an extension of broader microeconomic policy. Peston’s assessment of the role of the 
Treasury under Brown is that it ‘intervened and influenced every government debate of any 
significance’, and ‘annexed for itself agendas that ought to belong to other parts of Whitehall’ 
(2005: 73-74). This rings true to a point with respect to labour immigration, but the Treasury 
was politically wary of being too closely associated with the issue. One senior official says 
that the Treasury ‘always knew that the politics of this thing were difficult. So they were in 
favour of this liberal immigration regime … but they never took it over in the way that they 
did with a number of other areas of policy’ (interview, Treasury/Cabinet Office official 
UK22).50 Although the Treasury saw its involvement as tangential, its impact on labour 
immigration reform was nonetheless significant. 
 
Discussion 
The emergence of labour shortages in the context of sustained growth created a clear 
economic motivation for relaxing labour immigration controls between 2000 and 2004. 
Various structural factors also made this policy response more attractive than possible 
alternatives. The low salience of labour immigration during this period perhaps further 
enhanced its attraction. While the salience of immigration as a general issue continually 
increased from 1997, labour immigration appeared to contribute little to this upsurge. This 
                                                
50Aside from occasional references to labour immigration policy in his budget and pre-budget speeches, Brown 
appeared to be deliberately cautious when discussing this issue as Chancellor. For instance, he said in a 
November 2006 speech, “managed immigration has a role to play, but I stress the word managed” (quoted in 
Daily Mail, 2006). 
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resulted in a situation where the government did not see the development of a more liberal 
labour immigration policy as significant in its own right. Rather, it was essentially considered 
as an unproblematic means for other, more important ends. As such, decisions to relax labour 
immigration controls were taken without much regard for the possible long-term 
ramifications.  
 
The lack of formal coordinated mechanisms for policy-making allowed the Blair 
government’s labour immigration decisions to occur in an incoherent manner, driven as they 
were by the diverse agendas of core executive actors and institutions. Despite the Blair 
government’s promotion of ‘joined-up government’ (cf. Kavanagh and Richards, 2001), there 
was no established policy network for labour immigration policy-making. One minister says, 
‘it wasn’t that there wasn’t liaison, there was all the normal Cabinet procedures for discussion 
and working together… But there was no real joint thinking approach about how to address 
some of these issues’ (interview, Education/Home Office minister UK38). Different 
ministries often had different and even conflicting objectives with respect to labour 
immigration policy (interviews, CBI official UK02; Home Office minister UK41). According 
to an official, ‘what we ended up having was not one immigration policy for government but 
actually quite a few immigration policies for government. There was a Treasury policy on 
migration, there was an Education [ministry] policy on migration, there was a DWP policy, 
and a BIS policy’ (interview, Home Office official UK40). Moreover, the Home Office and 
the IND had weak command over labour immigration and their engagement with other 
ministries and non-government stakeholders was minimal and intermittent (interviews, Home 
Office officials UK28, UK30).  
 
The 2004 decision to allow A8 nationals to work freely exemplified these characteristics. It 
was the result of various other considerations relating to monetary, labour market, welfare, 
immigration control, and foreign policies. These issues represented interweaving yet largely 
disconnected agendas of different ministries. Admittedly, the decision was complicated by the 
equivocations of other nation states, which in turn contributed to the Blair government’s own 
indecision (cf. Kvist, 2004: 315-316). But the lack of coordination on this particular decision 
contributed to a backlash against the Blair government’s liberal labour immigration policies, 
which became apparent after 2004. 
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Post-script: UK labour immigration policy and politics since 2004 
A reversion to restriction 
Various labour immigration policies with a restrictionist hue have been implemented over the 
last few years. Assessing these more recent developments, and the reasons why they occurred, 
helps to illustrate further the nature of UK immigration politics and policy-making. The 
impact of the global financial crisis on the employment prospects of resident workers was a 
factor contributing to the tightening of controls after October 2008. But the introduction of 
restrictive policies prior to the economic downturn can be interpreted as a backlash against 
earlier liberal policies. The Blair government had relaxed labour immigration controls with 
minimal opposition from the press, other political parties, and popular opinion. These forces 
turned against the government’s handling of immigration after 2004. Two factors largely 
account for this. 
 
First, the liberal shift in labour immigration policy under the Blair government did not extend 
to a shift in the terms of public debate. Its attempt to create a narrative around the reforms to 
the lower skilled categories proved somewhat ineffective. A likely reason for this is that the 
government underestimated the difficulty of promoting the virtues of relaxing labour 
immigration controls, while simultaneously pursuing a highly visible strategy of minimising 
asylum and other unwanted immigration. Tackling asylum issues in this manner did not 
neutralise, but rather drew attention to the issue. A further consequence was that the 
distinction between asylum and labour immigration became blurred. This undermined the 
Blair government’s efforts to create a narrative around the relaxation of immigration controls 
(see Chapter 7), which were lost in the clamour surrounding asylum. As Sarah Spencer says:  
 
Positive messages from Home Office ministers on the economic benefits of labour 
migration were drowned by the negative messages on asylum… The public did not 
hear messages direct from ministers but via the press, and the tabloids continued to 
headline anti-asylum-seeker stories on a regular basis, despite falling numbers… 
[And] the public did not, as the government had anticipated, readily tell the 
difference between an asylum-seeker, a migrant worker or an international student in 
their neighbourhood (2007: 348-349, 359). 
 
The government’s failure to anticipate the size of the inflow of A8 workers following EU 
enlargement was a second factor contributing to the backlash. A 2003 report commissioned 
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by the Home Office estimated that the average annual net immigration of A8 workers to the 
UK would range from 5,000 to 13,000. The report’s authors placed strong caveats on this 
prediction, saying that an absence of reliable statistics on net migration flows to the UK and 
from the A8 states introduced ‘a large potential error in the analysis’ (Dustmann et al., 2003: 
58). This warning proved prophetic, as the scale of the inflows was significantly greater than 
the report anticipated. One year after the 2004 accession, some 200,000 A8 nationals were 
recorded as working in the UK labour market. By October 2006, this figure had increased to 
almost 500,000 (Border and Immigration Agency et al., 2007: Table 1). The Immigration 
Minister later conceded that the scale of the inflow was ‘unpredicted’ (Byrne, 2007).51 The 
rather haphazard way in which the government’s position on A8 workers had been finalised 
contributed to this outcome. Senior ministers and officials knew that the changing policy 
stances of other EU-15 states had implications for the scale of labour immigration to the UK. 
But the government nonetheless opted to allow free movement without properly considering 
or acknowledging that the inflows would be much larger than predicted.52 These factors 
contributed to the backlash that culminated in a more restrictionist labour immigration policy. 
 
Restrictions on European labour mobility 
The government’s deliberations in deciding whether to allow free movement for A2 workers 
exemplified the backlash against its earlier liberal policies. On 1 January 2007, Bulgaria and 
Romania (the ‘A2’ states) became members of the EU. Similar transitional arrangements 
applied with respect to free movement of labour for the nationals of these states. In contrast to 
its position on the 2004 enlargement, the Blair government opted to restrict their ability to 
work, and instead set an annual quota of 20,000 who could work in the UK. The Bulgarians 
and Romanians accepted under this quota could only work in low-skilled food processing and 
agricultural jobs (although self-employed workers were exempt from these restrictions) (The 
Guardian, 2006b).  
  
                                                
51 The Migration Advisory Committee found that the report’s estimation of the total aggregate emigration flows 
of A8 workers was, at one level, correct (2008: 5.3-5.4). Where it erred was on the assumption that all EU-15 
states would open their labour markets simultaneously, since it did not factor in the possibility that transitional 
arrangements would vary. One of the authors of the report later told a House of Lords committee inquiry that he 
was “absolutely sure that if Germany had opened its labour market to the accession countries we would have 
seen lower inflows to the UK” (Dustmann, quoted in House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 
2008: 74). 
52 The report for the Home Office received significant media coverage. Senior government figures sought to 
distance themselves from its findings. As David Blunkett told the House of Commons, “the figure of 13,000 has 
never crossed my lips” (Hansard, 2004: Column 27). 
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There were signs that actors and institutions within the executive branch, including Blair and 
FCO ministers, wished to allow A2 nationals to work without restriction in the UK (The 
Guardian, 2006c; The Independent, 2006c). But sustained media coverage of the arrival of 
larger than expected numbers of A8 workers appeared to fuel broader perceptions that the 
government had lost control of the UK’s borders. Opinion polling reflected growing unease in 
the broader community. Measures of public opinion and press coverage indicate that 
immigration became a more salient policy issue in the lead up government’s decision on A2 
workers in late 2006 (though other immigration issues remained more dominant in press 
coverage than labour immigration) (see Figures 8.10 and 8.11).  
 
The Conservatives challenged the government’s immigration policies more forcefully after 
Michael Howard became party leader in 2003. The party made a more restrictionist 
immigration policy (including on labour immigration) a key component of its 2005 general 
election platform. Conservative campaign posters declared, “it’s not racist to impose limits on 
immigration” (quoted in The Independent, 2005), and its manifesto stated that the UK had 
‘benefitted from immigration’ but that the government had ‘lost effective control of our 
borders’ (Conservative Party, 2005). The party softened its tone on the issue after David 
Cameron became leader in December 2005, but maintained a critical focus on the 
government’s allegedly incompetent management of immigration (Smith, J. 2008: 423-424). 
Public opinion polls found that respondents consistently favoured the policies of the 
Conservatives on immigration to Labour’s (see Figures 8.12). In the month prior to the A2 
decision, 52 per cent of respondents said that asylum and immigration issues were likely to 
influence the party that they would vote for. Crime and anti-social behaviour and health care 
were the only issues that scored higher ratings (Ipsos MORI, 2006).  
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Figure 8.10 Respondents citing ‘race relations/immigration/immigrants’ as one of the three 
most important issues facing Britain today (%), January 2005 to May 2010 
 
Source: Ipsos MORI Issues Index (2010) ‘Trends since 1997’, www.ipsos-mori.com, 23 August 
 
 
Figure 8.11 Number of articles containing the term ‘immigration’ in the domestic political 
news sections of selected daily newspapers, January 2005 to December 2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data generated from Factiva.com  
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Figure 8.12 Respondents nominating the party with the best policies on asylum and 
immigration (%), September 2003 to March 2010 
 
Note: Figures for September 2003 and September 2004 only for asylum 
Source: Ipsos MORI (2010) Best party on key issues: Asylum and immigration, 23 August, available at: 
www.ipsos-mori.com 
 
Among organised interests, the Trades Union Congress called on the government to allow A2 
nationals to work freely (The Independent, 2006b). However, various business groups called 
for limits on free movement. The head of the CBI had criticised the Conservative’s proposals 
for stricter labour immigration controls during the 2005 general election campaign (Financial 
Times, 2005). UK businesses had also widely praised the motivation of A8 workers and their 
role in filling job vacancies (cf. Anderson et al., 2006: 66-78). The Director-General of the 
BCC claimed they had “higher-level skills and a far better attitude to work than local people”. 
But he also said their “vast” number risked creating “significant social problems”, and 
pondered whether “enlargement fatigue” made it appropriate to impose working restrictions 
on A2 nationals (quoted in Financial Times, 2006a). The Director-General of the CBI also 
claimed it would be a mistake to for the government to allow free movement: 
 
The question is about the numbers, the sheer numbers. This is by far the biggest 
wave of immigration in the history of these islands. It has implications for the social 
fabric, for housing and education, for the way we live in this country… We should 
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have a pause for breath before the next wave of new comers (quoted in The 
Guardian, 2006a). 
 
In explaining why peak business groups adopted this position, one representative says ‘the 
business mood shifted because the public mood shifted… The government appeared to have 
lost control and didn’t have the faintest [idea] how many people were in the country… [We] 
felt the need to be a bit more cautious in order to be good corporate citizens’ (interview, CBI 
official UK02). Another claims that peak business groups pressured the government for 
restrictions because ‘we were trying to listen to the concerns of lots of other different groups 
who were saying that there was pressure on public services in communities with high levels 
of migration’ (interview, BCC official UK04). Support for an unrestricted policy for 
Bulgarian and Romanian workers was muted even among industry associations whose 
members had gained substantial benefits from the inflows of low-skilled A8 workers, such as 
those representing agricultural and hospitality employers. The BHA in fact called for 
restrictions, despite its earlier support for liberal policies (interview, BHA official UK20).53 
The response of business shows that its ambivalence during the earlier liberal period of 
reform reflected a restrictionist mindset. While business groups were prospective 
beneficiaries of liberal labour immigration controls, they hesitated from advocating such a 
position for fear that it could adversely affect their reputations in the broader community, 
which they presumed to be hostile to liberal policies. 
 
MigrationWatchUK was one group that was particularly vocal in advocating for controls to be 
imposed on A2 workers. The organisation had emerged in the early 2000s as a self-styled 
think-tank headed by a former diplomat with support from various academics. 
MigrationWatchUK was consistently critical of the Blair government’s immigration policies, 
but was nonetheless able to gain access to Home Office ministers to put its position. 
However, it predominantly sought to influence public debate through the media, particularly 
tabloid newspapers favourable to the anti-immigration thrust of its message. According to a 
MigrationWatchUK spokesperson: 
 
                                                
53 Some business and industry groups did call upon the government to adopt a free movement policy, perhaps 
most notably Business for New Europe, which had the support of companies such as Sainbury’s and Centrica 
(The Independent, 2006a). 
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We are very influential with public opinion. In relation to Romania and Bulgaria, it 
was politically impossible for the government to grant full access to those two 
countries. The public … could see that the decision with respect of the [A8 workers] 
had given a result that was completely unexpected to the government, [though] not 
unexpected to us… People would not have accepted it. And that’s because of our 
influence on public opinion, I think, in part (interview, MigrationWatchUK official 
UK27). 
 
The groundswell of opposition emanating from the unanticipated scale arrivals from the A8 
states deterred the government from allowing free movement for Bulgarians and Romanians. 
According to one senior civil servant, ‘we couldn’t say on the second accession … “well, 
there won’t be all that many, it will be fine”. That [option] wasn’t really open to us’ 
(interview, Home Office official UK42). The decision to impose restrictions ultimately came 
after Home Secretary John Reid and a number of senior ministers mounted considerable 
resistance to the prospect of free movement within Cabinet (Bache and Nugent, 2007: 536-
537; The Times, 2006).  
 
Following the decision on A2 workers, further regulatory changes in November 2008, April 
2009, and March 2010 made it more difficult for foreign nationals from outside of the EU to 
qualify for employer-sponsored work visas (Dobson and Salt, 2009: 27; Home Office, 2008c; 
House of Commons, 2010). In June 2010, the newly elected Cameron government pledged to 
introduce an annual cap on non-EU labour immigration, in order to reduce net intakes ‘to tens 
of thousands rather than hundreds of thousands’. The government tightened eligibility criteria 
for skilled visas as an interim measure, and said that its full strategy for achieving this 
reduction would be set out and implemented by April 2011 (Home Office, 2010). 
 
A shift towards more coordinated policy-making 
Despite the tightening of controls since the 2006 decision, a number of routes for labour 
immigration remain relatively open. While the Conservatives (the larger party in the 
Coalition) claim that immigration is ‘too high and needs to be reduced’ (Conservative Party, 
2010a), they also say they want to ‘continue to attract the brightest and the best people to the 
UK, but with control on the overall numbers coming here’ (Conservative Party, 2010b).  
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This reflects two changes that have occurred in UK immigration policy and politics since 
2000. First, Messina’s claim that ‘policymakers are not free to choose new labour migration’ 
(2001: 268) has been proved wrong. Labour immigration well and truly returned to the public 
policy landscape under the Blair government. The 2004 decision on A8 workers prompted 
‘almost certainly the largest single wave of immigration that the British Isles have ever 
experienced’, according to Salt and Millar (2006b: 14). Labour immigration from outside the 
EU is likely to continue, even if controls are further tightened in the future, particularly since 
intra-company transfers account for a large proportion of non-EU labour immigration, which 
would be practically difficult to curtail (Dobson and Salt, 2009: 27-28).  
 
Second, the executive branch has sought to increase its control over labour immigration 
selection and the manner in which policy is made. This development has unfolded since the 
Blair government’s unveiling of the Points-Based System (PBS) in 2005. The PBS 
consolidated the 80 existing visas for labour, student and business immigration into a new 
structure consisting of five tiers. An independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) of 
academic economists was established to advise the government on how immigration selection 
under the PBS could best complement supply and demand within the domestic labour market 
(Financial Times, 2006b; Home Office, 2005; 16-17). The PBS was designed to give the 
government more control over the entry and selection of foreign workers. It was billed as a 
‘tough, new Australian-style points system’ (Home Office, 2008d), under which ‘only the 
migrants with the skills Britain needs can come – and no more’, in the words of former 
Immigration Minister Liam Byrne (Home Office, 2008b). ‘Skilled’ immigration would be 
permitted in instances of labour market ‘shortage’ when it was ‘sensible’ to do so (Migration 
Advisory Committee, 2008: 12).  
 
The advent of the PBS represented a concerted effort to establish a more coherent policy 
network around labour immigration policy. It seems that labour immigration policy-making 
has indeed become more integrated than was the case during the period between 2000 and 
2004. One Home Office official says that there was ‘a huge shift in how we engage with 
Whitehall partners and stakeholders’ after the establishment of the PBS (interview, Home 
Office official UK32). This development resulted in the IND being granted the status of a 
semi-autonomous agency. It became the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and was given greater 
authority over all areas of immigration policy, including labour immigration. The UKBA’s 
economic and ‘evidence-based’ policy-making credentials were bolstered through the creation 
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of the MAC, which based its analysis on quantitative assessments, as well as consultation 
with employers and other interested parties. This opened up channels for formal dialogue with 
stakeholders. The Migration Impacts Forum was also set up to advise the UKBA on the social 
impacts of immigration. This body includes representatives from a range of ministries and 
non-government stakeholders, including various community organisations, and peak business 
and union bodies, such as the CBI and the TUC (Dobson and Salt, 2009: 21-22; Home 
Office/Immigration and Nationality Directorate, 2006: 16-20). The policy preferences of 
stakeholders, such as business, appears to have shifted, as seen in the vocal opposition of peak 
industry groups to the prospect of the Cameron government imposing tighter controls on non-
EU labour immigration (cf. Financial Times, 2010). Whether this changing policy preference 
was a direct consequence of a more formalised policy-making apparatus being created is 
unclear. Nevertheless, these recent developments suggest that UK labour immigration politics 
may be in the process of transformation. 
 
Conclusion 
The processes and dynamics underpinning the liberalisation of labour immigration policy 
between 2000 and 2004 exhibited the hallmarks of the reluctant state model. Many actors and 
institutions remained fixed in restrictionist mindsets. Labour immigration policy-making 
lacked coordination, and policy change occurred incidentally to broader reform agendas. And 
a restrictionist legacy and the executive branch’s lack of experience in administering liberal 
policy change constrained its capacity to negotiate the fraught terrain of immigration politics. 
 
Business groups played a minor role in the reform process between 2000 and 2004. While 
employers were indeed beneficiaries of these policies, the engagement of their representatives 
was rather limited and ambivalent. Peak associations lent support to Blair government’s 
initiatives, and some industry associations agitated for specific changes, but business groups 
did not provide impetus for reform. It seems that business groups were wary of being too 
closely associated with a politically sensitive issue. In fact, their support for restrictions in A2 
workers in 2006 of was the one instance where they appear to have had some influence on 
government policy. 
 
As with the period between 1946 and 1962, the executive branch largely drove the liberal 
shifts in labour immigration between 2000 and 2004. Core executive institutions and actors, 
such as the Treasury, the PMO and the Home Secretary’s office under David Blunkett, played 
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particularly predominant roles in these developments. The Treasury took an interest in labour 
immigration only because it promised opportunities for the achievement of a broader 
microeconomic agenda. Structural deficiencies in the UK economy and the regulation of 
market institutions constrained the feasibility of various policy options in pursuing this 
agenda. The voluntarist nature of training arrangements prevented the Treasury from fulfilling 
its ambition of unleashing the UK’s potential reservoir of human capital, which it believed 
would boost productivity levels. However, the Treasury was not prepared to force business to 
invest in workforce skills and training, as this would supposedly undermine the dynamism 
created by liberal markets. The Treasury found a solution to this dilemma in the relaxation of 
labour immigration controls, as seen in the high-skilled and professional category reforms. 
Blair and the PMO’s desire for the government to be seen as in command of the UK’s borders 
generated a wide-ranging shake-up of policies around immigration control, which extended to 
labour immigration through the lower skilled category reforms. To this end, Blunkett and his 
ministerial office assisted Blair and the PMO. Blunkett challenged the gatekeeper mentality of 
the Home Office and the IND by insisting that broadening the scope for legal labour 
immigration would help to control irregular immigration, rather than relying only on the 
punitive measures that had been previously used. These respective agendas, and foreign 
policy considerations, informed the European labour mobility reform of 2004. The 
uncoordinated manner in which this decision was made, and the way in which the government 
chose to politically manage immigration policy, contributed to the subsequent backlash 
against liberal reform.  
 
The Blair government relaxed labour immigration controls at a time of relatively low salience, 
which was another parallel with the period between 1946 and 1962. It faced minimal 
opposition from the public, the media, opposition parties and organised interests. However, 
the Blair government also inherited a legacy of restrictionism that influenced the manner in 
which it addressed immigration control issues. The government believed that adopting high 
visibility strategies would allow it to flaunt its border control credentials in a public policy 
context that demanded state vigilance. But when the Blair government did appear to lose 
control over immigration after the European labour mobility reform of 2004, this precipitated 
a backlash. Moreover, the attention drawn by the government to its control efforts 
overshadowed its attempts to construct a narrative around the merits of liberal labour 
immigration reform. These two factors resulted in the line between wanted labour 
immigration and unwanted asylum and irregular immigration being increasingly blurred.
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It appears that the economic downturn since 2008 and the backlash against the Blair 
government’s liberal policy changes are the main factors for the tightening of labour 
immigration controls since 2004. The language of restrictionism has re-emerged with respect 
to labour immigration and it is likely that controls will be further tightened. However, a return 
to the pre-1997 ‘zero’ immigration scenario is unlikely (even for non-EU labour 
immigration). It appears that the major parties recognise that some labour immigration is 
inevitable and indeed desirable. This is reflected in the deliberate creation of a mechanism to 
allow greater coordination in labour immigration policy-making, which may well lead to a 
more formalised policy network of government and non-government actors and institutions 
and, consequently, perhaps also a shift in the UK’s immigration politics.  
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CHAPTER 9 
THE IMPACT OF POLICY LEGACIES ON THE PROCESSES AND DYNAMICS OF 
LABOUR IMMIGRATION SELECTION AND CONTROL 
 
The preceding chapters analysed the labour immigration policy-making process in two states 
that implemented liberal reforms in recent years. The specific reasons for policy change, the 
manner in which it occurred, and role of key institutions and actors were all examined. These 
developments at the national level occurred against the backdrop of an increase in 
international migration flows and a corresponding trend among developed states to 
(selectively) relax labour immigration controls. As discussed in Chapter 1, this trend in labour 
immigration policy was partly driven by various structural changes across developed states. 
Ageing populations and workforces, shifts in industrial composition away from 
manufacturing, technological changes in production, and the growth of knowledge industries 
such as ICT, all contributed to the emergence of labour shortages (Boswell et al., 2004: 10-
11). These factors were more pronounced in some states than in others. For instance, 
population ageing was particularly acute in Germany, Italy and Japan (Bongaarts, 2004: 8-
10). However, it was not in these states that labour immigration controls were most 
significantly relaxed, but rather in Australia and the UK.   
 
These two cases were chosen to examine the reasons why states relax labour immigration 
controls, because their adoption of liberal reforms, and their differing immigration policy 
legacies, provided a good ground for comparison. The instrumental role that immigration has 
played in the process of nation-building in Australia has led it to be classified as a traditional 
destination state with a positive immigration policy legacy. By contrast, immigration has not 
been significant in the formation of national identity in the UK. It has a more negative 
immigration policy legacy and is generally regarded as a reluctant state. Examining the 
reasons for liberal shifts in labour immigration policy in two states with different immigration 
politics has allowed insights to be gained into the processes of policy change, and the 
dynamics that underpin it. 
 
To illuminate the processes and dynamics of recent reform in Australia and the UK more 
explicitly, the first part of this chapter returns to the questions outlined at the end of Chapter 
2. This discussion informs a critical appraisal of the various conceptual accounts that offer 
explanations for why states may relax labour immigration controls. This is followed by an 
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analysis of the relationship between labour immigration policy and politics, and of the roles of 
policy legacies and narrative construction in mediating this relationship. The conclusion of 
this chapter outlines the broader implications of this thesis. 
 
Why states relax labour immigration controls 
The Australian and UK case studies both show that increased labour demand driven by 
sustained economic growth was the central factor underpinning the decisions to relax labour 
immigration controls. But this was accompanied by a range of other reasons for why and how 
policy change occurred in each case. To examine these factors, we return to the questions 
posed at the end of Chapter 2 about the processes and dynamics of labour immigration policy. 
This section first assesses whether the state’s various functional duties shaped labour 
immigration policy decisions in Australia and the UK. The roles of business groups and trade 
unions in the reform process are then examined. This is followed by a look at the importance 
of national-level institutions and governing parties in influencing the particular character of 
labour immigration policy. Finally, it analyses the use of immigrant labour in the structuring 
of labour markets, the relationship between labour immigration and labour market regulation, 
and the extent to which these factors shaped policy decisions. 
 
 
How did the states’ basic requirements to facilitate wealth accumulation shape 
labour immigration selection and control policies? How did the states reconcile such 
policy decisions with their other core imperatives, such as the duty to promote 
fairness and to protect their territorial integrity? 
 
Boswell’s state-centred account of immigration policy posits that states need to fulfil certain 
functional imperatives, such as providing the conditions for wealth creation, promoting 
fairness, and protecting the rights and security of their citizens. This account offers a useful 
framework for explaining policy developments in Australia and the UK. It helps to explain 
why the Howard and Blair governments relaxed labour immigration controls, how they were 
able to do so, and the developments that occurred the post-reform period. 
 
In Australia, labour immigration policy liberalisation helped the Howard government to meet 
its fiscal, monetary and labour market policy objectives, and facilitated broader shifts in the 
national economy towards expanding industries and international engagement. In the UK, the 
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Blair government’s relaxation of labour immigration controls assisted its efforts to raise 
productivity through microeconomic reform and extend liberal markets as a core component 
of national comparative advantage. Policy change thus complemented the state’s 
accumulation imperatives in both cases, to use the terminology of Boswell’s framework. 
Moreover, the state’s need to protect its territorial integrity informed the Blair government’s 
introduction of lower-skilled immigration schemes, with the aim of controlling irregular 
immigration flows more effectively.  
 
According to a number of state-centred theorists, states may use distortion techniques to 
overcome the tensions between populist pressure for tighter immigration controls on one 
hand, and economic pressure for liberal controls, on the other. This was true in both Australia 
and the UK. But the varying success of the Howard and Blair governments in using focusing 
events to create distortions between various strands of immigration policy helps to account for 
the later divergence in their respective policy paths. The Blair government’s decision to 
publicise loudly its attempts to minimise irregular immigration fuelled negative salience 
around broader immigration issues. The uncoordinated manner of policy-making in relation to 
free movement for A8 workers also contributed to the backlash against the unexpected scale 
of inflows. These factors fuelled perceptions that the integrity of border controls had been 
weakened, and that increased immigration was contributing to unfair socio-economic 
outcomes. To use Boswell’s framework, the UK’s reversion to more restrictive immigration 
controls came about because these developments undermined the state’s security and fairness 
imperatives, which outweighed any accumulation-related benefits of maintaining liberal 
controls. 
 
The use of distortion techniques produced different results in Australia. The Howard 
government responded to Pauline Hanson’s protests against the supposedly unfair and 
detrimental outcomes of immigration selection policy in 1996 by making entry harder for 
applicants adjudged likely to deliver a negative economic impact. It also used force in 2001 to 
prevent the entry of seaborne asylum seekers attempting to avoid the formal immigration 
avenues. These resolute stances appeared to bolster public confidence in the Howard 
government’s handling of immigration control, which gave it more political capacity to 
increase labour immigration levels with less risk of complaint from the electorate. 
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Its successful use of distortion techniques to neutralise the political salience of immigration 
meant that the Howard government was more inclined to relax labour immigration controls 
after 2001. By contrast, the Blair government’s distortion techniques inadvertently raised the 
salience of immigration and precipitated a reversion to more restrictive controls after 2004. 
Boswell’s state-centred theory therefore provides a useful framework for analysing policy 
developments in these two cases. However, it is less successful in illuminating the 
circumstances in which states may use immigration to meet their accumulation imperatives, 
and the ways in which policy legacies can shape or constrain the policy choices available to 
states. 
 
The expansion of employer-sponsored visas in Australia is an example of a state reconciling 
its accumulation function with other core imperatives. Lahav’s notion of ‘remote control’ is 
useful in this respect. The Coalition parties used their close organisational and ideological ties 
with business to establish clientelistic – or what Lahav calls ‘principal-agent’ – relationships 
around immigration selection. The Howard government believed that good labour market 
outcomes for business equated to good immigration policy. Further, it believed that business 
was better positioned than the state to source the required immigrant labour, and therefore 
devolved an aspect of state responsibility for immigration selection to business. Allowing 
businesses to engage immigrant workers largely free of administrative constraints made the 
supply of immigrant labour more responsive to employer demand, and thereby improved 
labour market efficiency. 
 
Lahav shows how states may use third parties as immigration control agents (for instance, 
through instruments such as employer or carrier sanctions) in the hope of resolving 
‘economic-political control dilemmas’. The benefits that states gain by using such strategies 
to improve their control over immigration will notionally outweigh the costs of outsourcing 
part of their sovereign responsibility. Similar principles guided the use of employer 
sponsorship as a remote selection strategy. The Howard government believed that the 
economic benefits flowing from a more efficient labour market would outweigh the costs of 
surrendering some of the state’s autonomy over immigration selection. Thus, the concepts of 
the functional imperatives of the state (as employed by the state-centred accounts) can shed 
light on the reasons why states may relax labour immigration controls, and how they might 
resolve the potential political difficulties of such decisions. 
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What was the role of organised interests, particularly those predicted to benefit from 
or bear the costs of labour immigration (such as business and trade unions), in the 
making of policy? Did these interests influence policy decisions, and if so, how and 
through what means?  
 
Group politics theorists such as Freeman suggest that organised interests such as business and 
trade unions play key roles in labour immigration policy change. Freeman uses his client 
politics model to argue that immigration policy produces concentrated benefits and diffuse 
costs and that the beneficiaries therefore have a greater stake. Accordingly, vote-maximising 
politicians will be more persuaded by the interests agitating for liberal reforms, because these 
groups – such as employers – have a greater incentive to be more organised than those likely 
to oppose to such reforms – such as the workers and residential communities where newly 
arrived immigrants are most concentrated. 
 
Business played a prominent role in the reform process in Australia, as Freeman predicts. 
However, the client politics model does not explain the passivity of business groups in the 
UK. Moreover, it cannot account for either the prominence of government institutions and the 
executive branch, or the lack of significant opposition from organised labour, in both cases. 
Consistent with Freeman’s argument, employers were an important source of institutional 
pressure in the relaxation of labour immigration policy controls in Australia. Peak groups 
such as the BCA and the ACCI, and various industry associations, played key roles in 
persuading the Howard government to relax labour immigration controls. The industry 
associations that most actively pushed for liberalisation were those most likely to reap a large 
short-term benefit, such as those representing the housing industry, and hospitality, 
agriculture and mining industry employers. However, it is difficult to claim that employer 
pressure was the definitive reason for why policy change occurred. State/Territory 
governments were also active in making the case for reform. And the Howard government 
had its own self-interested reasons for relaxing labour immigration controls, as these changes 
complemented its fiscal, monetary and labour market policy agendas (even if these issues 
overlapped with business interests). 
 
The client politics model is conceived with reference to the traditional destination states 
(Freeman, 1995a: 886). It should nevertheless be able to account for the UK’s liberal reforms, 
since the framework explicitly seeks to account for instances of expansive immigration 
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policy. However, the Blair government’s implementation of seemingly pro-business policies 
did not necessarily reflect business preferences. UK business groups were fragmented in their 
policy preferences, and did not seek to influence the direction of policy in a concerted 
manner. Some industry associations did push for the loosening of labour immigration 
controls, such as those representing agriculture and hospitality employers. But the major 
instances of liberal reform were not the result of agitation by peak business groups, such as 
the CBI and the BCC, that were largely passive in their support. In fact, opposition to the 
prospect of free movement for A2 workers was the one instance where these groups sought to 
openly influence a labour immigration policy decision. 
 
Other studies have also found the executive branch of the state to be more dominant than 
organised interests in UK immigration politics. In his analysis of the Blair government’s 
immigration policies, Hansen argues that ‘rationally motivated nation-states have an interest 
in attracting these migrants and in using regulated forms of migration control to pursue that 
interest’ (2004: 339). Statham and Geddes also take issue with the applicability of Freeman’s 
thesis. They argue that ‘the government appears as an active “entrepreneur” dominating and 
influencing the political environment’. In their study of political claims-making around UK 
asylum policy, political elites were shown to exercise ‘considerable autonomy’, and played a 
more dominant role in the policy process than organised interests (Statham and Geddes, 2006: 
254, 266).  
 
There are various possible reasons for the limited applicability of the client politics model to 
labour immigration policy in Australia and the UK. First, Freeman equates the state with vote-
maximising politicians (who can be pressured to support expansionary immigration policies 
in return for electoral support) (1995a: 885). This effectively renders the state as a passive 
mediator that can be easily steered towards the policy objectives of organised interests. This 
characterisation discounts the potential for the state to exercise ‘autonomy in the formulation 
and implementation of preferences that are independent of societal interests’, as Boswell 
claims (2007: 79). The theory therefore cannot account for the possibility that the active 
drivers or facilitators of reform may be influential politicians (as seen in the agenda-setting 
role played by David Blunkett in the UK, or in the conversion of John Howard to the merits 
of relaxed controls), or government ministries (such as the UK Treasury, through the pursuit 
of its supply-side agenda). 
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Second, in focusing on the role of organised interests to explain why immigration controls are 
often more liberal than majority public opinion would otherwise allow, the client politics 
model overlooks the importance of issue salience. The Australian case shows that views on 
immigration will not necessarily determine individual party preference, even when opinion 
polling gauges reasonably high levels of voter dissatisfaction (cf. Goot, 2000: 57-58). 
Moreover, the level of salience can affect the capacity of organised interests to influence 
policy (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007: 7). The relatively low salience of immigration may have 
been a reason why business groups were successful in agitating for the relaxation of controls 
in Australia. Conversely, the high salience of the issue may have enhanced the influence of 
groups favouring restriction in the post-liberalisation period in the UK.  
 
The peculiarities of labour market regulation in the US point to a third reason for the 
limitations of Freeman’s theory. The client politics model has been crafted from various 
comparative studies, but the US experience seems to underpin a number of its assumptions, 
and thereby skews its broader applicability. Low minimum wage benchmarks, weak 
employment protection laws, weak trade unions and minimal scrutiny of informal market 
activity may give American employers greater incentives to hire immigrants willing to work 
in low-skilled, low-paid jobs. These features mean that the relative costs and benefits of 
immigration are greater in the US than elsewhere, and give organised interests more reason to 
pressure for policy change (Hollifield, 1992: 36). For various reasons, the liberal regulation of 
labour markets in Australia and the UK heightened the attraction of relaxing labour 
immigration controls. But Freeman’s prediction that workers will oppose liberal labour 
immigration initiatives because of the likely detrimental impact on the wages and 
employment prospects of resident workers was not borne out in either case.  
 
The UK’s liberal labour market regulations make the absence of union opposition to the Blair 
government’s labour immigration initiatives between 2000 and 2004 somewhat puzzling. 
Trade union leaders’ socially liberal views on immigration and tolerance of liberal markets, as 
well as a buoyant economic climate yielding steady employment growth, all combined to 
quell potential union opposition. In addition, the recent introduction of a national minimum 
wage helped to cushion the economic impact of low-wage immigration. There has been some 
recent evidence of A8 immigration placing downward pressure on wages at the lower end of 
the labour market (Low Pay Commission, 2007: 157). But the findings of a government 
report, indicating that around 80 per cent of A8 workers earned within 33 per cent of the 
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national minimum wage, suggests that wages would have been pushed to lower levels had the 
benchmark not been introduced (Gilpin et al., 2006: 21). As one senior civil servant says, this 
meant that ‘from a political point of view, the minimum wage [was] absolutely essential in 
making the policy sustainable’ (interview, Cabinet Office/DWP official UK26).  
 
Organised labour in Australia became more hostile to the relaxation of labour immigration 
controls after 2005. The main factors fuelling this hostility were the Howard government’s 
dismantling of strong employment security and wage protections, and the weakening of 
employment regulations for temporary work visas. According to Freeman, ‘the effects of 
migration depend on the skills of migrants and sectors they enter’. He suggests that high-
skilled immigration will complement the labour market needs of the receiving state and 
therefore be tolerated, but that low-skilled immigration may be perceived as threatening the 
job prospects of natives and will hence be resisted (Freeman, 2006: 234). However, the 
Australian and UK cases show that the level of protection offered by labour market regulation 
is more likely to shape the impact of immigration on wages and employment (and therefore 
how resident workers respond to labour immigration reform) than – as Freeman suggests – the 
skills of newly-arrived immigrants.  
 
A fourth and related reason for the limitations of Freeman’s theory is that organised interests 
in the US command disproportionate influence over immigration policy.54 Candidates are 
more reliant on external fundraising in congressional elections compared with elsewhere (Dür 
and De Bièvre, 2007: 5). And the US Congress plays a significant role in shaping immigration 
policy (Sassen, 1999: 187) compared to the Australian and UK systems, in which power is 
concentrated within Cabinet. As Fenna claims, Cabinet systems present ‘far fewer meaningful 
points of access to policy-making’ (2004: 152). With respect to labour immigration, this 
meant that the capacity of ministers in Australia and the UK to adjust policy was far less 
subject to legislative scrutiny than would have been the case in the US. This in turn means 
that – contrary to Freeman’s assumptions – the influence of organised interests was largely 
contingent upon the access granted by Cabinet ministers, rather than congresspersons or 
parliamentarians, as Freeman assumes.  
 
                                                
54 Freeman has acknowledged that the different systems of political representation will affect the capacity of 
organised interests to influence policy (2005: 123). 
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The assumption that business groups will have a natural interest in immigration control policy 
and, moreover, have the capacity to exert that influence, provides a fifth reason for the 
minimal applicability of the client politics model. This premise essentially follows 
Lindblom’s argument that business does not face the collective action problems of other 
interests in capitalist democracies in order to exert leverage over public policy, due to its 
unique function in generating and distributing goods, income and employment. As a result, 
governments pay heed to business interests because voters will primarily hold politicians – 
rather than businesses – accountable for the negative fallout of a cessation in business activity 
(Lindblom, 1982: 326-329). The Australian and UK examples show that these advantages are 
not inherently sufficient for business to have automatic influence over labour immigration 
policy. As Atkinson and Coleman demonstrate, the capacity of business groups to exert 
influence is also contingent upon their organisational coherence. The extent of membership 
coverage, whether the views espoused by business group leaders represent those of their 
members, and whether they are unified or fragmented in terms of policy preferences, all 
condition the sway that business groups are able to exert (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989: 53).  
 
Business groups in Australia had an ongoing interest in immigration policy. However, their 
lack of organisational coherence in the 1980s and early 1990s diminished their capacity to 
influence policy. This changed in the late 1990s, when groups such as the BCA and the ACCI 
pursued a strategy based on building advocacy coalitions. While this gave Australian business 
greater scope to influence policy, reform ensued only when the Howard government became 
convinced that relaxing labour immigration controls was compatible with its own objectives. 
Freeman equates the alignment of policy outputs and the preferences of business interests 
with business power. However, as a number of studies show, the actual influence of business 
is often contingent on the extent of the state’s receptivity and the extent to which the 
respective agendas of business and the state overlap (cf. Princen, 2007: 17-18; Woll, 2007: 
58-59). Business groups played an important role in convincing the Howard government of 
the merits of reform, but it was a confluence of interests – rather than the government 
succumbing to business pressure – that eventually drove policy change. 
 
In sum, Freeman’s client politics model helps to illuminate the role of business groups in the 
implementation of liberal policy change, particularly in the Australian case. However, 
because it overlooks the importance of issue salience, generalises the peculiarities of US 
politics and labour market regulation, discounts the role and interest of the executive branch 
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of the state, and contains misguided assumptions about business group influence, its ability to 
account for the relaxation of labour immigration controls is somewhat limited. 
 
To return to a theme mentioned above, trade unions did not stand in the way of the major 
instances of liberal policy change in either case. Trade unions in the UK encouraged the 
relaxation of labour immigration controls, and Australian unions played a largely passive role 
and were not significantly involved in the reform process. While the latter grew hostile to the 
growth of temporary work visas from 2005, this was mainly a consequence of the Howard 
government’s liberal labour law reform agenda. These respective stances are significant 
insofar as Australian unions largely drove the restriction of labour immigration in the early 
twentieth century, and UK unions displayed some antipathy to labour immigration after the 
Second World War. However, the weakened industrial and political power of organised 
labour in both Australia and the UK means that it is doubtful whether unions in either case 
would have had the capacity to successfully oppose the recent relaxation of labour 
immigration controls, even had they wanted to.  
 
 
What was the role of particular national-level institutions (such as the respective 
branches of the state, government ministries responsible for immigration, labour and 
economic policies, or particular ‘policy institutions’) in influencing or shaping the 
direction of labour immigration selection and control policy? 
 
The Australian and UK cases show that national-level institutions played an important role in 
bringing about liberal labour immigration policy reform. The Treasury’s prescriptions for 
offsetting long-term demographic decline, the RBA’s warnings over the inflationary pressures 
caused by labour shortages, and the lobbying of State/Territory governments, were all factors 
that increased the Howard government’s inclination to relax labour immigration controls. The 
strong influence of the executive branch over labour immigration policy, and the 
responsiveness of the public service to Cabinet, meant that the Howard government faced few 
institutional impediments to reform. Moreover, the Immigration Department’s institutional 
preference for an immigration selection policy that favoured labour over other categories of 
immigration helped to facilitate the government’s agenda. Boswell’s argument that ministries 
often use expert knowledge to legitimise policy decisions is informative in this respect. The 
Immigration Department’s somewhat selective use of ‘evidence’ helped to redefine the 
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parameters of immigration selection in support of the Howard government’s policy 
preferences is an example of this phenomenon. In the UK, the dominance of the executive 
branch over labour immigration also allowed the Blair government to introduce liberal 
policies without any major institutional constraints. The strength of the core executive in 
general, and institutions and actors such as the Treasury, the PMO and the Home Secretary’s 
office in particular, provided much of the impetus for the relaxation of labour immigration 
controls.  
 
Foreign policy was another ‘institution’ that was shown to shape policy developments in both 
cases. Continuing a trend that began in 1973, the UK’s institutionalised relationship with the 
EU shaped the Blair government’s policies, but – with respect to its 2004 decision on A8 
workers – EU membership had a more profound impact on labour immigration selection and 
control than had ever previously been the case. The gradual shift in the focus of Australia’s 
foreign economic policy away from the UK and towards East and South East Asia – a process 
that began after the Second World War and accelerated from 1972 – informed changes in its 
immigration selection policy, the outcomes of which were evident in the shifting composition 
of the origins of foreign nationals immigrating to Australia. These institutional features are 
quite unique to each case and the executive or foreign policy may not play such a dominant 
role over labour immigration policy in other states. The Australian and UK cases nevertheless 
demonstrate the importance of a state’s institutional traits in shaping the direction of labour 
immigration policy. 
 
 
Did centre-left or centre-right political parties in government shape the particular 
direction of labour immigration selection and control policy?  
 
The literature on political parties suggests that labour immigration policy cuts across the 
philosophies and the electoral support bases of both centre-right and centre-left political 
parties, and therefore neither can be thought to be more likely to liberalise controls. A centre-
right government in Australia and a centre-left government in the UK implemented reform. In 
Australia, a liberal labour immigration policy was consistent with the Coalition parties’ liberal 
market philosophies. The Coalition faced no evident pressure from within its support base for 
increasing labour immigration on cultural or security grounds (although these were 
foundations for protest against other immigration issues, as seen with Hanson in 1996 and 
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asylum seekers in 2001). As discussed, the UK Labour government could implement reform 
without any major internal obstacles, because its labour immigration policies received the 
support of organised labour. Liberal labour immigration controls may have been inconsistent 
with the pre-New Labour belief in strong protections for workers’ employment conditions and 
job security. But they were largely compatible with Labour’s support for liberal labour market 
regulation and supply-side labour market policies under Blair and Brown (Taylor, 2007: 216-
217, 234-237). The evidence from the two cases therefore supports the proposition that 
neither centre-left nor centre-right parties are more likely to relax labour immigration 
controls. 
 
 
Were certain industries or employers structurally dependent on labour immigration? 
If so, how? What created the conditions for this? 
 
Various structural functionalist accounts suggest that immigrant labour can become a 
structural feature of labour supply under certain conditions. Sassen’s ‘globalisation thesis’ – 
which falls within the structural functionalist paradigm – has been criticised for its 
reductionism (cf. Hansen, 2002: 263-264; Meyers, 2000: 1268-1269). But her argument that 
the growth of international markets and business activity has diminished the state’s control 
over immigration has some resonance with respect to the two case studies presented here. In 
both cases, the growth of industries with highly integrated global labour markets (such as ICT 
in both cases, and finance in the UK) contributed to the relaxation of labour immigration 
controls. Increased regional trade integration in both Australia and UK placed further pressure 
on policy change. Moreover, the growth of employer-sponsored visas, particularly in 
Australia, reflected the use of immigration policy as a vehicle for greater labour market 
efficiency, as was deemed necessary in the context of more competitive and internationalised 
market environments. The Marxist and segmented labour market theories assume that the 
value of immigrant labour to employers (and the state) lies in its concentration in marginal or 
secondary segments of the workforce. This has limited application to Australia. While the 
Howard government relaxed immigration controls to allow labour markets to function more 
efficiently, the intake of labour immigration was primarily skilled. Later developments saw 
the lowering of skill thresholds for temporary work visas, but the Howard government’s 
immigration selection policies actively discriminated against candidates deemed unlikely to 
succeed in the labour market, such as those with lower levels of skill, English language 
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competency, and age. Structural functionalist accounts have more explanatory value with 
respect to the UK. Although there was a focus on selecting skilled applicants, the reforms in 
the lower-skilled and intra-European labour mobility categories provided greater scope for 
immigration to address shortages in areas of the economy prone to structural dependence on 
low-skilled, low-wage labour.  
 
It is questionable whether labour immigration controls were relaxed to deliberately undermine 
the collective power of the working class, as Marxist writers would have it. Structural 
functionalist accounts nonetheless help to explain why labour immigration policy was used as 
a plank of monetary policy, which was a reason for reform in both Australia and the UK. 
Various structural functionalist accounts show how Western European governments used 
immigrant labour during periods of low unemployment in the post-war decades to overcome 
labour supply bottlenecks and facilitate low inflationary economic growth (Castells, 1975: 44; 
Castles, S. 1986: 772-773). This was a motivation for the reforms of the Howard and Blair 
governments. Labour immigration controls were relaxed in both states after economic growth 
diminished labour supplies, thereby raising the risk of escalating labour prices and their 
economies overheating. Unemployment fell to 4.3 per cent in second quarter of 2007 in 
Australia and to 4.6 per cent in the third quarter of 2004 in the UK (OECD, 2010). These 
were low levels by contemporary standards, but nowhere near the levels in many Western 
European economies when post-war immigration was at its peak.55 This suggests that during 
the recent period of labour immigration expansion, labour shortages caused by falling 
unemployment in Australia and the UK were not absolute, as they essentially were in post-
war Western Europe. Moreover, to reiterate a point made in Chapter 8, unemployment rates 
during the contemporary period were at comparable or lower levels in a number of states with 
tighter labour immigration controls (see Figure 9.1). In any case, structural functional 
accounts provide some insight into the structural role that immigrant labour can play within 
labour markets, as well as how this may shape labour immigration policy decisions. 
 
                                                
55 In the 1960s, unemployment hovered between 1.0 per cent and 2.1 per cent in France, 0.8 per cent and 2.0 per 
cent in the Netherlands, and 0.7 per cent and 2.2 per cent in Germany (Castells, 1975: 40-43). 
226 
Figure 9.1 Harmonised unemployment rates in selected OECD states (%),  
2000-2005 average 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD (2009): 250 
 
 
Did the character of market regulation shape labour immigration selection? Did 
national comparative advantages reinforced by market regulation shape the design 
of immigration selection mechanisms (for instance, preferences for certain skills)?  
 
To use the terminology of the varieties of capitalism framework, both Australia and the UK 
are LMEs with relatively liberal labour market regulations. This classification also applies to 
a number of other states that oversaw significant liberal labour immigration reforms during 
the recent wave of international migration, such as Canada, Ireland and New Zealand. By 
contrast, states in East Asia and continental Europe generally maintained relatively tighter 
labour immigration controls. Many of these states are CMEs with much more protective 
labour market regulations. This suggests that comparative political economy theories of 
market regulation, such as those that utilise the varieties of capitalism framework, may shed 
light on the reasons why some developed states relaxed labour immigration controls more 
than others. 
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Menz uses the varieties of capitalism framework to propose that states will adjust labour 
immigration selection mechanisms to select foreign workers with skills complementary to the 
comparative advantages offered by their production systems. This largely holds true in 
relation to the UK where, as he predicts, labour immigration appeared to be concentrated in 
highly skilled occupations in the ICT, finance/business and health industries, and lower 
skilled occupations in administration and hospitality. However, Menz’s argument is less 
pertinent with respect to the Australian case. The evidence suggests that newly arrived foreign 
workers were clustered in highly skilled jobs in knowledge industries such as ICT, and to a 
lesser extent in other areas of comparative advantage, such as mining. But there appeared to 
be relatively minimal immigration of lower skilled workers, which selection policy actively 
discouraged. This was despite Australia’s status as an LME, and the growth in temporary 
service industry jobs with limited training opportunities. 
 
The application of the varieties of capitalism framework to notions of comparative advantage 
by other writers has relevance to the two case studies, particularly the UK. Fioretos extends 
the link between market regulation and production systems to predict that states will engage 
in multilateral institutions in ways consistent with their comparative advantages (2001: 215). 
This can be seen through the responses of member states to various EU policy measures. For 
example, according to Fioretos, the UK has generally reacted to EU initiatives by seeking ‘to 
preserve its existing comparative institutional advantage that provides low-cost production’ 
(1996: 28). This explains the fear of UK governments that, were the UK to join the European 
Monetary Union, a loss of autonomy over currency adjustment mechanisms would undermine 
the allure of its comparatively lower wage and production costs to foreign direct investment 
(Fioretos, 2001: 229-230). Similarly, concerns that its flexible labour market and wage setting 
institutions could be fragmented appeared to inform the UK’s antipathy towards the EU 
Social Protocol until 1997 (Fioretos, 2001: 230-231; Schmidt, 2002: 264-268). From this 
perspective, the Blair government used labour immigration policy to further its quest for 
greater labour market flexibility, believing that an increased supply of labour would be 
beneficial. In contrast, various EU-15 states with more protectively regulated labour markets 
(and in some cases lower unemployment levels) saw the enlargement of the European 
workforce in 2004 as an economic threat.  
 
The varieties of capitalism framework can be extended in other ways to illuminate the reasons 
for labour immigration policy change in Australia and the UK. Liberal labour markets with 
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weaker systems of employment protection – typical among LMEs – are assumed to produce 
more temporary employment relationships. The diminished commitment of employees to 
their employers thus encourages ‘both parties to focus on more immediate gains, and so short-
term workers generally receive less training’, according to Harcourt and Wood (2007: 146). 
While such arrangements make it easier for workers to move between firms, it can be 
predicted that poaching will be a common way for LME firms to acquire skilled workers 
(particularly in the context of more competitive market relationships). This will deter 
investment in training, and thereby lower the stock of skills across the labour force. By 
contrast, greater inter-firm collaboration around training and more rigid labour markets 
through stronger employment protection – a hallmark of CMEs – will mean that labour is less 
mobile, but poaching less prevalent (Hall and Gingerich, 2009: 460; Streeck, 1989: 93-94; cf. 
Menz, 2009: 10). In both Australia and the UK, the shift towards more liberal systems of 
labour market regulation placed a greater onus on individual employers to make their own 
training arrangements. This increased their inclination to poach labour, and possibly 
compounded labour shortages. 
 
Moreover, the varieties of capitalism framework has been used to predict that businesses and 
governments operating in LMEs will be more hostile to the presence of trade unions in the 
workplace and the influence of unions over public policy (Thelen, 2001: 71-74; Wood, 2001: 
250-253). The weakening of unions had implications for labour supply in both Australia and 
the UK. Large decreases in union membership in both states, and the active marginalisation of 
union involvement in training policy in the UK, meant that policy increasingly reflected the 
preferences of employers. In both cases, governments incorporated ‘market-led’ training 
principles that primarily sought to meet the short-term labour requirements of employers, but 
led to weakened skills bases. Transferable and occupation- and industry-specific skills were 
eroded in Australia and the standards and portability of skills declined in the UK. This 
resulted in employers in both states being less equipped to respond to labour shortages. 
 
If states with liberal labour market regulations are more susceptible to labour shortages, why 
then did they only become pronounced in Australia and the UK in recent years? Economic 
growth and decreased unemployment evidently provides one explanation. Another might be 
the recent affirmation of both states as LMEs in light of the large-scale economic 
restructuring and market liberalisation undertaken by their governments during the 1980s and 
1990s. Australia exhibited some of the trademarks of a CME (such as centralised wage 
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bargaining and strong trade unions) until a deregulatory policy agenda was pursued in the 
1980s and 1990s (Briggs, 2006: 869-872). The gradual shift to workplace bargaining resulted 
in more part-time and temporary employment, greater competition over wages, and the 
erosion of industry and formalised training structures. All of these factors made employers 
less willing to invest in training, and thus undermined the skills base. Similarly, while Hall 
and Gingerich consider the UK to be a relatively ‘pure’ LME (2009: 459), others argue that 
this only became the case after the election of the Thatcher government. Before this point, 
there had been extensive collective bargaining and greater employer cooperation in the UK 
(Goodin, 2001: 207; Howell, 2003: 119). 
 
The logic of the varieties of capitalism framework can therefore be extended to suggest that 
liberal modes of labour market regulation will exaggerate the extent of labour shortages. 
Periods of increased labour demand will compound these shortages, and prompt governments 
to look for alternative labour supply mechanisms. Since immigration and training are the 
‘only two ways for a nation to secure an adequate supply of skilled workers’, according to 
Toner and Woolley (2008: 48), buoyant economic environments may therefore make states 
with liberal labour markets more likely to relax labour immigration controls than states with 
more coordinated or protective forms of regulation. This is merely a prediction, as the two 
cases presented here are LMEs, and no direct comparison has been made with a CME. 
Nonetheless, the relationship between labour market regulation and labour immigration policy 
controls is fertile ground for future research. Indeed, additional elements of the varieties of 
capitalism framework could be used to further investigate other patterns in comparative 
labour immigration policy. For instance, the greater preoccupation of LME firms with short-
term profitability may diminish their inclination to invest in assets with longer-term rates of 
return, and thereby act as a further barrier to training investment. 
 
The resilience of immigration politics 
The existing literature helps to illuminate the reasons for the recent relaxation of labour 
immigration controls in Australia and the UK. The concept utilised by state-centred accounts 
that states have to meet various functional duties in order to secure their legitimacy helps to 
explain some of the Howard and Blair governments’ specific motivations for labour 
immigration reform, as well as the political strategies they used in its implementation. The 
group politics theories help to account for the influential role of Australian business groups, 
but evidence from both cases exposes the various limitations of these theories. The cases also 
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show that national-level institutions play an important role in influencing the particular 
character of labour immigration policy, and confirm that neither centre-left nor centre-right 
parties are more likely to preside over liberal reform. While structural functional accounts are 
more applicable to the UK, in each case they offer an understanding of the various ways that 
immigrant labour provided structure to labour markets, which served to influence policy 
decisions. And the evidence from Australia and the UK suggests that theories employing the 
varieties of capitalism framework can be used to argue that the character of national labour 
market regulation may shape the available supply of labour within a domestic labour market, 
and that labour immigration may be used as a complementary supply. 
 
Despite the insights offered by the existing literature, none of the above theories fully 
explains the role of the various institutions and actors involved in the labour immigration 
policy process, and the manner in which they implemented reform in Australia and the UK. 
This issue is important because it helps to account for developments in the period following 
liberal reform in each of the two cases, and can therefore be used to infer general lessons 
about labour immigration policy and politics. In Australia, labour immigration controls were 
relaxed incrementally and through a deliberative process. Reform was justified on the grounds 
that it fulfilled economic needs and objectives, and was consistent with an accepted definition 
of the national interest. In the UK, liberal shifts in labour immigration policy were the 
incidental consequence of the pursuit of objectives in other policy areas. Reform was 
implemented unilaterally and in an uncoordinated manner characterised by an absence of 
consultation. The contrast in the manner in which reform was managed by the various actors, 
institutions and stakeholders involved in the process both reflected and served to reinforce a 
positive immigration policy legacy in Australia, and a negative one in the UK. Returning to 
the historical institutionalist concepts outlined in Chapter 1 will help to advance this 
argument. 
 
Creating narratives for reform around policy legacies 
Similar factors underpinned the relaxation of labour immigration controls in both states. 
Labour immigration was not implemented for its own sake but rather to help meet broader 
policy objectives that were underpinned by a range of largely exogenous shifts, such as 
structural economic change and market regulatory reform. In Australia, a range of institutions 
and actors, such as senior government ministers, various government ministries, 
State/Territory governments and business groups, came to see labour immigration policy as 
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an appropriate device for achieving these objectives. The adroit handling of liberal policy 
change was seemingly due to the longstanding role of the executive branch in managing 
immigration control and selection within clearly defined parameters and in accordance with 
due process. In the UK, various senior ministers and ‘core’ government ministries saw the 
loosening of labour immigration controls as complementary to their broader goals. But while 
business groups could be thought to share their objectives, business played a largely 
incidental and ambivalent role in the reform process. The rather disorderly way in which 
policy was made was due largely to the inexperience of those driving reform, their 
insufficient political deftness in managing the inevitable socio-economic impact of increased 
immigration, and the weak coordinating role of the government ministry responsible for 
administering reform.  
 
This shows that the two states’ respective policy legacies shaped the labour immigration 
policy preferences of the actors and institutions involved in the reform process, and the way 
that policy change was managed. Moreover, the Howard government used Australia’s 
positive immigration policy legacy to construct a coherent narrative to justify the 
implementation of liberal reform. This generated greater immediate and lasting support for its 
reforms among stakeholders and the broader community. By contrast, lacking a similarly 
positive legacy, the Blair government found it difficult to create such a narrative, which 
contributed to the unpopularity of its reforms.  
 
Hall’s use of the notion of ‘policy paradigm’ to explain the shift in UK monetary policy from 
a Keynesian to a monetarist orthodoxy in the 1970s and 1980s can help to explain labour 
immigration policy developments in the two cases. Hall explains that the shift in the UK 
monetary policy paradigm emanated from a period of economic stagnation that began in the 
early 1970s, which could not be alleviated by the hitherto conventional economic policy 
responses, informed by Keynesian principles. A loss of confidence in the policy orthodoxy 
among policy-makers, media commentators and the broader public followed. This led to a 
‘shift in the locus of authority’ around macroeconomic policy-making beyond Whitehall, and 
an expansion of the ‘marketplace in economic ideas’ across the press and think tanks all in 
search of credible policy alternatives (Hall, 1993: 286). Political parties became engaged in 
the debates over the merits of alternative policy paradigms. The Conservative opposition 
under Margaret Thatcher adopted a monetarist paradigm, which it successfully used to 
critique the Labour government’s economic management. This paradigm formed the basis of 
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the narrative that helped the Conservative Party win the 1979 general election and informed 
(for a short time anyway) its macroeconomic policy once in office. Within a few years, 
monetarist views became institutionalised within the traditional policy-making venues in 
Whitehall, and thereby affirmed a shift in the policy paradigm. While the election of the 
Thatcher government was an important part of this shift, it was mediated through a raft of 
state and non-state institutions and stakeholders (Hall, 1993: 283-289). 
 
Hall’s illustration of the policy paradigm can help to account for the shift to a human capital 
orthodoxy as the basis for Australian immigration selection policy. In this case, there was not 
only a change in policy, but also in the policy parameters, or what Hall calls ‘the hierarchy of 
goals and set of instruments employed to guide policy’ (1993: 283-284). Exogenous forces 
provided a spur for change, but there was deep involvement by various actors and institutions 
in the reform process. The shift in the immigration selection policy orthodoxy came about 
because of a need for economic competitiveness in the context of greater international 
integration, even if the basis of policy remained consistent with principles defined according 
to the national interest. The consistent use of immigration as an instrument for nation-building 
in the two centuries between colonisation and the election of the Howard government was 
achieved by selecting the applicants deemed to be compatible with the national interest. 
Although the policy paradigm over how national interest was defined changed in response to 
changing contexts, agreement on its definition across the major political parties, organised 
interests and the broader community was important in generating support for consistently 
large immigration intakes.  
 
The origins of the Howard government’s successful shifting of the policy paradigm originated 
in the fragmentation of consensus on how immigration selection policy should be defined in 
the early 1970s. The fragmentation was underpinned by the shift from a protectionist model 
of political economy to a more internationally engaged and liberal model. Disagreement 
emerged between organised interests and the major political parties as to whether human 
capital or settlement criteria should be the principal basis for immigration selection. This 
contention contributed to growing malaise about the state’s capacity to select immigration in 
line with the national interest. From the mid-1980s, support coalesced behind the notion that 
human capital criteria should be the main foundation for immigration selection, and that 
policy should be adjusted to favour the candidates most likely to deliver a net economic 
benefit to Australia. This view first emerged within the various government ministries and 
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gained traction among the opposition Coalition parties and later with business groups. From 
1996, the Coalition in government established a human capital orthodoxy as the core principle 
for immigration selection. Positive labour market outcomes for applicants, employers and 
regional areas became the yardstick by which good immigration selection policy was 
measured. The government used this policy paradigm to gain leverage against its political 
opponents, boost its electoral standing and generate popular support for its – increasingly 
liberal – labour immigration policies. The congruence between a human capital doctrine and 
the imperative of economic competitiveness in the context of the broader shifts in Australia’s 
political economy further assisted the establishment of the new paradigm. Despite the 
imposition of some restrictions, developments since 2007 suggest that a human capital 
orthodoxy has been affirmed as the basis for immigration selection. There is a large degree of 
institutionalised support in Australian immigration politics for the view that immigration is 
beneficial to the national interest, so long as it fulfils a justifiable need and is properly 
regulated. This support is consistent with Australia’s status as a ‘traditional destination state’. 
The Howard government was able to use this undercurrent, formed in large part by 
Australia’s positive immigration policy legacy, to relax labour immigration controls with 
broad support among institutions, stakeholders and the community. 
 
The Blair government’s reforms were not as resilient. This was due not only to its rather inept 
handling of policy change, but because the policy paradigm for liberal labour immigration 
controls was not firmly established. Schmidt’s argument that governments will have difficulty 
implementing policies that do not easily ‘fit’ with the national policy legacy – particularly if a 
case is not sufficiently made to stakeholders and the broader public for why reform is 
appropriate or necessary – is informative in this respect (2002: 65-66). The UK’s restrictionist 
legacy did not prevent the Blair government from loosening labour immigration controls 
between 2000 and 2004, which it was able to do with relatively little fanfare. Attempting to 
construct a narrative for liberalising labour immigration controls, the government had invoked 
arguments about the UK’s comparative economic advantages and the imperatives of effective 
border controls. However, these arguments were not sufficiently strong or coherent to 
institutionalise a new policy paradigm. This narrative became seriously fragmented as 
increasing numbers of A8 workers arrived ahead of the decision on A2 workers, and 
precipitated a collapse of the liberal reform agenda.  
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The respective geographical features of Australia and the UK impacted upon the Howard and 
Blair governments’ narratives in a manner that was beyond the control of either. Howard’s 
phrase – ‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they 
come’ – captured the essence of why his government’s resolute stance against the arrival of 
seaborne asylum seekers had such a high degree of popular support. But this principle was 
equally applicable to the relative support in the electorate for its liberal labour immigration 
reforms. The prevention of entry to anyone deemed unlikely to deliver a net benefit was the 
flipside of an immigration selection policy based on permitting entry only to those likely to 
produce a net benefit for the Australian economy. Successful control over immigration flows 
was a prerequisite for this policy to function effectively and hence receive popular support. 
While Australia’s geographical isolation allowed this control to be exerted, such luxury was 
not available in the UK. The Blair government’s attempt to create a successful narrative 
around labour immigration was overwhelmed by the negative attention drawn to the 
continuing inflows of asylum seekers and other unwanted forms of immigration. The UK’s 
close proximity to continental Europe, and the multiple points of entry for would-be 
immigrants, meant that border control could never be as successful as in Australia. This 
blurred the Blair government’s messages on unwanted immigration on one hand, and labour 
immigration on the other, and undermined its capacity to create a positive narrative with 
respect to the latter. 
 
Immigration politics and the limits to successful narrative construction 
The successful creation of a narrative can be a key factor in determining whether or not policy 
reforms gain popular acceptance, according to Schmidt and Radaelli (2004: 206). Narrative 
construction was crucial in determining the degree of support for liberal labour immigration 
reform among stakeholders and the broader community in the two cases presented here. The 
availability of a positive policy legacy was a decisive factor in crafting a successful narrative 
in Australia, and this appeared to engender more resilient support for policy change than in 
the UK. Hall argues that ideas are an essential ingredient in successfully building a policy 
paradigm, because they allow a political discourse to be created between society and the state:  
 
Politicians, officials, the spokesmen for social interests, and policy experts all 
operate within the terms of political discourse that are current in the nation at a given 
time, and the terms of political discourse generally have a specific configuration that 
lends representative legitimacy to some social interests more than others, delineates 
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the accepted boundaries of state action, associates contemporary political 
developments with particular interpretations of national history, and defines the 
context in which many issues will be understood (1993: 289). 
 
In a similar manner, a state’s ‘ideology of immigration’ will constrain its ability to create a 
policy paradigm that is inconsistent with the broader traits of its immigration politics. The 
impact of contrasting ideologies of immigration on the immigration politics of traditional 
destination and reluctant states is illustrated in the following excerpts from interviews with 
two government officials. The first is a British immigrant working in the Australian 
Immigration Department, and the second is a Home Office official recently returned from 
secondment to Australia: 
 
Immigration is such a given in this country… Some of those European countries 
where they have a low birth rate are looking down the barrel of annihilation. I don’t 
want to exaggerate … but they can’t have the kind of migration programmes that we 
run… Australia is either lucky or makes its own luck [because it] runs a programme 
that everyone is confident is well managed. The integrity is there and it delivers 
[positive outcomes] and ordinary Australians are made aware of that (interview, 
Immigration Department official AU38). 
 
Immigration not being part of [the UK’s] myth of nation-building tends to make the 
debate in the public domain almost unremittingly negative… [Immigration] becomes 
quite mangled by negative publicity in the newspapers, primarily, whereas the public 
debate in Australia was a good deal more balanced and mature … because there is a 
genuine public interest in the nation-building part of it (interview, Home Office 
official UK30). 
 
Ideologies of immigration serve to produce self-reinforcing mechanisms within policy 
processes and dynamics – or what Thelen terms ‘feedback effects’ – that shape the viability of 
options available to policymakers (1999: 392-396). These feedback effects are evident at a 
number of levels.  
 
While net immigration in Europe and North America is comparable in relative terms, 
‘European governments and their electorates continue to display a profound ambivalence 
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about immigration’, according to Boswell, even when there is a patent economic case for 
relaxed controls (2005: 1). Recent data produced by the International Social Survey Program 
shows a continuing gulf in public attitudes to immigration across traditional destination and 
reluctant states. Australians and Canadians responded in a categorically positive manner when 
questioned about the economic and cultural contribution of immigration and current intake 
levels, whereas Britons and Germans remain unequivocally negative (cited in Markus et al., 
2009: 123-124). Breunig and Luedtke find that a nation’s immigration politics is one of the 
few institutional factors with a tangible bearing on governing party preferences on 
immigration (2008: 141). Penninx and Roosblad show a nation’s policy legacy to be the most 
important factor explaining trade union attitudes towards immigrants (2000: 200-206). 
Feedback effects might also account for the more active role of the UK media in fuelling the 
negative salience of immigration compared to Australia, and the respective policy preferences 
of institutions and stakeholders in both cases. Despite the recent relaxation of labour 
immigration controls among traditional destination and reluctant states alike, the differences 
in their immigration politics appear to be enduring. 
 
Conclusions 
What, then, are the broader implications of this study? Can the findings of these cases be 
extrapolated to other traditional destination and reluctant states? Given that considerable 
diversity exists within these categories, any generalisations should be made with caution, 
particularly since these two cases contain various traits that set them apart from other states.  
Australia’s geographical isolation gives it an abnormal capacity to control immigration flows, 
but also means that it has to work harder to attract immigrants, even compared to other 
traditional destination states. For more complex reasons, the UK has long been regarded as an 
exceptional case among the reluctant states.  
 
This thesis has nonetheless shown that, with respect to the central research question outlined 
in Chapter 1, policy legacies had a significant impact on the processes and dynamics that 
shaped labour immigration selection and control decisions during the recent wave of 
international migration. As the case studies demonstrate, a nation’s past immigration policy 
experiences shape its policy-making structures, as well as institutional and stakeholder policy 
preferences, which are core constituent components of a nation’s immigration politics. The 
UK case shows that even when reluctant states implement liberal labour immigration policies, 
these characteristics tend to create feedback effects that make it difficult for reform to be 
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durable. The relationship between immigration policy and politics thus becomes self-
reinforcing.  
 
This does not necessarily mean that states are forever bound to their status as a traditional 
destination or reluctant state. The US has shown many of the hallmarks of the latter model in 
recent years. Australia became increasingly ‘reluctant’ in the two decades prior to the Howard 
government’s election, and there are signs that its immigration politics may be entering 
another transitional phase. Conversely, UK governments have recently established 
mechanisms for labour immigration policy to be made in a more considered, deliberative and 
formalised manner. This may mean that possible consequences of government decisions will 
be assessed more carefully, which would provide for greater stability in its immigration 
politics.  
 
In any case, this thesis has shown that although they may be resilient, the institutions that help 
to make a nation’s immigration policy and shape its politics will inevitably undergo a process 
of adaptation in response to changing contexts. As Freeman argues, the politics of 
immigration during the ‘good times’ of economic growth exhibit distinct traits to those during 
the ‘bad times’ of economic stagnation. This thesis has looked at the reasons for policy 
change in the context of a ‘good times dynamic’ that has since been resolutely swept away by 
a global economic downturn, the consequences of which are yet to be fully realised. Whatever 
change the future brings, the contexts of national-level labour immigration policy will 
undoubtedly change with them.  
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEWEES – AUSTRALIAN CASE STUDY 
 
Jose Alvarez, Deputy Manager – NSW Branch, Immigration Department (4/4/08) 
 
Kevin Andrews, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, 2007 (12/3/08) 
 
Paul Bidwell, General Manager – Membership and Policy, Commerce Queensland (24/1/08) 
 
Roger Boland, National Industrial Relations Director, Australian Industry Group, 1971-2000 
(13/2/08) 
 
Nick Bolkus, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 1993-96 (1/2/08) 
 
David Buckingham, Executive Director, Business Council of Australia, 1996-2001 (5/9/08) 
 
Geoff Bull, Principal Employee Relations and Legal Consultant, Australian Mines and Metals 
Association (12/2/08) 
 
Sharan Burrow, President of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, 2000-2009 (12/3/08) 
 
Patrick Coleman, Director of Policy, Business Council of Australia (4/2/08) 
 
Chris Conybeare, Secretary, Immigration Department, 1990-96 (21/2/08) 
 
Bert Dennis, President, Australian Population Institute, 1998-2006 (31/1/08) 
 
Penny Gale, General Manager – Policy and International Business, Business SA (8/4/08) 
 
Wayne Gibbons, Deputy Secretary, Immigration Department, 1969-93 (19/3/08) 
 
Philippa Godwin, former Deputy Secretary, Immigration Department (19/3/08) 
 
Jenny Goldie, National President, Sustainable Population Australia (19/2/08) 
 
Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer, Master Builders Australia (3/3/08) 
 
Tony Harris, Deputy Secretary, Immigration Department, 1986-1990 (4/3/08) 
 
Bill Healey, Director – National Affairs, Australian Hotels Association (26/2/08) 
 
Peter Hendy, Chief Executive, Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2002-2008 
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